The following is an exact copy of the 1st investigatory interview
My thoughts are added underneath each part.
ACAS Guidelines on Establishing the Facts:
When investigating a disciplinary matter take care to deal with the employee in a fair and reasonable manner. The nature and extent of the investigations will depend on the seriousness of the matter and the more serious it is then the more thorough the investigation should be. It is important to keep an open mind and look for evidence which supports the employee’s case as well as evidence against.
Perry Webb Investigatory Interview
15 January 2009
Tanner Row, York
Perry Webb (PW) - Driver
Stephen Percival (SP) - Driver Manager
Ashley Judge (note taker)
1. SP Outlined to PW that the objective of this meeting to investigate an incident whereby unit no 185119 had been withdrawn from traffic due to allegations about defects.
Firstly, SP stated that the unit had been withdrawn from traffic. (see 6). “Withdrawn from traffic due to allegations about defects”. Notice he says withdrawn due to allegations about defects and not about the near miss report. The defects were real and existed at the time, noise and wipers were proven on the depot, the horn was tested and found working, nothing new there as this is always the case on a depot.
2. SP Explained the aim of the investigation was to ascertain all the facts of the incident and the importance of being open and honest.
SP explains that the objective was to ascertain all the facts of the incident and the importance of being open and honest. Ascertain all the facts! Which we will see as the investigation continued that major points were not ascertained. I was nothing but open and honest and freely explained everything.
3. SP asked PW if he had filled in a defect slip form (TPE 122063) and stated on this form that he had had a near miss.
See (4) below
4. PW admitted that he had put this on the form, but also confirmed that he had NOT had a near miss, he admitted that he had noted this down to get a reaction and have the problems on the unit looked at. The unit was very noisy and drafty and the wipers and warning horn did not work correctly.
I then went on to admit everything, explaining that there was no near miss, SP states, “He admitted he had noted this down to get a reaction”. A reaction intent on getting the faults finally rectified, no other ulterior motive as he is suggesting. I then explained the unit was (a) noisy, (b) wipers not working correctly and (c) warning horn not working correctly.
5. SP Explained that the defect slip did not have any details on it at all in regards to the drivers name, unit number etc. PW admitted this had been done in error as he had filled it in and then there was a unit swap and so he had been interrupted, this had not been done intentionally and he thought he had sent it fully completed.
I had not intentionally missed off my name on the defect slip, there was a unit swap at York which caused confusion and interrupted me. A basic simple error.
6. SP further explained that this this had been noted in the control log and the unit had been removed from traffic.SP explained that FTPE had taken the safety allegations seriously and the control log stated that the unit had been stopped at Ardwick due to the nature of the report in the defect book, which had led to short formations.
SP Now makes it clear that the unit was not allowed back into service from Ardwick Depot, due to my allegations in the repair book. The only concern for Siemens is surely the defects listed, the near miss report whether happened or not has no bearing on them keeping this train out of service, that is IF they have rectified all the defects. They clearly had time to do this, but they opted to keep the unit out of traffic, why? What possible further investigations did they carry out?
7. PW Commented that this was his desired reaction and that maybe something would now be done about the long list of defects he had submitted. PW further commented that he had copies of all his previous slips and would if nothing was done, submit these to the HMRI as he had done in the past with Arriva, who had been investigated because of this.
SP states, “That this was his desired reaction”, making it sound as if my only intention was to make sure a train was kept out of service, the only reaction I wanted was the defects sorting out. If I had wanted that unit taking out of service, I would have asked for this at the time.
8. SP pointed out that the TPE100 standard report form (14/01/09) made no mention of the near miss, and only reported the noise defect.
SP points out that the “near miss”, was not mentioned on the report form 100, I explained in number 4 above, there was no near miss.
9. PW Repeated that he would like these matters taken seriously and dealt with and had tried all different approaches to get this done and felt that defect entries "tested at depot" was not a helpful way to resolve these issues.
I explain that I wanted the defects taken seriously because they are always ignored, I have tried different approaches (but why should I have to do this), and sick of the same old answers, “tested on depot”, which is exactly what happened again!
10. SP reminded PW that TPE took a near miss incident very seriously and PW agreed that if there had been a near miss he would have reported this correctly, SP confirmed that PW fully understood the correct reporting procedure.
SP continues to mention a near miss that never happened, I explained again, there was no near miss and that if there had been I would have reported it to the signal box.
11. SP clarified that PW reported this near miss in an attempt to get action on repairs and a near miss did not occur.
SP Finally or so I think understands, the reported near miss never happened and that it was done to get action on repairs.
12. SP advised PW that this was not the correct procedure and PW acknowledged this.
SP states, “Not the correct procedure”.
13. SP Closed the investigation by reminding PW that he may be questioned again in the future in regards to this incident.
SP, kept making the point that TPE had taken these safety allegations very seriously, but from the tone of the interview it was obvious to me that the real issue was the train being kept at Ardwick leading to a short formation the following morning. Regarding this, Siemens carried out 3 checks, 2 of which proved me right, which were noise and wipers. The warning horn got the usual bog standard response. Once these were checked, what was the reason that stopped this train from entering service on time?
As for the usual response, it clearly goes against your own fleet update, period 10 protocol, which states the following.
“NFF or working on arrival at depot shall no longer be acceptable answers”.
Class 185 horns
The issue of class 185 air horn defects is one problem about which FTPE drivers wish to know what is happening. Since introduction, horn faults have become prevalent during the winter months especially during damp conditions. A number of alterations to the system have already been on carried out in the form of pressure regulators, non-return valves, settings and adjustments. We have discussed the matter further with Siemens and the following protocol will now be followed:-
• Reported horn defects will be endorsed as "checked against specification", with details
of rectification work or found to be compliant with specification (as applicable).
• 'NFF' or 'working on arrival' at depot shall no longer be acceptable answers.
• Siemens producing an action plan for managing and rectifying horn faults.
• Assistance from FTPE to investigate in service and provide the necessary detailed
information on the reported fault.
We will update on progress with this matter.
I would like you to bear the above in mind and SP`s words, “ FTPE had taken the safety allegations very seriously “.
Please also note, I was not asked once about how the warning horn behaved that morning in question.