On the 14th January 2009, I wrote the following entry on a class 185 repair book sheet.
REPAIR BOOK PAGE 122063 DATED 14th January 2009
REPAIR BOOK ENTRY READS
"Noise and draught through drivers side door drop down window. Noise levels excessive.
Windscreen wiper only works on fast speed intermittently stopping all together. Warning horn took ages till it eventually worked, possibly frozen. All of this combined led to a near miss with p way staff, distracted by noise, unable to obtain a clear view and unable to give adequate warning.
Yet all I ever see is, “tested on depot, ok”. Somebody needs to wake up to these problems and now".
Following on from this report, I had 2 investigatory interviews which can be seen in the section titled, "Investigatory Interviews 1 & 2", following on from the 2 interviews I received a letter outlining the charges against me.
1st Interview on the 15th January 2009
2nd Interview on the 20th January 2009
Letter Below sent on the 5th February 2009
For these comments I ended up with 3 charges of Gross Misconduct. In a letter dated 5th February 2009, I was charged with the following by Route Driver Manager Barry Cook:
1. On Wednesday 14th January you failed to follow the Correct procedure for reporting a defective warning horn.
As we all know, in reporting a defective warning horn there are 2 different procedures
1.2 Reporting defective on-train equipment, (Complete Warning Horn Failure).
a) Stopping train immediately.
You must stop your train as soon as you become aware of a defect on the following equipment and tell the signaller:
b) Stopping train at the first convenient opportunity, (Partial Warning Horn Failure).
You must stop your train at the first convenient opportunity when you become aware of a defect on the following equipment and tell the train operator’s control:
Which of the above 2 procedures have I actually been charged with?
Barry Cook did not know what type of warning horn failure I had on that morning in question, because nowhere in the investigation report is there a section that dealt with the failure of the warning horn. So how could this man possibly come up with this non specific charge totally unrelated to the investigation report?
2. You also failed to follow the correct procedure for reporting a near miss incident, resulting in a train being taken out of service. You subsequently admitted that this was a false allegation.
Did a near miss incident actually happen? No it didn't, therefore if there was such a procedure to follow, there would have been no use reporting something that never happened.
Evidence will show later that when I requested a copy of the correct procedure for reporting a near miss incident, Charlotte Pears responded by simply saying as per the rule book.
When I informed Charlotte that there is no near miss procedure in the rule book, she responded with, "I understand the rule book does not specifically cover "near miss" incidents, however this is covered in Train Driving Competence Standards & Guidance (SC1) ". I cannot find such a procedure to follow anywhere in this booklet.
"Resulting in a train being taken out of service"? That unit was not "taken" out of service, it remained in service till the end of the day when it arrived at Ardwick Depot as planned. TPE however came up with 3 different reasons why this unit stayed out of service (not taken out of service). The following details are copied from my witness statement.
1. (41), “to undergo the necessary safety checks”. These are checks that would/should have happened regardless of the near miss allegation. Therefore it was not kept out of service for the allegation of a near miss; it was kept out of service because safety checks were necessary in other words mandatory.
2. (41a ) But in TPE grounds of resistance, they state the unit was taken out of service, “due to the severity of the allegations within the defect slip”. What was this so called severity?
3. (41b) Yet as we will see later in this investigation, TPE say the following, “As a result of the additional investigations carried out by depot staff”. After you have completed the repairs and tested the equipment, there is no further investigation to carry out.
As for the false allegation, I readily admitted from the outset that the near miss never occurred.
3. You failed to follow the correct procedure for reporting unit defects.
Again, a very non specific charge, funnily enough this charge was dropped at my hearing by Mark Atkinson.
The charges are allegations of Gross Misconduct. If they are upheld you are at risk from summary dismissal.
I could argue the point here that they were not upheld. They as being all 3 charges and that this sentence refers to all 3 needing to be upheld to be at risk of dismissal.
The following is an email I sent to ASLEF and certain named TPE Managers
21st January 2009
To, Stephen Percival, Andrew Steele, Peter Turpin, Barry Cook, ASLEF
REPAIR BOOK ENTRY
" Noise and draft through drivers side door drop down window. Noise levels excessive. Windscreen wiper only works on fast speed, intermittently stopping all together. Warning horn took ages till it eventually worked, possibly frozen. All of this combined led to a near miss with pway staff. Distracted by noise, unable to obtain a clear view and unable to give adequate warning. Yet all I ever see is, " Tested on depot ok ". Somebody needs to wake up to these problems and now".
Dear Stephen, Barry, Andrew, Peter and ASLEF
Please let me explain exactly how I feel about this incident.
I feel once again that you are persecuting me for highlighting failures in health and safety matters. This was the reason after many years as health and safety rep that I resigned the post. All I ever come across is ignorance from yourselves and from Siemens.
How can my entry in that repair book be of such a serious nature that I am taken for a second interview, not given the chance to have representation just like the first interview and then suspended from driving?
Once again the real issue is completely overlooked, the issue that will one day cause the death of some track worker(s). All you seemed bothered about was the " impact to TPE ", exactly what you said in the first interview that, " the train was delayed coming back into service ". Personally I would rather a train be cancelled if it meant saving the life of someone.
Apparently these trains cost around £1,000,000 per carriage, its well documented that you and Siemens have been aware of these so called design faults from the outset, nobody in the right mind would put up with this from a car costing £10,000, yet you sit back and do absolutely nothing.
All of this makes a mockery of your own working principles, your own literature states, " We all have a responsibility to create a safe working environment, which everyday is free from injury ". Please explain how you are being responsible in this matter? Furthermore you set out your own guidelines, they are as follows.
Page 2, 21st January 2009
FIRST SAFETY PRINCIPLES
1. Accepting responsibility for your own safety and for the safety of those working around you.
This is quite simply all I have done, after years of complaining ( documented proof available ) and quite clearly being constantly ignored I had to think of a strategy that might make someone stand up and take notice, what I said is something that one day could easily become reality, there was no malice or rudeness in the wording just an honest opinion of something I feel strongly about. A letter we all received from Vernon Barker dated 21st September 2006 stated, " Safety is our number one priority and we must all play our part in ensuring our stations, trains, and places where we work are safe ". All I am doing is playing my part, sadly though it should never have got this far, you should hang your heads in shame.
2. Working safely at all times.
This is all I have ever tried to do.
3. Reporting anything you think is unsafe, no matter how small you think it may be.
How many times does this matter have to be reported? Thankfully I have proof that its not only myself who has complained. This is not a small matter, its quite simply a matter of life and death, keep playing Russian roulette and eventually you will get shot.
4. Remembering that " if you cannot do it safely, don't do it ". Tell your manager / supervisor why this is and what help you require.
If I was to take this statement literally then by rights every train that this problem occurs on should be taken out of service immediately, " Tell your manager ", how many times? One, twenty, one hundred? I have more than one hundred pieces of documentation, how many more do you want?
5. More management contact with employees to listen to and address safety concerns.
What can I say? Speechless! Especially on these matters.
6. Improved monitoring of and compliance with our policies and procedures.
Certainly require looking at, take for instance your commitment to provide a response to each individuals IPP report, who ever receives a response? Again looks good on paper but in reality? Siemens need to answer why they constantly think that testing on depot at 5mph is adequate and why their response is always, " tested on depot ok to run ". Documented proof available.
7. Better training for safe working to be introduced where required.
Take a look at Siemens Depot in York, I have documented proof that the depot workings required looking at, I even produced a set of risk assessments at the time, but nobody listened. Now look at it, how many incidents have we had? Again only luck saves people from injury or death.
page 3, 21st January 2009
8. Zero tolerance of unsafe behaviours at all levels of the organisation.
ZERO TOLERANCE!!!! I guess allowing trains into service on a daily basis with faulty warning horns, faulty windscreen wipers, inadequate cooling heating systems, having to breathe ETS every day while in the cab and extremely high constant noise levels is safe?
All of the above highlights that you are failing miserably on your very own safety principles. All you ever seem to do is pick fault with your staff, sometimes for the most minor issue, yet look where the real failings are and then ask who is to blame.
At present I am putting together a comprehensive package that beyond any reasonable doubt proves that these major problems have been known from when these units came into service, then after consulting with ASLEF we will look at where to go next, my own personal feeling are such that due to the seriousness involved and the fact that this will one day cause loss of life that this information should be forwarded to the HSE, HMRI, RSSB, Geoffrey Hoon Transport Secretary, the Shadow Transport Secretarys, Hugh Bailey local MP etc, also including Vernon Barker and Moir Lockhead.
I once witnessed a track worker killed at Trafford Park by a Central train, I think you will remember it as at the time I was put through the proverbial mill by your management who accused me of lying. documented proof available, I lost count of how many times I was interviewed. I attended the inquest on my own because nobody from TPE could be bothered to accompany me. I gave a witness testimony of the incident (all documented), I had tried to warn the two track workers by use of my warning horn that a train was approaching them, sadly they only acknowledged me, the Central train did not use his warning horn, one man was injured the other killed. If he had used the warning horn then perhaps there would not have been a fatality, but what if the warning horn was used but failed to work? I think with all the evidence we have about the failure of these horns and the complete disregard to rectify them that someone would be on a manslaughter charge.
Stop blaming the messenger, look at reality.
Yours Sincerely
Perry Webb
Not one of them had the decency to respond, but nothing new there, why break the habit of a lifetime.
You would surely have thought that with such hard hitting complaints I would have received a response.
The following is about the man I witnessed being killed by a train at Trafford Park,
Track worker killed by train
21/ 4/2006
A RAILWAY subcontractor died after he was hit by a high-speed train while working to install safety equipment on a line.
Lindsey Warrington, 60, moved out of the path of one passenger train but was hit by another travelling in the opposite direction at 82mph.
An inquest was told the married father, also known as Les, suffered "dreadful head injuries". He died instantly in the incident at Old Trafford on October 26 last year.
Peter Phillips, a supervisor with a firm Carillion who was standing next to Mr Warrington, when he was hit, said: "I saw a train coming and shouted `Stand clear, lads'. We started to move off. The next thing I was on my back and Les was on the ground next to me. Another train must have come past and knocked us over.
"I don't know if I was knocked over by the train, the draught, or by Les. I was scared to move him in case I made him worse. I dialled 999 and told him I had called for paramedics but he made no response."
Another man was with them when the incident happened next to Manchester United's stadium at about 9.30am but he was standing in a different place and was answering a call on his mobile phone.
REPAIR BOOK ENTRY READS
"Noise and draught through drivers side door drop down window. Noise levels excessive.
Windscreen wiper only works on fast speed intermittently stopping all together. Warning horn took ages till it eventually worked, possibly frozen. All of this combined led to a near miss with p way staff, distracted by noise, unable to obtain a clear view and unable to give adequate warning.
Yet all I ever see is, “tested on depot, ok”. Somebody needs to wake up to these problems and now".
Following on from this report, I had 2 investigatory interviews which can be seen in the section titled, "Investigatory Interviews 1 & 2", following on from the 2 interviews I received a letter outlining the charges against me.
1st Interview on the 15th January 2009
2nd Interview on the 20th January 2009
Letter Below sent on the 5th February 2009
For these comments I ended up with 3 charges of Gross Misconduct. In a letter dated 5th February 2009, I was charged with the following by Route Driver Manager Barry Cook:
1. On Wednesday 14th January you failed to follow the Correct procedure for reporting a defective warning horn.
As we all know, in reporting a defective warning horn there are 2 different procedures
1.2 Reporting defective on-train equipment, (Complete Warning Horn Failure).
a) Stopping train immediately.
You must stop your train as soon as you become aware of a defect on the following equipment and tell the signaller:
b) Stopping train at the first convenient opportunity, (Partial Warning Horn Failure).
You must stop your train at the first convenient opportunity when you become aware of a defect on the following equipment and tell the train operator’s control:
Which of the above 2 procedures have I actually been charged with?
Barry Cook did not know what type of warning horn failure I had on that morning in question, because nowhere in the investigation report is there a section that dealt with the failure of the warning horn. So how could this man possibly come up with this non specific charge totally unrelated to the investigation report?
2. You also failed to follow the correct procedure for reporting a near miss incident, resulting in a train being taken out of service. You subsequently admitted that this was a false allegation.
Did a near miss incident actually happen? No it didn't, therefore if there was such a procedure to follow, there would have been no use reporting something that never happened.
Evidence will show later that when I requested a copy of the correct procedure for reporting a near miss incident, Charlotte Pears responded by simply saying as per the rule book.
When I informed Charlotte that there is no near miss procedure in the rule book, she responded with, "I understand the rule book does not specifically cover "near miss" incidents, however this is covered in Train Driving Competence Standards & Guidance (SC1) ". I cannot find such a procedure to follow anywhere in this booklet.
"Resulting in a train being taken out of service"? That unit was not "taken" out of service, it remained in service till the end of the day when it arrived at Ardwick Depot as planned. TPE however came up with 3 different reasons why this unit stayed out of service (not taken out of service). The following details are copied from my witness statement.
1. (41), “to undergo the necessary safety checks”. These are checks that would/should have happened regardless of the near miss allegation. Therefore it was not kept out of service for the allegation of a near miss; it was kept out of service because safety checks were necessary in other words mandatory.
2. (41a ) But in TPE grounds of resistance, they state the unit was taken out of service, “due to the severity of the allegations within the defect slip”. What was this so called severity?
3. (41b) Yet as we will see later in this investigation, TPE say the following, “As a result of the additional investigations carried out by depot staff”. After you have completed the repairs and tested the equipment, there is no further investigation to carry out.
As for the false allegation, I readily admitted from the outset that the near miss never occurred.
3. You failed to follow the correct procedure for reporting unit defects.
Again, a very non specific charge, funnily enough this charge was dropped at my hearing by Mark Atkinson.
The charges are allegations of Gross Misconduct. If they are upheld you are at risk from summary dismissal.
I could argue the point here that they were not upheld. They as being all 3 charges and that this sentence refers to all 3 needing to be upheld to be at risk of dismissal.
The following is an email I sent to ASLEF and certain named TPE Managers
21st January 2009
To, Stephen Percival, Andrew Steele, Peter Turpin, Barry Cook, ASLEF
REPAIR BOOK ENTRY
" Noise and draft through drivers side door drop down window. Noise levels excessive. Windscreen wiper only works on fast speed, intermittently stopping all together. Warning horn took ages till it eventually worked, possibly frozen. All of this combined led to a near miss with pway staff. Distracted by noise, unable to obtain a clear view and unable to give adequate warning. Yet all I ever see is, " Tested on depot ok ". Somebody needs to wake up to these problems and now".
Dear Stephen, Barry, Andrew, Peter and ASLEF
Please let me explain exactly how I feel about this incident.
I feel once again that you are persecuting me for highlighting failures in health and safety matters. This was the reason after many years as health and safety rep that I resigned the post. All I ever come across is ignorance from yourselves and from Siemens.
How can my entry in that repair book be of such a serious nature that I am taken for a second interview, not given the chance to have representation just like the first interview and then suspended from driving?
Once again the real issue is completely overlooked, the issue that will one day cause the death of some track worker(s). All you seemed bothered about was the " impact to TPE ", exactly what you said in the first interview that, " the train was delayed coming back into service ". Personally I would rather a train be cancelled if it meant saving the life of someone.
Apparently these trains cost around £1,000,000 per carriage, its well documented that you and Siemens have been aware of these so called design faults from the outset, nobody in the right mind would put up with this from a car costing £10,000, yet you sit back and do absolutely nothing.
All of this makes a mockery of your own working principles, your own literature states, " We all have a responsibility to create a safe working environment, which everyday is free from injury ". Please explain how you are being responsible in this matter? Furthermore you set out your own guidelines, they are as follows.
Page 2, 21st January 2009
FIRST SAFETY PRINCIPLES
1. Accepting responsibility for your own safety and for the safety of those working around you.
This is quite simply all I have done, after years of complaining ( documented proof available ) and quite clearly being constantly ignored I had to think of a strategy that might make someone stand up and take notice, what I said is something that one day could easily become reality, there was no malice or rudeness in the wording just an honest opinion of something I feel strongly about. A letter we all received from Vernon Barker dated 21st September 2006 stated, " Safety is our number one priority and we must all play our part in ensuring our stations, trains, and places where we work are safe ". All I am doing is playing my part, sadly though it should never have got this far, you should hang your heads in shame.
2. Working safely at all times.
This is all I have ever tried to do.
3. Reporting anything you think is unsafe, no matter how small you think it may be.
How many times does this matter have to be reported? Thankfully I have proof that its not only myself who has complained. This is not a small matter, its quite simply a matter of life and death, keep playing Russian roulette and eventually you will get shot.
4. Remembering that " if you cannot do it safely, don't do it ". Tell your manager / supervisor why this is and what help you require.
If I was to take this statement literally then by rights every train that this problem occurs on should be taken out of service immediately, " Tell your manager ", how many times? One, twenty, one hundred? I have more than one hundred pieces of documentation, how many more do you want?
5. More management contact with employees to listen to and address safety concerns.
What can I say? Speechless! Especially on these matters.
6. Improved monitoring of and compliance with our policies and procedures.
Certainly require looking at, take for instance your commitment to provide a response to each individuals IPP report, who ever receives a response? Again looks good on paper but in reality? Siemens need to answer why they constantly think that testing on depot at 5mph is adequate and why their response is always, " tested on depot ok to run ". Documented proof available.
7. Better training for safe working to be introduced where required.
Take a look at Siemens Depot in York, I have documented proof that the depot workings required looking at, I even produced a set of risk assessments at the time, but nobody listened. Now look at it, how many incidents have we had? Again only luck saves people from injury or death.
page 3, 21st January 2009
8. Zero tolerance of unsafe behaviours at all levels of the organisation.
ZERO TOLERANCE!!!! I guess allowing trains into service on a daily basis with faulty warning horns, faulty windscreen wipers, inadequate cooling heating systems, having to breathe ETS every day while in the cab and extremely high constant noise levels is safe?
All of the above highlights that you are failing miserably on your very own safety principles. All you ever seem to do is pick fault with your staff, sometimes for the most minor issue, yet look where the real failings are and then ask who is to blame.
At present I am putting together a comprehensive package that beyond any reasonable doubt proves that these major problems have been known from when these units came into service, then after consulting with ASLEF we will look at where to go next, my own personal feeling are such that due to the seriousness involved and the fact that this will one day cause loss of life that this information should be forwarded to the HSE, HMRI, RSSB, Geoffrey Hoon Transport Secretary, the Shadow Transport Secretarys, Hugh Bailey local MP etc, also including Vernon Barker and Moir Lockhead.
I once witnessed a track worker killed at Trafford Park by a Central train, I think you will remember it as at the time I was put through the proverbial mill by your management who accused me of lying. documented proof available, I lost count of how many times I was interviewed. I attended the inquest on my own because nobody from TPE could be bothered to accompany me. I gave a witness testimony of the incident (all documented), I had tried to warn the two track workers by use of my warning horn that a train was approaching them, sadly they only acknowledged me, the Central train did not use his warning horn, one man was injured the other killed. If he had used the warning horn then perhaps there would not have been a fatality, but what if the warning horn was used but failed to work? I think with all the evidence we have about the failure of these horns and the complete disregard to rectify them that someone would be on a manslaughter charge.
Stop blaming the messenger, look at reality.
Yours Sincerely
Perry Webb
Not one of them had the decency to respond, but nothing new there, why break the habit of a lifetime.
You would surely have thought that with such hard hitting complaints I would have received a response.
The following is about the man I witnessed being killed by a train at Trafford Park,
Track worker killed by train
21/ 4/2006
A RAILWAY subcontractor died after he was hit by a high-speed train while working to install safety equipment on a line.
Lindsey Warrington, 60, moved out of the path of one passenger train but was hit by another travelling in the opposite direction at 82mph.
An inquest was told the married father, also known as Les, suffered "dreadful head injuries". He died instantly in the incident at Old Trafford on October 26 last year.
Peter Phillips, a supervisor with a firm Carillion who was standing next to Mr Warrington, when he was hit, said: "I saw a train coming and shouted `Stand clear, lads'. We started to move off. The next thing I was on my back and Les was on the ground next to me. Another train must have come past and knocked us over.
"I don't know if I was knocked over by the train, the draught, or by Les. I was scared to move him in case I made him worse. I dialled 999 and told him I had called for paramedics but he made no response."
Another man was with them when the incident happened next to Manchester United's stadium at about 9.30am but he was standing in a different place and was answering a call on his mobile phone.
Following on from this I was diagnosed with depression, prescribed medication and I went on my planned visit to Thailand to see my wife and son.
Vernon Barker did seem naturally concerned and even arranged for an independent company to investigate my claims, however being off sick with certified sick notes was enough for Charlotte Pears now Mayne to take it upon herself to withdraw the investigation.
I then end up at my hearing and then appeal, from there to my tribunal and then denied an appeal.