_ The following are exact copies of the 2 investigatory interviews.
ACAS Guidelines on Establishing the Facts
When investigating a disciplinary matter take care to deal with the employee in a fair and reasonable manner. The nature and extent of the investigations will depend on the seriousness of the matter and the more serious it is then the more thorough the investigation should be. It is important to keep an open mind and look for evidence which supports the employee’s case as well as evidence against.
Perry Webb Investigatory Interview
15 January 2009
Tanner Row, York
Present:
Perry Webb (PW) - Driver
Stephen Percival (SP) - Driver Manager
Ashley Judge (note taker)
1. SP Outlined to PW that the objective of this meeting to investigate an incident whereby unit no 185119 had been withdrawn from traffic due to allegations about defects.
Firstly, SP stated that the unit had been withdrawn from traffic. (see 6). “Withdrawn from traffic due to allegations about defects”. Notice he says withdrawn due to allegations about defects and not about the near miss report. The defects were real and existed at the time, noise and wipers were proven on the depot, the horn was tested and found working, nothing new there as this is always the case on a depot.
2. SP Explained the aim of the investigation was to ascertain all the facts of the incident and the importance of being open and honest.
SP explains that the objective was to ascertain all the facts of the incident and the importance of being open and honest. Ascertain all the facts! Which we will see as the investigation continued that major points were not ascertained. I was nothing but open and honest and freely explained everything.
3. SP asked PW if he had filled in a defect slip form (TPE 122063) and stated on this form that he had had a near miss.
See (4) below
4. PW admitted that he had put this on the form, but also confirmed that he had NOT had a near miss, he admitted that he had noted this down to get a reaction and have the problems on the unit looked at. The unit was very noisy and drafty and the wipers and warning horn did not work correctly.
I then went on to admit everything, explaining that there was no near miss, SP states, “He admitted he had noted this down to get a reaction”. A reaction intent on getting the faults finally rectified, no other ulterior motive as he is suggesting. I then explained the unit was (a) noisy, (b) wipers not working correctly and (c) warning horn not working correctly.
5. SP Explained that the defect slip did not have any details on it at all in regards to the drivers name, unit number etc. PW admitted this had been done in error as he had filled it in and then there was a unit swap and so he had been interrupted, this had not been done intentionally and he thought he had sent it fully completed.
I had not intentionally missed off my name on the defect slip, there was a unit swap at York which caused confusion and interrupted me. A basic simple error.
6. SP further explained that this this had been noted in the control log and the unit had been removed from traffic. SP explained that FTPE had taken the safety allegations seriously and the control log stated that the unit had been stopped at Ardwick due to the nature of the report in the defect book, which had led to short formations.
SP Now makes it clear that the unit was not allowed back into service from Ardwick Depot, due to my allegations in the repair book. The only concern for Siemens is surely the defects listed, the near miss report whether happened or not has no bearing on them keeping this train out of service, that is IF they have rectified all the defects. They clearly had time to do this, but they opted to keep the unit out of traffic, why? What possible further investigations did they carry out?
7. PW Commented that this was his desired reaction and that maybe something would now be done about the long list of defects he had submitted. PW further commented that he had copies of all his previous slips and would if nothing was done, submit these to the HMRI as he had done in the past with Arriva, who had been investigated because of this.
SP states, “That this was his desired reaction”, making it sound as if my only intention was to make sure a train was kept out of service, the only reaction I wanted was the defects sorting out. If I had wanted that unit taking out of service, I would have asked for this at the time. But we all know, TPE never take units with a partial failure of the warning horn out of service.
8. SP pointed out that the TPE100 standard report form (14/01/09) made no mention of the near miss, and only reported the noise defect.
SP points out that the “near miss”, was not mentioned on the report form 100, I explained in number 4 above, there was no near miss. I cannot report something that never happened to the signaller.
9. PW Repeated that he would like these matters taken seriously and dealt with and had tried all different approaches to get this done and felt that defect entries "tested at depot" was not a helpful way to resolve these issues.
I explain that I wanted the defects taken seriously because they are always ignored, I have tried different approaches (but why should I have to do this), and sick of the same old answers, “tested on depot”, which is exactly what happened again!
10. SP reminded PW that TPE took a near miss incident very seriously and PW agreed that if there had been a near miss he would have reported this correctly, SP confirmed that PW fully understood the correct reporting procedure.
SP continues to mention a near miss that never happened, I explained again, there was no near miss and that if there had been I would have reported it to the signal box.
11. SP clarified that PW reported this near miss in an attempt to get action on repairs and a near miss did not occur.
SP Finally or so I think understands, the written fabrication of a near miss never happened and that it was done to get action on repairs.
12. SP advised PW that this was not the correct procedure and PW acknowledged this.
SP states, “Not the correct procedure”.
13. SP Closed the investigation by reminding PW that he may be questioned again in the future in regards to this incident.
SP, kept making the point that TPE had taken these safety allegations very seriously, but from the tone of the interview it was obvious to me that the real issue was the train being kept at Ardwick leading to a short formation the following morning. Regarding this, Siemens carried out 3 checks, 2 of which proved me right, which were noise and wipers. The warning horn got the usual bog standard response. Once these were checked, what was the reason that stopped this train from entering service on time?
As for the usual response, it clearly goes against your own fleet update, period 10 protocol, which states the following.
“NFF or working on arrival at depot shall no longer be acceptable answers”.
Class 185 horns
The issue of class 185 air horn defects is one problem about which FTPE drivers wish to know what is happening. Since introduction, horn faults have become prevalent during the winter months especially during damp conditions. A number of alterations to the system have already been on carried out in the form of pressure regulators, non-return valves, settings and adjustments. We have discussed the matter further with Siemens and the following protocol will now be followed:-
• Reported horn defects will be endorsed as "checked against specification", with details
of rectification work or found to be compliant with specification (as applicable).
• 'NFF' or 'working on arrival' at depot shall no longer be acceptable answers.
• Siemens producing an action plan for managing and rectifying horn faults.
• Assistance from FTPE to investigate in service and provide the necessary detailed
information on the reported fault.
We will update on progress with this matter.
I would like you to bear the above in mind and SP`s words, “ FTPE had taken the safety allegations very seriously “.
Please also note, I was not asked once about how the warning horn behaved that morning in question.
2nd Investigatory Interview
Investigatory Interview Notes
Attendees:
Stephen Percival (SP) Investigating Officer
Perry Webb (PW) York Driver
Andrew Steele (AS) Note Taker
Location: DOM`s Office, York Station Date: Tuesday 20/01/09 Time: 2100 - 2130hrs
1. SP Started off by explaining that it was an investigatory interview on-going from last Thursday`s interview and that he had a few area`s to clarify and a few more questions to ask. SP explained that his role as investigating officer was not to be judgmental or apportion blame, but to ascertain the facts so a full and accurate report could be formulated.
SP started by saying that as investigating officer he was "not to be judgmental or apportion blame but to ascertain the facts so a full and accurate report could be formulated".
2. PW said he would be prepared to cover the shunt job after the interview was completed.
3. SP said this would not be necessary as cover had been provided.
SP says this is not necessary as my job has been covered. This straight away suggests that the outcome of this investigatory interview is all ready predetermined, SP has no idea what I will say but has already decided my outcome. He is already being judgmental before we start.
4. SP asked if PW had any lifestyle issues that may have influenced his behaviour or actions.
The only thing that ever influenced my behaviour was their constant ignorance of my reports, the more they ignored me, the more hard hitting the reports became, the only reason I gave up on Health & Safety after many years was down to their IGNORANCE, and as I will show in a later report, how they blatantly lied to the Office of the Rail Regulator (evidence is on official letter headed paper) that I had never informed TPE of certain Health and Safety issues, which of course I have proof that I informed them but they IGNORED me.
I will also show proof of how they even ignored the BUPA Doctor`s report after they sent me to see Dr Pearlman because they thought I was mentally unstable! I found this out and much more when I requested my medical files from BUPA.
5. PW Replied that he had no lifestyle issues.
6. SP Asked for clarification as to which driving cabs had been used York - Newcastle and Newcastle - York.
7. PW Was unsure however he confirmed that the Newcastle - York was in the cab where he made his report.
8. SP Verified that this was the 54 car as this was the vehicle with the reported faults.
9. SP Asked what the weather conditions were during the journey.
10. PW Said it was mostly rainy and it was cold. PW thought that it might be cold enough to cause freezing problems with the horn. He was unsure about the weather conditions on arrival at York.
SP asked me about weather conditions, I replied it was rainy and cold and that I thought it might be cold enough to cause freezing problems with the horn, (major point). Unsure of weather conditions on arrival at York, (major point).
I actually told them that it was below freezing in the North East area and that the nearer to York we traveled, the milder the weather became. I do have weather charts to prove what I said was true.
I was never given the chance to verify either of the investigation minutes with my signature, so could never challenge their validity.
11. SP Asked when PW had filled out the defect slip.
12. PW Replied partly at Darlington and partly at Northallerton and that he had no time to finish it at Northallerton.He then completely forgot to fill out the rest of the form.
13. SP Asked where PW had placed the repair book at Northallerton.
14. PW Replied that the book was placed on top of the TMS console.
15.SP Asked if PW informed the relieving driver about the defects.
16. PW replied definately about the wiper and possibly about the other defects.
17. SP Asked if he could remember who relieved him at York.
SP asked if I knew who the relieving driver was, and had I informed him of the defects, (major point).
18. PW Was unsure suggesting it may have been Gav Tomlinson or a Manchester Driver.
Confusion was such, that I did briefly speak with the relieving Driver who I think was Gavin Tomlinson, but cannot honestly remember, but as Manchester Drivers do not sign Middlesbrough, I assume it was Gavin.
Why didn`t Stephen Percival ask the relieving Driver for a report on what happened when he relieved me at York?
Why wasn`t any Driver who drove the unit that day after me asked for a report?
19. SP then asked if PW had attempted to report the faults during the journey from Newcastle.
20. PW Informed SP that he had tried to contact maintenance control twice using the NRN, firstly after leaving Darlington and again after leaving Northallerton but couldn`t get through due to poor reception (static).
21. SP Asked PW when did he complete his standard report form.
22. PW Said he completed and faxed it to control at the end of his shift.
I said completed and faxed to control, (major point).
23. SP asked if this had jogged PW`s memory about the defect slip.
24. PW Said it hadn`t adding that he fills so many in.
It hadn`t because of how many I fill in, (major point).
25. SP Asked if there had been any distractions or incidents during his shift.
26. PW Initially said no, but later said that he had been informed by his conductor before arriving in York that a unit swap would take place at York. PW also explained that on arrival in York, the platform screens were still showing his train as going forward and that he informed the acting DOM and the conductor of this as passengers were boarding the train. PW was unsure where his unit went to.
I explain that the conductor informed of a set swap at York, the screens still showed us as being an Airport service and that passengers were boarding thinking this. I informed the Dom and conductor of this, I did also mention that I went to help and stop people boarding this train, (major point).
27. SP asked PW to confirm if he had recently had a conversation with Driver Manager Peter Turpin concerning the correct content and structure of reports and advice to keep to the correct format in the future. SP understood that P. Turpin had advised PW to contact the Driver Managers should he need advice regarding reports.
Why? Halfway through an investigation would SP suddenly mention a recent conversation that I had with Manager Peter Turpin, (This is not factual to this incident or in line with ACAS guidelines, but then TPE don`t work to ACAS guidelines), ACAS guideline states, “Any investigatory meeting should be conducted by a management representative and should be confined to establishing the facts of the case”, (major point).
SP goes on to say that the conversation I had with Manager Peter Turpin concerned the correct content and structure of reports and advice to keep to the correct format in future.
Firstly this was an informal chat between ourselves, not a discipline, not a verbal or written warning. So how would SP find out about the content of our chat? Then as we will see in his investigation report he obtained a letter from Peter Turpin explaining our chat, which is more than I received. It`s very evident already what is going on here.
28. PW acknowledged that such a conversation had taken place and that P. Turpin had had a quiet word with him to tone down reports.
SP again relates back to this informal chat, (irrelevant and not factual to this investigation), and asks why I felt the need to make up the allegations of a near miss
29. SP asked in view of this why PW had felt the need to make up allegations of a near miss incident.
30. PW Replied that he felt strongly about in his view the inaction of Siemens with this type of fault and that he was sick of Siemens ignoring reports. PW referred to repair slips in other books and fault slips that had been left in his pigeon hole previously by other drivers. He also mentioned that he had had faults with warning horns and wipers in the past. PW said that he had spoken to maintenance controllers in the past and been informed by them that these faults were common on the class 185`s. PW went on to say that he had made up the near miss incident to give Siemens a short sharp shock and get someone listening and not bury their head in the sand.
31. PW Then went on to say if this disciplinary action go`s further, mentioning firstly ASLEF and then he would go to the following. Geoff Hoon the Transport Secretary, The Shadow Secretary and the HMRI.
32. PW Then mentioned that he had witnessed a fatality about two years ago in the Trafford Park area involving a p way worker and a Central Trains service.He had attended Stockport Coroners Court as a witness and it was found that the Central Trains Driver had not sounded a warning as he had been blinded by low sunlight. PW said the incident had a great impact upon him. PW also mentioned that G.Hill (York Driver) had been in the cab route learning.
33. SP Asked PW why he had not followed P. Turpin`s advice regarding reports.
SP once more brings up the point about the conversation with Peter Turpin, again this is not factual to this incident and in any case was not a recorded discipline, it is irrelevant but he keeps pushing it on me. For what reason? Why?
34. PW Said he felt so strongly about the issue he wanted to ensure something was done.
35. SP Asked if PW had anything else to add.
36. PW Repeated what he said about the fatality.
37. SP Then recapped what was said during the interview and again asked if PW had anything else to add.
38. PW Agreed with the content of SP`s recap and mentioned that he had nothing further to add.
39. SP Said that after consideration of the evidence that he had available and in view of the serious nature of the allegations that he felt it necessary to place PW on investigatory suspension with immediate effect. SP Explained that this was not a disciplinary measure and that PW would receive full basic pay whilst this was effective.SP said that he would confirm his decision in writing the following day and asked PW for his address.
SP mentions the nature of the allegations as of a “serious nature”, if it is that serious then why didn`t he carry out a thorough investigation? As from the ACAS guidelines, “the more serious it is then the more thorough the investigation should be”.
40. SP Told PW that while on investigatory suspension he was not to report for duty or travel on FTPE services.
41. PW Mentioned that he was aware of the procedure as he had been through it before and that he had been off for 3 weeks on that occasion. PW also mentioned that he thought this reaction was harsh and asked if it was SP making the decision or somebody above.
Off for 3 weeks with charges of a near mirror image nature. These charges however, only resulted in a reprimand! The details of this reprimand will appear later.
42. SP Assured PW that it was his decision and that he felt it justified owing to the seriousness of the allegations and the impact that it had on the business.
SP said it was his decision and that he felt it justified owing to the seriousness of the allegation and the impact it had on business. SP at the very beginning of this interview states, “as investigating officer he was not to be judgmental”.
43. PW Asked if the impact on business was the important thing.
44. SP Said this was a consideration although his main concern was the false allegation of a near miss incident.
I ask SP if the impact on business is the most important thing. He says it is a consideration, but the main concern was the false allegation of a near miss incident. You will notice that the so called, not reporting of defects correctly is never mentioned here, this is because they are secondary to him, it`s now plainly obvious why he kept on about the conversation with Peter Turpin, and then it took 16 days from investigatory interview stage to being sent the charges and investigation findings.
45. PW Asked who this would go to now.
46. SP said this had not been decided but it may be Barry Cook.
It did go to Barry Cook, which is hardly a surprise.
47. SP asked PW for his PTS and SCWID cards and informed him that they were withdrawn until further notice.
48. SP Then assured PW that everything would go into the report and that it was not his remit to make recommendations as to further action.
By placing me on investigatory suspension with immediate effect, SP is already taking further action.
49. SP Then asked if PW needed transport home.
50. PW Initially declined the offer but after consideration decided to accept the offer of a taxi.
51. SP Then contacted TPE Traincrew to authorise a taxi home for PW after he had picked up some belongings from his locker.
This is a true and accurate record of the above interview.
After 4 days off work, (rest days), I returned for duty at 21.00 hours on Tuesday 20th January 2009. I was met by Managers Stephen Percival and Andrew Steele. I was told they wanted to interview me further , I immediately asked for a rep to accompany me to which they said it wasn’t convenient because it was 21.00 hours. When we went into the interview room I asked if I was still doing the shunt job after the interview to which Stephen Percival replied that the job had already been covered. This to me was clear evidence that the outcome of that interview had already been decided.
Stephen Percival also stated “that his role as investigating officer was not to be judgmental or apportion blame”, but during the interview he said, (1) “that after consideration of the evidence that he had available and in view of the serious nature of the allegations that he felt it necessary to place me on investigatory suspension with immediate effect”, further stating, (2) “that it was his decision and that he felt it justified owing to the seriousness of the allegations and the impact it had on business”. I was never once informed what impact it supposedly had to the business.
Quite obviously, the decision to suspend me was made before the interview. If his role as investigating officer was not to be judgmental then why would he place me on suspension? By taking the actions he did, I was denied representation which should have been allowed the moment it became apparent that action against me was being contemplated, which in this case was the moment Manager Percival covered my turn of duty with another driver, before interviewing me.
What should have happened in this instance is summarised in the Drivers Rostering and Manning Agreement called the blue book. I would like to point out that until this case, I had never seen this book. “Whilst the right to accompaniment is not triggered at this stage, a fellow employee, staff representative or TU official may attend to support the driver provided that this is possible without unnecessarily prolonging or causing undue delay to the process”. Furthermore under, Guidelines for managers on operating this procedure it states, “the main aim of this procedure is to affect changes in behaviour. Managers should work in close co-operation with drivers to encourage and support a positive safety culture. By working together, joint benefits can (be) achieved. By considering alternatives to disciplinary action where appropriate and offering adequate support and training, a culture will be created which will lead to a reduction in safety of the line incidents”. Which TPE manager ever worked with me and offered encouragement or support towards any issues on health and safety? What type of culture is actually in place if no alternatives are used and even the smallest word of encouragement is never used?
Furthermore, it states, “ Whilst the formal right to be accompanied is not triggered at the investigation stage, this can be a particularly stressful experience and managers should ensure that drivers are offered the support of a representative where one is available without causing undue disruption or delay to the process”, continuing with, “the investigation should cover all the circumstances in which the incident took place, managers should consider whether an error or mistake has occurred or whether it is more appropriate to consider the case under capability, not conduct. A single serious incident or a series of less serious incidents may have occurred which would indicate that a pattern is emerging and will alert the manager to the appropriateness of dealing with the case under capability rather than discipline”.
Then under scenario`s it says, “managers should recognize those circumstances where drivers have used their best judgment and made decisions based on the safety and best interest of passengers. Managers should consider the range of options with which the driver was faced in the circumstances of the incident, before deciding on the fairest way to proceed with the case”. It is evident from this procedure that in my case, this was not put into practice. The only option used against me was dismissal, none of the circumstances which I am using in this statement and were available to TPE throughout the investigation and hearings were considered.
If taken as a serious investigation SP should have obtained a DOM`s (Duty Operations Manager) report and also interviewed the relieving driver for a report. I believe the reason why he never is because this would have helped me and as the investigation report will show, everything was against me.
Once again as is the pattern throughout the whole process, this is solely aimed at putting me down. I have never in the past 4 years had as much as a verbal warning regarding the content of my reports and I know that most of them are hard hitting, but the reason why I have not been disciplined for them is because the managers know the content is the truth, the biggest problem they have is answering, which as you will see they don’t do, ignorance is their only response.
The facts of this investigation are not the secondary occurrences about the “ impact it had on business “, or “ been withdrawn from traffic “ and “ which led to short formations “. SP should have stuck to the investigatory facts, but all he does is portray me in a bad light.
One major point to note
Absolutely nowhere in these 2 investigatory interviews was I once asked about the behaviour of the warning horn. This is further enhanced by the fact that it is also not mentioned in the Investigation Report.
So how could Barry Cook possibly come up with the first charge of Gross Misconduct?
"On Wednesday 14th January you failed to follow the correct procedure for reporting a defective warning horn".
ACAS Guidelines on Establishing the Facts
When investigating a disciplinary matter take care to deal with the employee in a fair and reasonable manner. The nature and extent of the investigations will depend on the seriousness of the matter and the more serious it is then the more thorough the investigation should be. It is important to keep an open mind and look for evidence which supports the employee’s case as well as evidence against.
Perry Webb Investigatory Interview
15 January 2009
Tanner Row, York
Present:
Perry Webb (PW) - Driver
Stephen Percival (SP) - Driver Manager
Ashley Judge (note taker)
1. SP Outlined to PW that the objective of this meeting to investigate an incident whereby unit no 185119 had been withdrawn from traffic due to allegations about defects.
Firstly, SP stated that the unit had been withdrawn from traffic. (see 6). “Withdrawn from traffic due to allegations about defects”. Notice he says withdrawn due to allegations about defects and not about the near miss report. The defects were real and existed at the time, noise and wipers were proven on the depot, the horn was tested and found working, nothing new there as this is always the case on a depot.
2. SP Explained the aim of the investigation was to ascertain all the facts of the incident and the importance of being open and honest.
SP explains that the objective was to ascertain all the facts of the incident and the importance of being open and honest. Ascertain all the facts! Which we will see as the investigation continued that major points were not ascertained. I was nothing but open and honest and freely explained everything.
3. SP asked PW if he had filled in a defect slip form (TPE 122063) and stated on this form that he had had a near miss.
See (4) below
4. PW admitted that he had put this on the form, but also confirmed that he had NOT had a near miss, he admitted that he had noted this down to get a reaction and have the problems on the unit looked at. The unit was very noisy and drafty and the wipers and warning horn did not work correctly.
I then went on to admit everything, explaining that there was no near miss, SP states, “He admitted he had noted this down to get a reaction”. A reaction intent on getting the faults finally rectified, no other ulterior motive as he is suggesting. I then explained the unit was (a) noisy, (b) wipers not working correctly and (c) warning horn not working correctly.
5. SP Explained that the defect slip did not have any details on it at all in regards to the drivers name, unit number etc. PW admitted this had been done in error as he had filled it in and then there was a unit swap and so he had been interrupted, this had not been done intentionally and he thought he had sent it fully completed.
I had not intentionally missed off my name on the defect slip, there was a unit swap at York which caused confusion and interrupted me. A basic simple error.
6. SP further explained that this this had been noted in the control log and the unit had been removed from traffic. SP explained that FTPE had taken the safety allegations seriously and the control log stated that the unit had been stopped at Ardwick due to the nature of the report in the defect book, which had led to short formations.
SP Now makes it clear that the unit was not allowed back into service from Ardwick Depot, due to my allegations in the repair book. The only concern for Siemens is surely the defects listed, the near miss report whether happened or not has no bearing on them keeping this train out of service, that is IF they have rectified all the defects. They clearly had time to do this, but they opted to keep the unit out of traffic, why? What possible further investigations did they carry out?
7. PW Commented that this was his desired reaction and that maybe something would now be done about the long list of defects he had submitted. PW further commented that he had copies of all his previous slips and would if nothing was done, submit these to the HMRI as he had done in the past with Arriva, who had been investigated because of this.
SP states, “That this was his desired reaction”, making it sound as if my only intention was to make sure a train was kept out of service, the only reaction I wanted was the defects sorting out. If I had wanted that unit taking out of service, I would have asked for this at the time. But we all know, TPE never take units with a partial failure of the warning horn out of service.
8. SP pointed out that the TPE100 standard report form (14/01/09) made no mention of the near miss, and only reported the noise defect.
SP points out that the “near miss”, was not mentioned on the report form 100, I explained in number 4 above, there was no near miss. I cannot report something that never happened to the signaller.
9. PW Repeated that he would like these matters taken seriously and dealt with and had tried all different approaches to get this done and felt that defect entries "tested at depot" was not a helpful way to resolve these issues.
I explain that I wanted the defects taken seriously because they are always ignored, I have tried different approaches (but why should I have to do this), and sick of the same old answers, “tested on depot”, which is exactly what happened again!
10. SP reminded PW that TPE took a near miss incident very seriously and PW agreed that if there had been a near miss he would have reported this correctly, SP confirmed that PW fully understood the correct reporting procedure.
SP continues to mention a near miss that never happened, I explained again, there was no near miss and that if there had been I would have reported it to the signal box.
11. SP clarified that PW reported this near miss in an attempt to get action on repairs and a near miss did not occur.
SP Finally or so I think understands, the written fabrication of a near miss never happened and that it was done to get action on repairs.
12. SP advised PW that this was not the correct procedure and PW acknowledged this.
SP states, “Not the correct procedure”.
13. SP Closed the investigation by reminding PW that he may be questioned again in the future in regards to this incident.
SP, kept making the point that TPE had taken these safety allegations very seriously, but from the tone of the interview it was obvious to me that the real issue was the train being kept at Ardwick leading to a short formation the following morning. Regarding this, Siemens carried out 3 checks, 2 of which proved me right, which were noise and wipers. The warning horn got the usual bog standard response. Once these were checked, what was the reason that stopped this train from entering service on time?
As for the usual response, it clearly goes against your own fleet update, period 10 protocol, which states the following.
“NFF or working on arrival at depot shall no longer be acceptable answers”.
Class 185 horns
The issue of class 185 air horn defects is one problem about which FTPE drivers wish to know what is happening. Since introduction, horn faults have become prevalent during the winter months especially during damp conditions. A number of alterations to the system have already been on carried out in the form of pressure regulators, non-return valves, settings and adjustments. We have discussed the matter further with Siemens and the following protocol will now be followed:-
• Reported horn defects will be endorsed as "checked against specification", with details
of rectification work or found to be compliant with specification (as applicable).
• 'NFF' or 'working on arrival' at depot shall no longer be acceptable answers.
• Siemens producing an action plan for managing and rectifying horn faults.
• Assistance from FTPE to investigate in service and provide the necessary detailed
information on the reported fault.
We will update on progress with this matter.
I would like you to bear the above in mind and SP`s words, “ FTPE had taken the safety allegations very seriously “.
Please also note, I was not asked once about how the warning horn behaved that morning in question.
2nd Investigatory Interview
Investigatory Interview Notes
Attendees:
Stephen Percival (SP) Investigating Officer
Perry Webb (PW) York Driver
Andrew Steele (AS) Note Taker
Location: DOM`s Office, York Station Date: Tuesday 20/01/09 Time: 2100 - 2130hrs
1. SP Started off by explaining that it was an investigatory interview on-going from last Thursday`s interview and that he had a few area`s to clarify and a few more questions to ask. SP explained that his role as investigating officer was not to be judgmental or apportion blame, but to ascertain the facts so a full and accurate report could be formulated.
SP started by saying that as investigating officer he was "not to be judgmental or apportion blame but to ascertain the facts so a full and accurate report could be formulated".
2. PW said he would be prepared to cover the shunt job after the interview was completed.
3. SP said this would not be necessary as cover had been provided.
SP says this is not necessary as my job has been covered. This straight away suggests that the outcome of this investigatory interview is all ready predetermined, SP has no idea what I will say but has already decided my outcome. He is already being judgmental before we start.
4. SP asked if PW had any lifestyle issues that may have influenced his behaviour or actions.
The only thing that ever influenced my behaviour was their constant ignorance of my reports, the more they ignored me, the more hard hitting the reports became, the only reason I gave up on Health & Safety after many years was down to their IGNORANCE, and as I will show in a later report, how they blatantly lied to the Office of the Rail Regulator (evidence is on official letter headed paper) that I had never informed TPE of certain Health and Safety issues, which of course I have proof that I informed them but they IGNORED me.
I will also show proof of how they even ignored the BUPA Doctor`s report after they sent me to see Dr Pearlman because they thought I was mentally unstable! I found this out and much more when I requested my medical files from BUPA.
5. PW Replied that he had no lifestyle issues.
6. SP Asked for clarification as to which driving cabs had been used York - Newcastle and Newcastle - York.
7. PW Was unsure however he confirmed that the Newcastle - York was in the cab where he made his report.
8. SP Verified that this was the 54 car as this was the vehicle with the reported faults.
9. SP Asked what the weather conditions were during the journey.
10. PW Said it was mostly rainy and it was cold. PW thought that it might be cold enough to cause freezing problems with the horn. He was unsure about the weather conditions on arrival at York.
SP asked me about weather conditions, I replied it was rainy and cold and that I thought it might be cold enough to cause freezing problems with the horn, (major point). Unsure of weather conditions on arrival at York, (major point).
I actually told them that it was below freezing in the North East area and that the nearer to York we traveled, the milder the weather became. I do have weather charts to prove what I said was true.
I was never given the chance to verify either of the investigation minutes with my signature, so could never challenge their validity.
11. SP Asked when PW had filled out the defect slip.
12. PW Replied partly at Darlington and partly at Northallerton and that he had no time to finish it at Northallerton.He then completely forgot to fill out the rest of the form.
13. SP Asked where PW had placed the repair book at Northallerton.
14. PW Replied that the book was placed on top of the TMS console.
15.SP Asked if PW informed the relieving driver about the defects.
16. PW replied definately about the wiper and possibly about the other defects.
17. SP Asked if he could remember who relieved him at York.
SP asked if I knew who the relieving driver was, and had I informed him of the defects, (major point).
18. PW Was unsure suggesting it may have been Gav Tomlinson or a Manchester Driver.
Confusion was such, that I did briefly speak with the relieving Driver who I think was Gavin Tomlinson, but cannot honestly remember, but as Manchester Drivers do not sign Middlesbrough, I assume it was Gavin.
Why didn`t Stephen Percival ask the relieving Driver for a report on what happened when he relieved me at York?
Why wasn`t any Driver who drove the unit that day after me asked for a report?
19. SP then asked if PW had attempted to report the faults during the journey from Newcastle.
20. PW Informed SP that he had tried to contact maintenance control twice using the NRN, firstly after leaving Darlington and again after leaving Northallerton but couldn`t get through due to poor reception (static).
21. SP Asked PW when did he complete his standard report form.
22. PW Said he completed and faxed it to control at the end of his shift.
I said completed and faxed to control, (major point).
23. SP asked if this had jogged PW`s memory about the defect slip.
24. PW Said it hadn`t adding that he fills so many in.
It hadn`t because of how many I fill in, (major point).
25. SP Asked if there had been any distractions or incidents during his shift.
26. PW Initially said no, but later said that he had been informed by his conductor before arriving in York that a unit swap would take place at York. PW also explained that on arrival in York, the platform screens were still showing his train as going forward and that he informed the acting DOM and the conductor of this as passengers were boarding the train. PW was unsure where his unit went to.
I explain that the conductor informed of a set swap at York, the screens still showed us as being an Airport service and that passengers were boarding thinking this. I informed the Dom and conductor of this, I did also mention that I went to help and stop people boarding this train, (major point).
27. SP asked PW to confirm if he had recently had a conversation with Driver Manager Peter Turpin concerning the correct content and structure of reports and advice to keep to the correct format in the future. SP understood that P. Turpin had advised PW to contact the Driver Managers should he need advice regarding reports.
Why? Halfway through an investigation would SP suddenly mention a recent conversation that I had with Manager Peter Turpin, (This is not factual to this incident or in line with ACAS guidelines, but then TPE don`t work to ACAS guidelines), ACAS guideline states, “Any investigatory meeting should be conducted by a management representative and should be confined to establishing the facts of the case”, (major point).
SP goes on to say that the conversation I had with Manager Peter Turpin concerned the correct content and structure of reports and advice to keep to the correct format in future.
Firstly this was an informal chat between ourselves, not a discipline, not a verbal or written warning. So how would SP find out about the content of our chat? Then as we will see in his investigation report he obtained a letter from Peter Turpin explaining our chat, which is more than I received. It`s very evident already what is going on here.
28. PW acknowledged that such a conversation had taken place and that P. Turpin had had a quiet word with him to tone down reports.
SP again relates back to this informal chat, (irrelevant and not factual to this investigation), and asks why I felt the need to make up the allegations of a near miss
29. SP asked in view of this why PW had felt the need to make up allegations of a near miss incident.
30. PW Replied that he felt strongly about in his view the inaction of Siemens with this type of fault and that he was sick of Siemens ignoring reports. PW referred to repair slips in other books and fault slips that had been left in his pigeon hole previously by other drivers. He also mentioned that he had had faults with warning horns and wipers in the past. PW said that he had spoken to maintenance controllers in the past and been informed by them that these faults were common on the class 185`s. PW went on to say that he had made up the near miss incident to give Siemens a short sharp shock and get someone listening and not bury their head in the sand.
31. PW Then went on to say if this disciplinary action go`s further, mentioning firstly ASLEF and then he would go to the following. Geoff Hoon the Transport Secretary, The Shadow Secretary and the HMRI.
32. PW Then mentioned that he had witnessed a fatality about two years ago in the Trafford Park area involving a p way worker and a Central Trains service.He had attended Stockport Coroners Court as a witness and it was found that the Central Trains Driver had not sounded a warning as he had been blinded by low sunlight. PW said the incident had a great impact upon him. PW also mentioned that G.Hill (York Driver) had been in the cab route learning.
33. SP Asked PW why he had not followed P. Turpin`s advice regarding reports.
SP once more brings up the point about the conversation with Peter Turpin, again this is not factual to this incident and in any case was not a recorded discipline, it is irrelevant but he keeps pushing it on me. For what reason? Why?
34. PW Said he felt so strongly about the issue he wanted to ensure something was done.
35. SP Asked if PW had anything else to add.
36. PW Repeated what he said about the fatality.
37. SP Then recapped what was said during the interview and again asked if PW had anything else to add.
38. PW Agreed with the content of SP`s recap and mentioned that he had nothing further to add.
39. SP Said that after consideration of the evidence that he had available and in view of the serious nature of the allegations that he felt it necessary to place PW on investigatory suspension with immediate effect. SP Explained that this was not a disciplinary measure and that PW would receive full basic pay whilst this was effective.SP said that he would confirm his decision in writing the following day and asked PW for his address.
SP mentions the nature of the allegations as of a “serious nature”, if it is that serious then why didn`t he carry out a thorough investigation? As from the ACAS guidelines, “the more serious it is then the more thorough the investigation should be”.
40. SP Told PW that while on investigatory suspension he was not to report for duty or travel on FTPE services.
41. PW Mentioned that he was aware of the procedure as he had been through it before and that he had been off for 3 weeks on that occasion. PW also mentioned that he thought this reaction was harsh and asked if it was SP making the decision or somebody above.
Off for 3 weeks with charges of a near mirror image nature. These charges however, only resulted in a reprimand! The details of this reprimand will appear later.
42. SP Assured PW that it was his decision and that he felt it justified owing to the seriousness of the allegations and the impact that it had on the business.
SP said it was his decision and that he felt it justified owing to the seriousness of the allegation and the impact it had on business. SP at the very beginning of this interview states, “as investigating officer he was not to be judgmental”.
43. PW Asked if the impact on business was the important thing.
44. SP Said this was a consideration although his main concern was the false allegation of a near miss incident.
I ask SP if the impact on business is the most important thing. He says it is a consideration, but the main concern was the false allegation of a near miss incident. You will notice that the so called, not reporting of defects correctly is never mentioned here, this is because they are secondary to him, it`s now plainly obvious why he kept on about the conversation with Peter Turpin, and then it took 16 days from investigatory interview stage to being sent the charges and investigation findings.
45. PW Asked who this would go to now.
46. SP said this had not been decided but it may be Barry Cook.
It did go to Barry Cook, which is hardly a surprise.
47. SP asked PW for his PTS and SCWID cards and informed him that they were withdrawn until further notice.
48. SP Then assured PW that everything would go into the report and that it was not his remit to make recommendations as to further action.
By placing me on investigatory suspension with immediate effect, SP is already taking further action.
49. SP Then asked if PW needed transport home.
50. PW Initially declined the offer but after consideration decided to accept the offer of a taxi.
51. SP Then contacted TPE Traincrew to authorise a taxi home for PW after he had picked up some belongings from his locker.
This is a true and accurate record of the above interview.
After 4 days off work, (rest days), I returned for duty at 21.00 hours on Tuesday 20th January 2009. I was met by Managers Stephen Percival and Andrew Steele. I was told they wanted to interview me further , I immediately asked for a rep to accompany me to which they said it wasn’t convenient because it was 21.00 hours. When we went into the interview room I asked if I was still doing the shunt job after the interview to which Stephen Percival replied that the job had already been covered. This to me was clear evidence that the outcome of that interview had already been decided.
Stephen Percival also stated “that his role as investigating officer was not to be judgmental or apportion blame”, but during the interview he said, (1) “that after consideration of the evidence that he had available and in view of the serious nature of the allegations that he felt it necessary to place me on investigatory suspension with immediate effect”, further stating, (2) “that it was his decision and that he felt it justified owing to the seriousness of the allegations and the impact it had on business”. I was never once informed what impact it supposedly had to the business.
Quite obviously, the decision to suspend me was made before the interview. If his role as investigating officer was not to be judgmental then why would he place me on suspension? By taking the actions he did, I was denied representation which should have been allowed the moment it became apparent that action against me was being contemplated, which in this case was the moment Manager Percival covered my turn of duty with another driver, before interviewing me.
What should have happened in this instance is summarised in the Drivers Rostering and Manning Agreement called the blue book. I would like to point out that until this case, I had never seen this book. “Whilst the right to accompaniment is not triggered at this stage, a fellow employee, staff representative or TU official may attend to support the driver provided that this is possible without unnecessarily prolonging or causing undue delay to the process”. Furthermore under, Guidelines for managers on operating this procedure it states, “the main aim of this procedure is to affect changes in behaviour. Managers should work in close co-operation with drivers to encourage and support a positive safety culture. By working together, joint benefits can (be) achieved. By considering alternatives to disciplinary action where appropriate and offering adequate support and training, a culture will be created which will lead to a reduction in safety of the line incidents”. Which TPE manager ever worked with me and offered encouragement or support towards any issues on health and safety? What type of culture is actually in place if no alternatives are used and even the smallest word of encouragement is never used?
Furthermore, it states, “ Whilst the formal right to be accompanied is not triggered at the investigation stage, this can be a particularly stressful experience and managers should ensure that drivers are offered the support of a representative where one is available without causing undue disruption or delay to the process”, continuing with, “the investigation should cover all the circumstances in which the incident took place, managers should consider whether an error or mistake has occurred or whether it is more appropriate to consider the case under capability, not conduct. A single serious incident or a series of less serious incidents may have occurred which would indicate that a pattern is emerging and will alert the manager to the appropriateness of dealing with the case under capability rather than discipline”.
Then under scenario`s it says, “managers should recognize those circumstances where drivers have used their best judgment and made decisions based on the safety and best interest of passengers. Managers should consider the range of options with which the driver was faced in the circumstances of the incident, before deciding on the fairest way to proceed with the case”. It is evident from this procedure that in my case, this was not put into practice. The only option used against me was dismissal, none of the circumstances which I am using in this statement and were available to TPE throughout the investigation and hearings were considered.
If taken as a serious investigation SP should have obtained a DOM`s (Duty Operations Manager) report and also interviewed the relieving driver for a report. I believe the reason why he never is because this would have helped me and as the investigation report will show, everything was against me.
Once again as is the pattern throughout the whole process, this is solely aimed at putting me down. I have never in the past 4 years had as much as a verbal warning regarding the content of my reports and I know that most of them are hard hitting, but the reason why I have not been disciplined for them is because the managers know the content is the truth, the biggest problem they have is answering, which as you will see they don’t do, ignorance is their only response.
The facts of this investigation are not the secondary occurrences about the “ impact it had on business “, or “ been withdrawn from traffic “ and “ which led to short formations “. SP should have stuck to the investigatory facts, but all he does is portray me in a bad light.
One major point to note
Absolutely nowhere in these 2 investigatory interviews was I once asked about the behaviour of the warning horn. This is further enhanced by the fact that it is also not mentioned in the Investigation Report.
So how could Barry Cook possibly come up with the first charge of Gross Misconduct?
"On Wednesday 14th January you failed to follow the correct procedure for reporting a defective warning horn".