CHANGES REQUIRED NOW! (TPE CONTINGENCY PLANS & RULE BOOK)
*Emails have been sent to CEO Tim O'Toole and ASLEF (Mick Whelan) requesting their help in changing the Rule Book and TPE Contingency Plans*.
Of Course like always their IGNORANCE is everywhere, its now January 2014 and has anything been done to help prevent the only possible outcome from this IGNORANCE which is quite simply DEATH, does a leopard change its spots? You really are a bunch of pathetic backward morons, a risk assessment is all it would take, something none of you shamefully understand.
To Paul Watson & Mark Atkinson, when are you going to make changes to TPE contingency plans and recommendations to change the rule book wording when dealing with a partial failure of the warning horn? Because if you cannot see the DANGER`S, god help the railway.
REMEMBER: “That any unsafe activity is immediately stopped and prevented from continuing until adequate measures have been taken to reduce the risk associated with that activity to as low as reasonably practicable”. Your words, not mine!
UNSAFE ACTIVITY: Running a class 185 train with a partially defective warning horn at speeds up to 100mph.
WHY UNSAFE? Because:
"Since introduction, horn faults have become prevalent during the winter months especially during damp conditions".
"a number of failures of one or both warning horns in the freezing conditions were also experienced, over and above those blocked with snow”.
"The first fault to emerge was that the warning horns on the trains can be affected by either, freezing fog or snowy conditions, with one or both of the two horn tones affected depending on the severity of the weather”.
“for reasons that we don`t fully understand a build up of snow and ice in and around the compressor air inlets caused a complete blockage”.
"train 185103 ended up with no tones of the warning horn working".
"Unable to test at depot 01.30am”.
"as there is always the possibility that the other horn would fail".
"The train remained in service, when it should have been removed".
"The unit stayed in service was putting the safety of staff on the railway at risk”.
Then there is the "scenario situation", which is shown below, that clearly, beyond any doubt whatsoever shows that there is the possibility with the right set of circumstances that injury or death WILL HAPPEN one day.
STOPPED OR PREVENTED?: We can only live in hope!
ADEQUATE MEASURES?: Will our prayers be answered?
REDUCE THE RISK?: We live in hope with our prayers!
WHY DO I SAY THIS?: Because the IGNORANCE of these manager`s is the largest stumbling block to overcome, they are proven liars and at the moment cover each other`s backs, they are blinded by their power and therefore incapable of seeing and realising that their mistakes put the safety of many people in the railway industry at risk! If I was a religious person, prayers would be all I had, because even the most optimistic person in the world would have no faith that they would see sense.
CONTINGENCY PLANS: Allow a train with a partially defective warning horn to run at speeds of up to 100mph and remain in service indefinitely, these trains go onto a depot for repair and come of the depot with the same warning horn failure because of issues like, "Unable to test at depot 01.30am”! See the sections of, "Warning Horns (The Shocking Truth)", for many more issues.
Bearing in mind the usual scenario: It is a cold damp day and you already have a partial failure of the warning horn, you are travelling at 100mph which the contingency plans in conjunction with the rule book allow, when you encounter an area of bends and bridges, as you travel round one of these bends you see in front of you approximately 1000 feet away a group of track workers (this could be young children or anyone).
You immediately push your warning horn upwards, you get no response! Remembering at this speed you are travelling at 150 feet per second, (approx 7 seconds to impact). If you don`t actually freeze through the shock, (150 feet per second), you then push the lever downwards, (150 feet per second), nothing happens! Should anyone have to go through this sort of traumatic event? WHAT NEXT?
Spare a thought for the driver, the emergency service personnel, the police and the relatives and friends of the deceased, and all because a group of managers were IGNORANT!
THEREFORE THESE CONTINGENCY PLANS ARE A DANGER TO ANYONE ON OR AROUND THE RAILWAY. THEY MUST BE CHANGED.
Further enhanced in Mark Atkinson's own words.
“32 There was a discussion as to whether or not the horn defect was a partial failure or a full
failure. This was in reference to the fact that the 185 trains have two tones on their horns. If there is a partial failure, i.e. one of the horn tones fails but the other remains working, then the procedure for Drivers is to report the issue at the soonest convenience as there is always the possibility that the other horn would fail".
RULE BOOK: Use of wording that does not denote a mandatory outcome therefore leaving it open to interpretation.
The key words are CONVENIENT (stop your train at the first CONVENIENT opportunity).
Another key word is MAY (The first CONVENIENT opportunity MAY include the next scheduled station or other stopping point on the journey, or when detained at a stop signal showing a stop aspect).
The final key word is IF (IF reporting the defect will cause delay, you must inform the signaler the reason for the delay).
CONVENIENT: Suitable or favorable to one`s comfort, purpose or needs.
MAY: Used to indicate a certain measure of likelihood or possibility.
IF: In the event that.
All of these 3 key words do not express a mandatory outcome, they are open to a person`s interpretation. If TPE management require drivers to comply to their interpretation of these rules then they should make it known and because in their eyes any other interpretation other than theirs warrants dismissal they should strive to get the wording of this ruling re-worded.
Therefore to expect every driver to understand the rule book on a partial failure of the warning horn in the way that you decide is right, means that you MUST change the wording to something that actually denotes an action MUST be carried out.
MUST: Having an outcome that is MANDATORY.
That is if you want to prevent:
"The train remained in service, when it should have been removed".
"The unit stayed in service was putting the safety of staff on the railway at risk”.
And more importantly the possible death's of many people.
THEREFORE THE WORDING OF THIS RULE BOOK IS A DANGER TO ANYONE ON OR AROUND THE RAILWAY. IT MUST BE CHANGED.
Paul Watson & Mark Atkinson and also Nick Donovan, if the above is something that cannot possibly be true or indeed happen then I am accusing you three individuals of IGNORANCE at the highest possible level, an IGNORANCE TOWARDS SAFETY, I am telling the world. So do something about me and this website, stand up for yourselves.
I am doing this because I can see the danger's that you three should also see. You however are in a position of power and with the grade of job you are in should be able to understand what I am saying, you should have done something about this 5 years ago.
You should have done something about this back in 2006 when it became apparent there was a serious issue with these warning horns.
You didn't even carry out a basic risk assessment, you really lack the knowledge required to be in charge of a rail operating company and its drivers. How do I know this?
Because I carried out the risk assessment for you, in my "scenario situation" and the saying, "FAULTY EQUIPMENT COMBINED WITH DISTRACTION AND IGNORANCE = DEATH".
PROPOSED CHANGES TO THE RULE BOOK WORDING
Let me change the rule book wording for you, because you as a management fail to see the danger this ruling causes at the moment despite Route Driver Manager Mark Atkinson stating,"as there is always the possibility that the other horn would fail".
Partial failure of a warning horn ruling at present:
Proposed Changes:
b) Partial failure:
If the warning horn becomes partially defective (for example one tone not working) on a train which is in service, you must:
STOP immediately ("as there is always the possibility that the other horn could fail"), Tell the signaller, who will inform the train operators control and continue at caution being able to stop short of any persons on or around the trackside. In all cases, 20mph should be the maximum speed.
The above changes are BASIC COMMON SENSE, they are a product of the risk assessment that I carried out.
This however is something you Paul Watson as Head of Operational Safety should have carried out back in 2006 when the warning horn failures became apparent, my "near miss remark" was not made out of being malicious or being a trouble causer, it was made out of my risk assessment and FEAR that eventually someone will be badly injured or killed because of the risks involved in running a train with a partially defective warning horn at speeds up to 100mph when as your own Route Driver Manager Mark Atkinson states, "as there is always the possibility that the other horn could fail".
If Mark Atkinson was aware of his statement and its implications then surely being in the position of Route Driver Manager he should have acted to make sure the risk was as minimal as possible.
Amazingly my dismissal was down to the very issue of, "as there is always the possibility that the other horn could fail". My method of trying to explain what could happen running a train with a partially defective warning horn is because of the above statement made by Mark Atkinson, this is what I was screaming out could happen!!!
SO WHY WAS I DISMISSED WHEN MARK ATKINSON CAN PLAINLY SEE THE DANGER THIS CAUSES? YET HE FAILED TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT THIS, YOU HAVE TO ASK YOURSELF, WHY? Personally his failure to deal with such a serious and dangerous problem that could easily lead to death should at the very least lead to him being on a charge of gross misconduct for endangering life and above all else IGNORANCE TO SAFETY.
Not one of my hard hitting reports was done out of being malicious, they were always written from a perspective of "SAFETY IS PARAMOUNT", my dismissal was simply down to you and your management not being able to comprehend just how serious my reports were and deal with them, also knowing that to act on some of my concerns would cost you money, therefore you took the easy option and shot the messenger, there isn`t one of you that can look me in the face and say the above isn`t true.
Why you allowed the IGNORANCE over the years to continue, only you can answer, but please remember, the IGNORANCE is on this website for the whole world to witness, it can never be erased, it is this IGNORANCE that will eventually be the DOWNFALL of every single one of you except maybe Ged Higgins and possibly one other individual.
REMEMBER THIS: I AM HERE FOREVER.
HOW APT
b) Partial failure:
If the warning horn becomes partially defective (for example one tone not working) on a train which is in service, you must:
STOP immediately ("as there is always the possibility that the other horn could fail"), Tell the signaller, who will inform the train operators control and continue at caution being able to stop short of any persons on or around the trackside. In all cases, 20mph should be the maximum speed.
The above changes are BASIC COMMON SENSE, they are a product of the risk assessment that I carried out.
This however is something you Paul Watson as Head of Operational Safety should have carried out back in 2006 when the warning horn failures became apparent, my "near miss remark" was not made out of being malicious or being a trouble causer, it was made out of my risk assessment and FEAR that eventually someone will be badly injured or killed because of the risks involved in running a train with a partially defective warning horn at speeds up to 100mph when as your own Route Driver Manager Mark Atkinson states, "as there is always the possibility that the other horn could fail".
If Mark Atkinson was aware of his statement and its implications then surely being in the position of Route Driver Manager he should have acted to make sure the risk was as minimal as possible.
Amazingly my dismissal was down to the very issue of, "as there is always the possibility that the other horn could fail". My method of trying to explain what could happen running a train with a partially defective warning horn is because of the above statement made by Mark Atkinson, this is what I was screaming out could happen!!!
SO WHY WAS I DISMISSED WHEN MARK ATKINSON CAN PLAINLY SEE THE DANGER THIS CAUSES? YET HE FAILED TO DO ANYTHING ABOUT THIS, YOU HAVE TO ASK YOURSELF, WHY? Personally his failure to deal with such a serious and dangerous problem that could easily lead to death should at the very least lead to him being on a charge of gross misconduct for endangering life and above all else IGNORANCE TO SAFETY.
Not one of my hard hitting reports was done out of being malicious, they were always written from a perspective of "SAFETY IS PARAMOUNT", my dismissal was simply down to you and your management not being able to comprehend just how serious my reports were and deal with them, also knowing that to act on some of my concerns would cost you money, therefore you took the easy option and shot the messenger, there isn`t one of you that can look me in the face and say the above isn`t true.
Why you allowed the IGNORANCE over the years to continue, only you can answer, but please remember, the IGNORANCE is on this website for the whole world to witness, it can never be erased, it is this IGNORANCE that will eventually be the DOWNFALL of every single one of you except maybe Ged Higgins and possibly one other individual.
REMEMBER THIS: I AM HERE FOREVER.
HOW APT