LIE'S - Further Information - Page 2
These allegations (LIE'S) totally dumbfound me.
LIE NO 4: “you also failed to follow the correct procedure for reporting a near miss incident”.
LIE NO 7: “Prior to the hearing I considered the Investigation Report”.
LIE NO 8: “Prior to the hearing I considered the Industry Rule Book”.
LIE NO 9: “Prior to the hearing I considered the Company's procedures on defect reporting”.
LIE NO 23: “It was clear that Mr Webb had failed to follow the correct procedure for reporting a near miss incident as he had not completed the form correctly and had not reported the incident to Control or the signaller as soon as it had allegedly occurred”.
The following is information taken from my initial interview. Has it not been made abundantly clear that I never encountered a near miss?
1st Investigatory Interview.
4. PW admitted that he had put this on the form, but also confirmed that he had NOT had a near miss, he admitted that he had noted this down to get a reaction and have the problems on the unit looked at. The unit was very noisy and drafty and the wipers and warning horn did not work correctly.
10. SP reminded PW that TPE took a near miss incident very seriously and PW agreed that if there had been a near miss he would have reported this correctly, SP confirmed that PW fully understood the correct reporting procedure.
So common logic would dictate that if the event never happened would there have been any need to report?
Now for another look at the rest of Mark Atkinson's LIE'S.
LIE NO 6: “On 17 June 2009, his sick pay was stopped”.
Possibly a rather irrelevant lie, but nonetheless it is not true, what it does show is that he couldn't be bothered to ascertain all the facts even after my hearings.
LIE NO 15: “22.1 the full warning horn failure”.
Did I not make it perfectly clear that I had a PARTIAL FAILURE of the warning horn? Even the terminology this senior manager is using does not correspond with the rail industry rule book, there is no such thing as a "full" warning horn failure.
LIE NO 19: “32 There was a discussion as to whether or not the horn defect was a partial failure or a full failure”. This was in reference to the fact that the 185 trains have two tones on their horns. If there is a partial failure, i.e. one of the horn tones fails but the other remains working, then the procedure for Drivers is to report the issue at the soonest convenience as there is always the possibility that the other horn would fail".
Lets just say we had a discussion that decided the outcome as to what type of failure the warning horn encountered that morning, I have always maintained it was a PARTIAL FAILURE, I was the driver of that train, it was my judgment. I cannot find any specific so called discussion that decided this in the hearing minutes.
So the question now is, why did Mark Atkinson continue with his constant LIE'S that I had a complete warning horn failure? Judge Burton believed this, but this is simply not true.
Where in the rail industry rule book is the terminology, "at the SOONEST convenience" used?
The statement Mark Atkinson has made below is in total contrast to all his other lie's regarding the rule book and TPE contingency plans. Putting aside the "soonest convenience", the rule book states inform your control at the first convenient opportunity.
This is where the contingency plans come into play and they state that the train can remain in service without any restrictions to the speed, so imagine we allow this to happen, which happened for every single train that encountered a partial failure of a warning horn (that is if the driver could be bothered to report it!) and this then occurs, "as there is always the possibility that the other horn would fail". What if the chain of events unfold like this scenario below?
SCENARIO: It is a cold damp day, you are travelling at 100mph when you encounter an area of bends and bridges, as you travel round one of these bends you see in front of you approximately 1000 feet away a group of track workers (this could be young children or anyone), you immediately push your warning horn upwards, you get no response! Depending on the experience of the driver this could cause immediate shock.
Remembering at this speed you are travelling at 150 feet per second, (approximately 7 seconds to impact). If you don't actually freeze through the shock, (150 feet per second), you then push the lever downwards, (150 feet per second), nothing happens! WHAT NEXT?
This has always been my concern, hence the written fabricated near miss incident, the above could happen, not only to a TransPennine train but to any company's trains. WHO CARES?
LIE NO 27: “40.3 in relation to the suggestion by Mr Webb that the Company's alleged failures to respond to his defect reports had forced him to take the actions he did, I found that even if he was right (which I did not find was the case)”.
If you read the details above relating to LIE NO 19 it was because of that very scenario situation being a possibility and the very fact that TPE Management IGNORED every single report I ever gave them, how can anyone overcome such IGNORANCE?
What LIE 27 shows is that Mark Atkinson in the role as a senior manager is totally oblivious the dangers of running trains that have a partially defective warning horn, without even realising it he has actually pinpointed the problem when he states, "as there is always the possibility that the other horn would fail".
So what has he done about this? the answer is ABSOLUTELY NOTHING.
Would you not agree that LIE NO 25: “Above all, I noted that Mr Webb had demonstrated a wilful and blatant disregard for the procedures”, is exactly what Mark Atkinson is guilty of from the ignorance above?
LIE NO 4: “you also failed to follow the correct procedure for reporting a near miss incident”.
LIE NO 7: “Prior to the hearing I considered the Investigation Report”.
LIE NO 8: “Prior to the hearing I considered the Industry Rule Book”.
LIE NO 9: “Prior to the hearing I considered the Company's procedures on defect reporting”.
LIE NO 23: “It was clear that Mr Webb had failed to follow the correct procedure for reporting a near miss incident as he had not completed the form correctly and had not reported the incident to Control or the signaller as soon as it had allegedly occurred”.
The following is information taken from my initial interview. Has it not been made abundantly clear that I never encountered a near miss?
1st Investigatory Interview.
4. PW admitted that he had put this on the form, but also confirmed that he had NOT had a near miss, he admitted that he had noted this down to get a reaction and have the problems on the unit looked at. The unit was very noisy and drafty and the wipers and warning horn did not work correctly.
10. SP reminded PW that TPE took a near miss incident very seriously and PW agreed that if there had been a near miss he would have reported this correctly, SP confirmed that PW fully understood the correct reporting procedure.
So common logic would dictate that if the event never happened would there have been any need to report?
Now for another look at the rest of Mark Atkinson's LIE'S.
LIE NO 6: “On 17 June 2009, his sick pay was stopped”.
Possibly a rather irrelevant lie, but nonetheless it is not true, what it does show is that he couldn't be bothered to ascertain all the facts even after my hearings.
LIE NO 15: “22.1 the full warning horn failure”.
Did I not make it perfectly clear that I had a PARTIAL FAILURE of the warning horn? Even the terminology this senior manager is using does not correspond with the rail industry rule book, there is no such thing as a "full" warning horn failure.
LIE NO 19: “32 There was a discussion as to whether or not the horn defect was a partial failure or a full failure”. This was in reference to the fact that the 185 trains have two tones on their horns. If there is a partial failure, i.e. one of the horn tones fails but the other remains working, then the procedure for Drivers is to report the issue at the soonest convenience as there is always the possibility that the other horn would fail".
Lets just say we had a discussion that decided the outcome as to what type of failure the warning horn encountered that morning, I have always maintained it was a PARTIAL FAILURE, I was the driver of that train, it was my judgment. I cannot find any specific so called discussion that decided this in the hearing minutes.
So the question now is, why did Mark Atkinson continue with his constant LIE'S that I had a complete warning horn failure? Judge Burton believed this, but this is simply not true.
Where in the rail industry rule book is the terminology, "at the SOONEST convenience" used?
The statement Mark Atkinson has made below is in total contrast to all his other lie's regarding the rule book and TPE contingency plans. Putting aside the "soonest convenience", the rule book states inform your control at the first convenient opportunity.
This is where the contingency plans come into play and they state that the train can remain in service without any restrictions to the speed, so imagine we allow this to happen, which happened for every single train that encountered a partial failure of a warning horn (that is if the driver could be bothered to report it!) and this then occurs, "as there is always the possibility that the other horn would fail". What if the chain of events unfold like this scenario below?
SCENARIO: It is a cold damp day, you are travelling at 100mph when you encounter an area of bends and bridges, as you travel round one of these bends you see in front of you approximately 1000 feet away a group of track workers (this could be young children or anyone), you immediately push your warning horn upwards, you get no response! Depending on the experience of the driver this could cause immediate shock.
Remembering at this speed you are travelling at 150 feet per second, (approximately 7 seconds to impact). If you don't actually freeze through the shock, (150 feet per second), you then push the lever downwards, (150 feet per second), nothing happens! WHAT NEXT?
This has always been my concern, hence the written fabricated near miss incident, the above could happen, not only to a TransPennine train but to any company's trains. WHO CARES?
LIE NO 27: “40.3 in relation to the suggestion by Mr Webb that the Company's alleged failures to respond to his defect reports had forced him to take the actions he did, I found that even if he was right (which I did not find was the case)”.
If you read the details above relating to LIE NO 19 it was because of that very scenario situation being a possibility and the very fact that TPE Management IGNORED every single report I ever gave them, how can anyone overcome such IGNORANCE?
What LIE 27 shows is that Mark Atkinson in the role as a senior manager is totally oblivious the dangers of running trains that have a partially defective warning horn, without even realising it he has actually pinpointed the problem when he states, "as there is always the possibility that the other horn would fail".
So what has he done about this? the answer is ABSOLUTELY NOTHING.
Would you not agree that LIE NO 25: “Above all, I noted that Mr Webb had demonstrated a wilful and blatant disregard for the procedures”, is exactly what Mark Atkinson is guilty of from the ignorance above?