EQUITY & CHARGES
The following are two sets of charges both laid by Barry Cook, one in the mind of this man is gross misconduct, can you decide which set of charges it is?
Set 1
Set 2
What are the differences
Which of the above has the most potential to cause a serious problem? Set 1 or Set 2?
Set 1: If the charges were correct, a failure to report a partially defective warning horn would have made no difference to the running of that train, the rule book and the contingency plans allow that train to run without any restrictions.
There quite simply was no near miss, so how could I possibly follow a (so called) procedure for an event that never happened?
Set 2: Approaching a red signal too fast, causing the TPWS to brake the train and then moving the train without permission from the signalman, there are clear dangers involved in these actions with potential for disaster!
I don't have to explain which set of charges received gross misconduct, the question has to be, how in Barry Cook's mind can set 1 be gross misconduct and set 2 isn't? Neither set of charges should be gross misconduct but set 2 has a far greater risk of causing a serious incident.
How and why could the charges set out range from dismissal to a warning?
How: Because Barry Cook can make any decision he likes without being challenged, knowing full well that if he is investigated it is by his own management.
Why: Because as described by Driver Geoff Lee, "Look I understand that Perry was like an irritant that you’re sick of scratching". All I ever had was value's on health and safety issues, I know that sometimes I was outspoken and criticised management, but it was always on issues that required looking at. It is abundantly obvious that Barry Cook wanted an easy life and I was a major threat to this, it also highlights that the issues I was bringing up were clearly of a nature to cause concern, the concerns however were clearly causing this management problems and instead of talking with me, Barry Cook and his management decided that IGNORANCE was the easiest way to deal with it.
The amazing thing about this IGNORANCE is how all my hard hitting reports (over years) on partial and complete failures of the warning horn were systematically IGNORED until they decide to dismiss me. This is when Mark Atkinson and Paul Watson turn a partial failure of a warning horn against me and use my reasoning on the dangers of these failures as can be seen below.
Mark Atkinson Hearing:
"To get yourself noticed and the faults on the train noticed".
"if your so concerned about this train having faults, at the point when you arrived in York, that is the time and place to make sure the train doesn't go any further". "And you didn't".
"But at that point Perry", "your duty is".
"Your concerned about the state of this train".
"not to worry about people getting on and off with cases, deal with what you think is right”.
"If it was really unsafe, you thought you would have done, wouldn't you"?
Mark Atkinson's Witness Statement:
29. "I asserted during the hearing that if Mr Webb was as concerned about the horn defects as he alleged he was, then prior to arriving in York he should have reported the matter immediately and made sure the train did not go any further. In response to this, he admitted that he did not report the matter at the first available opportunity".
37. "In relation to charge one, I found that it had been proven that he had failed to follow the correct procedure for reporting a defective warning horn as he had not done so as soon as the matter arose and that as a result of this action the train had stayed in service which was a risk to those on or about the railway infrastructure".
Paul Watson Appeal:
"So the question is, given that as you have said yourself this was in your view serious because of the implications of warnings on the line obviously, do you think the fact that you knew you that call failed for whatever reason cos you said static you couldn't be heard because of static, do you think that the actions of therefore trying it again, next place up, I think you said Northallerton".
"Yeah but the question I have you see, the thing I am trying to understand is I am taking what you said at face value which is I have got that much concern because of the reasons that you highlighted before I have been involved in this and it was a danger to anybody on the track essentially, and all I am saying is at this stage we have got a partially defective warning horn, there are other methods of communication, there are phone conversations, the conductor on the train has a phone, there are single post telephones, there are a number of ways of raising that issue for the duration of the time that the horn was partially defective. All of which you elected not to use so I just trying to".
"But you can report it to control via the signal box, if you are saying, so effectively what I am saying to you is and this is only my opinion, but you have said to me how important you view this be in terms of a safety equipment failure and you believe that fulfils so if you ask the questions do you believe that fulfils what we call the rule book. Two failed NRM calls, do you think that’s sufficient and Perry to be fair said yes he does. I'm saying I don’t believe it is by a long way".
Paul Watson's Witness Statement:
31 "In relation to paragraph 9.3, (Mr Webb's assertion that he had fully complied with the rule book when reporting the horn defect through making his two unsubstantiated attempts to call the Company's control centre at Darlington and Northallerton) , I clarified, in reference to the procedures, that he had not followed the procedure in the rule book namely that when a Driver becomes aware of a defect on horn equipment, they are to inform the Train Operator's control and the line signaller.
The report for a full horn failure should be made immediately and for a partial failure it should be at the first convenient opportunity which may include the next scheduled station stop, any other stopping point in the journey, or even when detained at a signal following a stop aspect. If reporting the defect would cause a delay, the Driver must then tell the signaller the reason for the delay. I concluded that Mr Webb could and should have delayed his train at either Darlington or Northallerton and called control from the station phones present. I believed he also had the option of using the conductors phone or utilising station staff to do so. He had chosen not to utilise any of these options but instead opted to continue his journey without making a valid report. It appeared to me that if Mr Webb was as concerned as he alleged he was about the defects then he would and should have made further attempts to report the issues on different reporting lines".
So as you can see, they twist my reasoning against me, the same reasoning that they have systematically IGNORED for years. So if my reasoning is now so serious, why didn't they see this before 2009 and right up till the present day?
After all, lets please remember Route Driver Manager Mark Atkinson's famous words.
"as there is always the possibility that the other horn could fail".
"The train remained in service, when it should have been removed".
"The unit stayed in service was putting the safety of staff on the railway at risk”.
"and that as a result of this action the train had stayed in service which was a risk to those on or about the railway infrastructure".
The lack of action towards the evaluation of this event is astounding, the fact that Paul Watson, Head of Operational Safety and Mark Atkinson, Route Driver Manager were so blinkered to see or realise the implications of allowing a train to run with a partially defective warning horn despite
(Mark Atkinson actually stating, "as there is always the possibility that the other horn could fail", also remembering his own evaluation of this, "The unit stayed in service was putting the safety of staff on the railway at risk” and "The train remained in service, when it should have been removed")
is astounding, the possible outcome is as simple as a child being asked 2+2, the child would answer 4, Paul Watson and Mark Atkinson however would still be contemplating an answer!
This lack of action is because to do something about this would be to admit defeat, it would prove that I was right, so safety is compromised at the highest level out of spite and hatred towards me, which actually doesn't affect me in any way whatsoever, but one day could affect the lives of many people. Never forget, if or when this happens, there are many people out there who will be held responsible, but the main two individuals are Paul Watson and Mark Atkinson.
WHAT A SAD AND SORRY STATE OF AFFAIRS THAT THESE TWO INDIVIDUALS HAVE TO BEHAVE
THIS WAY.
Set 1: If the charges were correct, a failure to report a partially defective warning horn would have made no difference to the running of that train, the rule book and the contingency plans allow that train to run without any restrictions.
There quite simply was no near miss, so how could I possibly follow a (so called) procedure for an event that never happened?
Set 2: Approaching a red signal too fast, causing the TPWS to brake the train and then moving the train without permission from the signalman, there are clear dangers involved in these actions with potential for disaster!
I don't have to explain which set of charges received gross misconduct, the question has to be, how in Barry Cook's mind can set 1 be gross misconduct and set 2 isn't? Neither set of charges should be gross misconduct but set 2 has a far greater risk of causing a serious incident.
How and why could the charges set out range from dismissal to a warning?
How: Because Barry Cook can make any decision he likes without being challenged, knowing full well that if he is investigated it is by his own management.
Why: Because as described by Driver Geoff Lee, "Look I understand that Perry was like an irritant that you’re sick of scratching". All I ever had was value's on health and safety issues, I know that sometimes I was outspoken and criticised management, but it was always on issues that required looking at. It is abundantly obvious that Barry Cook wanted an easy life and I was a major threat to this, it also highlights that the issues I was bringing up were clearly of a nature to cause concern, the concerns however were clearly causing this management problems and instead of talking with me, Barry Cook and his management decided that IGNORANCE was the easiest way to deal with it.
The amazing thing about this IGNORANCE is how all my hard hitting reports (over years) on partial and complete failures of the warning horn were systematically IGNORED until they decide to dismiss me. This is when Mark Atkinson and Paul Watson turn a partial failure of a warning horn against me and use my reasoning on the dangers of these failures as can be seen below.
Mark Atkinson Hearing:
"To get yourself noticed and the faults on the train noticed".
"if your so concerned about this train having faults, at the point when you arrived in York, that is the time and place to make sure the train doesn't go any further". "And you didn't".
"But at that point Perry", "your duty is".
"Your concerned about the state of this train".
"not to worry about people getting on and off with cases, deal with what you think is right”.
"If it was really unsafe, you thought you would have done, wouldn't you"?
Mark Atkinson's Witness Statement:
29. "I asserted during the hearing that if Mr Webb was as concerned about the horn defects as he alleged he was, then prior to arriving in York he should have reported the matter immediately and made sure the train did not go any further. In response to this, he admitted that he did not report the matter at the first available opportunity".
37. "In relation to charge one, I found that it had been proven that he had failed to follow the correct procedure for reporting a defective warning horn as he had not done so as soon as the matter arose and that as a result of this action the train had stayed in service which was a risk to those on or about the railway infrastructure".
Paul Watson Appeal:
"So the question is, given that as you have said yourself this was in your view serious because of the implications of warnings on the line obviously, do you think the fact that you knew you that call failed for whatever reason cos you said static you couldn't be heard because of static, do you think that the actions of therefore trying it again, next place up, I think you said Northallerton".
"Yeah but the question I have you see, the thing I am trying to understand is I am taking what you said at face value which is I have got that much concern because of the reasons that you highlighted before I have been involved in this and it was a danger to anybody on the track essentially, and all I am saying is at this stage we have got a partially defective warning horn, there are other methods of communication, there are phone conversations, the conductor on the train has a phone, there are single post telephones, there are a number of ways of raising that issue for the duration of the time that the horn was partially defective. All of which you elected not to use so I just trying to".
"But you can report it to control via the signal box, if you are saying, so effectively what I am saying to you is and this is only my opinion, but you have said to me how important you view this be in terms of a safety equipment failure and you believe that fulfils so if you ask the questions do you believe that fulfils what we call the rule book. Two failed NRM calls, do you think that’s sufficient and Perry to be fair said yes he does. I'm saying I don’t believe it is by a long way".
Paul Watson's Witness Statement:
31 "In relation to paragraph 9.3, (Mr Webb's assertion that he had fully complied with the rule book when reporting the horn defect through making his two unsubstantiated attempts to call the Company's control centre at Darlington and Northallerton) , I clarified, in reference to the procedures, that he had not followed the procedure in the rule book namely that when a Driver becomes aware of a defect on horn equipment, they are to inform the Train Operator's control and the line signaller.
The report for a full horn failure should be made immediately and for a partial failure it should be at the first convenient opportunity which may include the next scheduled station stop, any other stopping point in the journey, or even when detained at a signal following a stop aspect. If reporting the defect would cause a delay, the Driver must then tell the signaller the reason for the delay. I concluded that Mr Webb could and should have delayed his train at either Darlington or Northallerton and called control from the station phones present. I believed he also had the option of using the conductors phone or utilising station staff to do so. He had chosen not to utilise any of these options but instead opted to continue his journey without making a valid report. It appeared to me that if Mr Webb was as concerned as he alleged he was about the defects then he would and should have made further attempts to report the issues on different reporting lines".
So as you can see, they twist my reasoning against me, the same reasoning that they have systematically IGNORED for years. So if my reasoning is now so serious, why didn't they see this before 2009 and right up till the present day?
After all, lets please remember Route Driver Manager Mark Atkinson's famous words.
"as there is always the possibility that the other horn could fail".
"The train remained in service, when it should have been removed".
"The unit stayed in service was putting the safety of staff on the railway at risk”.
"and that as a result of this action the train had stayed in service which was a risk to those on or about the railway infrastructure".
The lack of action towards the evaluation of this event is astounding, the fact that Paul Watson, Head of Operational Safety and Mark Atkinson, Route Driver Manager were so blinkered to see or realise the implications of allowing a train to run with a partially defective warning horn despite
(Mark Atkinson actually stating, "as there is always the possibility that the other horn could fail", also remembering his own evaluation of this, "The unit stayed in service was putting the safety of staff on the railway at risk” and "The train remained in service, when it should have been removed")
is astounding, the possible outcome is as simple as a child being asked 2+2, the child would answer 4, Paul Watson and Mark Atkinson however would still be contemplating an answer!
This lack of action is because to do something about this would be to admit defeat, it would prove that I was right, so safety is compromised at the highest level out of spite and hatred towards me, which actually doesn't affect me in any way whatsoever, but one day could affect the lives of many people. Never forget, if or when this happens, there are many people out there who will be held responsible, but the main two individuals are Paul Watson and Mark Atkinson.
WHAT A SAD AND SORRY STATE OF AFFAIRS THAT THESE TWO INDIVIDUALS HAVE TO BEHAVE
THIS WAY.