WARNING HORNS
THE SHOCKING TRUTH
This section will highlight just how severe the warning horn problems were, it will show many instances where Drivers failed to report complete and partial failures of the warning horn and that TPE Management turned their proverbial blind eye to this.
I would like to point out however that I am not being vindictive in showing how other Drivers treated these failures, I am trying to point out that they all behaved the same way that I did, because it had become the norm. Warning horn failures in cold and damp weather were prevalent on every 185 train that ran, trains would run regardless of the type of warning horn failure.
it will also show how TPE and especially SIEMENS dealt with these complete and partial failures of the warning horn. SIEMENS Maintenance Depots have a lot to answer.
After I was initially suspended I decided to start a petition of all Drivers from York, Newcastle and Scarborough Depots.
Below is a copy of that petition, please pay particular attention to what these Drivers actually agreed to and signed this petition for.
I never had much chance to meet all these Drivers as being on suspension I was not allowed near the station, otherwise I have no doubt whatsoever that nearly all of them would have signed this petition.
THE SHOCKING TRUTH
This section will highlight just how severe the warning horn problems were, it will show many instances where Drivers failed to report complete and partial failures of the warning horn and that TPE Management turned their proverbial blind eye to this.
I would like to point out however that I am not being vindictive in showing how other Drivers treated these failures, I am trying to point out that they all behaved the same way that I did, because it had become the norm. Warning horn failures in cold and damp weather were prevalent on every 185 train that ran, trains would run regardless of the type of warning horn failure.
it will also show how TPE and especially SIEMENS dealt with these complete and partial failures of the warning horn. SIEMENS Maintenance Depots have a lot to answer.
After I was initially suspended I decided to start a petition of all Drivers from York, Newcastle and Scarborough Depots.
Below is a copy of that petition, please pay particular attention to what these Drivers actually agreed to and signed this petition for.
I never had much chance to meet all these Drivers as being on suspension I was not allowed near the station, otherwise I have no doubt whatsoever that nearly all of them would have signed this petition.
As the above petition has shown, it is not only me that thinks these issues need rectification and that maintenance is extremely poor. Note that all the union men signed this petition, but behind the scenes, what did they actually do about this?
The following are from TransPennine Express publications highlighting the problems with the warning horns.
These pieces of evidence are from a fleet update dated January 2009.
The following are from TransPennine Express publications highlighting the problems with the warning horns.
These pieces of evidence are from a fleet update dated January 2009.
The above publication states the following:
Class 185 horns
The issue of class 185 air horn defects is one problem about which FTPE drivers wish to know what is happening. Since introduction, horn faults have become prevalent during the winter months especially during damp conditions. A number of alterations to the system have already been on carried out in the form of pressure regulators, non-return valves, settings and adjustments. We have discussed the matter further with Siemens and the following protocol will now be followed:-
• Reported horn defects will be endorsed as "checked against specification", with details
of rectification work or found to be compliant with specification (as applicable).
• 'NFF' or 'working on arrival' at depot shall no longer be acceptable answers.
• Siemens producing an action plan for managing and rectifying horn faults.
• Assistance from FTPE to investigate in service and provide the necessary detailed
information on the reported fault.
We will update on progress with this matter.
Class 185 horns
The issue of class 185 air horn defects is one problem about which FTPE drivers wish to know what is happening. Since introduction, horn faults have become prevalent during the winter months especially during damp conditions. A number of alterations to the system have already been on carried out in the form of pressure regulators, non-return valves, settings and adjustments. We have discussed the matter further with Siemens and the following protocol will now be followed:-
• Reported horn defects will be endorsed as "checked against specification", with details
of rectification work or found to be compliant with specification (as applicable).
• 'NFF' or 'working on arrival' at depot shall no longer be acceptable answers.
• Siemens producing an action plan for managing and rectifying horn faults.
• Assistance from FTPE to investigate in service and provide the necessary detailed
information on the reported fault.
We will update on progress with this matter.
_
The following also shows that a blockage of snow
is not always to blame, a fleet update (103b)
dated from 13th December 2009 to 9th January 2010 states,
“a number of failures of one or both
warning horns in the freezing conditions were also experienced, over and above
those blocked with snow”. They then give an example below.
Incident No3, train 185103 ended up with no tones of the warning horn working, TPE used heat and de-icing compound to try and defrost them to regain operability.
But please let`s think about this, what this is saying, is simply, this train was running in service, the warning horn was one minute working sufficiently when all of a sudden it ceases working, what if at that moment it ceased to work it was required in an emergency situation?
Then please let`s also realise that even when thawed out, if the weather is freezing and
below, travelling at speed the wind chill will be far greater, this problem will re-surface.
So let me ask you Mark Atkinson, who really puts the whole of the railway at risk?
PROBLEMS I FACED WHEN REPORTING THIS SERIOUS PROBLEM
But please let`s think about this, what this is saying, is simply, this train was running in service, the warning horn was one minute working sufficiently when all of a sudden it ceases working, what if at that moment it ceased to work it was required in an emergency situation?
Then please let`s also realise that even when thawed out, if the weather is freezing and
below, travelling at speed the wind chill will be far greater, this problem will re-surface.
So let me ask you Mark Atkinson, who really puts the whole of the railway at risk?
PROBLEMS I FACED WHEN REPORTING THIS SERIOUS PROBLEM
If you complain to your immediate management, they ignore you, this is not questionable, it is already admitted by TPE (See Case Management Discussion).
If you complain in a repair book, the only response is the usual tested on depot, or unable to test on depot, therefore allowed back into service without being tested, a clear danger to everyone track side, again proof of this is in the files of this section.
If I attempt to escalate to the Office of the Rail Regulator, I get accused of not bringing the subject to the attention of TPE even though my evidence proves I made them aware. What is left? Perhaps I should have behaved like the vast majority and not bothered to report anything.
I have witnessed death on the railway, both suicide and accidental, I don’t want to witness or hear of a death through ignorance and that is what I was faced with in this instance, especially when it can be preventable, I don`t want another Potters Bar incident where there was numerous warnings that were sadly ignored. I still feel extremely passionate about this problem, it is a danger to anyone trackside, sadly eventually there will be a death.
I chose what I thought was a reasonable option, aimed with shock treatment in mind towards, Siemens staff and TPE management, trying to get them to realise the implications of running trains knowing full well since introduction, already admitted conduct on behalf of TPE, that these train have a serious malfunction of a warning horn under a range of conditions with an unpredictability trait, so much so, that the next time you depress the warning horn lever it may not work in either tone, this was actually admitted by MD Vernon Barker in his letter dated 15th March 2010 to the Lib Dem Transport Secretary, Norman Baker.
If you complain in a repair book, the only response is the usual tested on depot, or unable to test on depot, therefore allowed back into service without being tested, a clear danger to everyone track side, again proof of this is in the files of this section.
If I attempt to escalate to the Office of the Rail Regulator, I get accused of not bringing the subject to the attention of TPE even though my evidence proves I made them aware. What is left? Perhaps I should have behaved like the vast majority and not bothered to report anything.
I have witnessed death on the railway, both suicide and accidental, I don’t want to witness or hear of a death through ignorance and that is what I was faced with in this instance, especially when it can be preventable, I don`t want another Potters Bar incident where there was numerous warnings that were sadly ignored. I still feel extremely passionate about this problem, it is a danger to anyone trackside, sadly eventually there will be a death.
I chose what I thought was a reasonable option, aimed with shock treatment in mind towards, Siemens staff and TPE management, trying to get them to realise the implications of running trains knowing full well since introduction, already admitted conduct on behalf of TPE, that these train have a serious malfunction of a warning horn under a range of conditions with an unpredictability trait, so much so, that the next time you depress the warning horn lever it may not work in either tone, this was actually admitted by MD Vernon Barker in his letter dated 15th March 2010 to the Lib Dem Transport Secretary, Norman Baker.
Vernon Barkers statement from above.
"The press reports spring from two design issues which only revealed themselves in very poor weather conditions, most notably in heavy snowfall. The first fault to emerge was that the warning horns on the trains can be affected by either, freezing fog or snowy conditions, with one or both of the two horn tones affected depending on the severity of the weather”.
What Vernon Barker is saying above is not factually correct, it does not require very poor weather conditions or heavy snowfall as this selection of reports and repair slips will show.
To put the record straight, you do not need very poor weather to affect the high and low tones on these horns, it only needs to be zero degrees or slightly below zero to affect any tone or both tones. They can also be affected in damp conditions and also when travelling at higher speeds, as many of the reports in my case file show.
Also remember, SIEMENS have had "since introduction" (which should have been apparent and sorted out during testing), introduction was 2006! So you have to ask the serious question, just how rigorous was the testing? Especially bearing in mind, the cab noise issues, the faulty windscreen wipers, the poor cab heating, the rocking seat bases etc.
Would British engineering be the same? I doubt very much, in British Rail days, we never once had this problem and most of our engines were built in Derby not Germany.
Letter Part 2
"The press reports spring from two design issues which only revealed themselves in very poor weather conditions, most notably in heavy snowfall. The first fault to emerge was that the warning horns on the trains can be affected by either, freezing fog or snowy conditions, with one or both of the two horn tones affected depending on the severity of the weather”.
What Vernon Barker is saying above is not factually correct, it does not require very poor weather conditions or heavy snowfall as this selection of reports and repair slips will show.
To put the record straight, you do not need very poor weather to affect the high and low tones on these horns, it only needs to be zero degrees or slightly below zero to affect any tone or both tones. They can also be affected in damp conditions and also when travelling at higher speeds, as many of the reports in my case file show.
Also remember, SIEMENS have had "since introduction" (which should have been apparent and sorted out during testing), introduction was 2006! So you have to ask the serious question, just how rigorous was the testing? Especially bearing in mind, the cab noise issues, the faulty windscreen wipers, the poor cab heating, the rocking seat bases etc.
Would British engineering be the same? I doubt very much, in British Rail days, we never once had this problem and most of our engines were built in Derby not Germany.
Letter Part 2
_One major point that Vernon Barker makes, is the fact that both tones are capable of failing to work. In other words there is no logic to the failure of these horns. Low tone, high tone or both tones can fail and do at any time. MD Vernon Barker goes on to say that there are processes in place that in the event of both tones failing the train`s onward journey is done safely.
MEANING
Complete Failure, train can travel at a reduced speed of 20mph to next suitable location. (That is only if the driver can be bothered, we all know what occurred, get to your relieving point and dump on the next driver).
Partial Failure, train can stay in service all day without any restriction to its speed.
But what happens when the failure is at 100mph, both tones have SUDDENLY failed, and some young children have wandered through an open farm crossing gate onto the track? Or a group of track workers are just round the blind bend walking with their backs to you, having just finished or just walking to their worksite. Then how about the train that`s broken down and the train crew are examining the outside, or in bad visibility and suddenly you see someone in a position of imminent danger. The scenarios are endless, but all possibilities.
The sad and frightening outcome is the possibility of death. TPE and Siemens are playing Russian Roulette and have been doing since 2006. We all know that when playing this game, someone always ends up shot.
Do I really deserve gross misconduct for highlighting such a serious high risk situation capable of killing someone? Especially bearing in mind that TPE management and Siemens have been aware since introduction in 2006, been made aware by my numerous reports and other drivers reports yet failed miserably in whatever attempt they have made to rectify this problem.
Lets keep in mind, Vernon Barkers statement, "And as with the horn situation, any defect condition arising from this fault is subject to close management `on the day` to ensure the safety of the trains passengers, other users of the railway, track workers and the general public".
The reports below will make a complete mockery of the above statement!
CRAINS MANCHESTER BUSINESS NEWS ARTICLE
Even stating as recent as January 2010, below, by Engineering Director Nick Donovan, “for reasons that we don`t fully understand a build up of snow and ice in and around the compressor air inlets caused a complete blockage”.
MEANING
Complete Failure, train can travel at a reduced speed of 20mph to next suitable location. (That is only if the driver can be bothered, we all know what occurred, get to your relieving point and dump on the next driver).
Partial Failure, train can stay in service all day without any restriction to its speed.
But what happens when the failure is at 100mph, both tones have SUDDENLY failed, and some young children have wandered through an open farm crossing gate onto the track? Or a group of track workers are just round the blind bend walking with their backs to you, having just finished or just walking to their worksite. Then how about the train that`s broken down and the train crew are examining the outside, or in bad visibility and suddenly you see someone in a position of imminent danger. The scenarios are endless, but all possibilities.
The sad and frightening outcome is the possibility of death. TPE and Siemens are playing Russian Roulette and have been doing since 2006. We all know that when playing this game, someone always ends up shot.
Do I really deserve gross misconduct for highlighting such a serious high risk situation capable of killing someone? Especially bearing in mind that TPE management and Siemens have been aware since introduction in 2006, been made aware by my numerous reports and other drivers reports yet failed miserably in whatever attempt they have made to rectify this problem.
Lets keep in mind, Vernon Barkers statement, "And as with the horn situation, any defect condition arising from this fault is subject to close management `on the day` to ensure the safety of the trains passengers, other users of the railway, track workers and the general public".
The reports below will make a complete mockery of the above statement!
CRAINS MANCHESTER BUSINESS NEWS ARTICLE
Even stating as recent as January 2010, below, by Engineering Director Nick Donovan, “for reasons that we don`t fully understand a build up of snow and ice in and around the compressor air inlets caused a complete blockage”.
This is 2010 (1 YEAR AFTER MY DISMISSAL!) and MD Nick Donovan readily admits that "for reasons we don`t fully understand", we have had these symptoms since introduction in 2006, nearly 4 years and no further forward!!! To be truthful, in my mind that says a lot for German engineering and the safety ethics of First Group.
BELOW IS A SELECTION OF REPORTS AND REPAIR SLIPS THAT SHOW JUST HOW MUCH TPE AND SIEMENS CARE ABOUT RULES AND REGULATIONS
BELOW IS A SELECTION OF REPORTS AND REPAIR SLIPS THAT SHOW JUST HOW MUCH TPE AND SIEMENS CARE ABOUT RULES AND REGULATIONS
My request above ask`s everything, why do you suppose this was IGNORED?
What if this had not been IGNORED and I actually got a response, maybe if I was given an understanding from their point of view, I wouldn`t have been forced to take other action that resulted in my dismissal. But then again, TPE wanted a response that is why I was IGNORED.
Injury Prevention Report
What if this had not been IGNORED and I actually got a response, maybe if I was given an understanding from their point of view, I wouldn`t have been forced to take other action that resulted in my dismissal. But then again, TPE wanted a response that is why I was IGNORED.
Injury Prevention Report
This is an IP report, one of the reports that TPE are committed to giving feedback! Did I get any? We all know that answer. This IP report however should have received a response, especially as there is a possibility that the train ran with a complete warning horn failure! It also makes a frightening statement, that all Drivers run trains with warning horn failures, because the failures are an every day occurrence in the correct weather conditions.
So why was it totally IGNORED?
Another Injury Prevention Report
So why was it totally IGNORED?
Another Injury Prevention Report
Another IP Report and before anyone even thinks, yes it was IGNORED. But this is an extremely serious report, this should have been looked at very closely, again this showed a possible complete warning horn failure in a situation that could have caused DEATH, so why, why, why was this as I always state, IGNORED? How can TPE Management be so rude and IGNORANT especially in this situation?
Repair Slip
Repair Slip
_ Repair slip
number 033264, by R Chevalier of Manchester, a complaint that both tones of the
warning horn are too quiet and a failure of the low tone altogether. Siemens response is disgraceful, "Unable to test at depot 01.30am”.
Many sections were not filled in like time, date, unit number etc. It wasn’t even signed off correctly.
Was this informed to the signaller or TPE Control, because to me, if both tones are too quiet, then this should be classed as a COMPLETE FAILURE of the warning horn, not that I am in anyway putting blame on this Driver.
The PROBLEM that we all encountered was not having any specific training on how to judge a PARTIAL or COMPLETE FAILURE of a warning horn. Its easy for a Manager to sit in his office all day and surmise on what should and shouldn`t happen in the real world just like Operations Director Paul Watson did in my appeal hearing.
So in other words its completely ignored, what would happen if this unit came into service later that day and killed a track worker because they did not hear the warning horn? This is the serious consequence of what could happen. That unit obviously entered service even though the rule book doesn't allow this with a defective warning horn because they were unable to test at 01.30am.
This repair slip contains shocking evidence of TPE
ignoring rules and procedures!
Many sections were not filled in like time, date, unit number etc. It wasn’t even signed off correctly.
Was this informed to the signaller or TPE Control, because to me, if both tones are too quiet, then this should be classed as a COMPLETE FAILURE of the warning horn, not that I am in anyway putting blame on this Driver.
The PROBLEM that we all encountered was not having any specific training on how to judge a PARTIAL or COMPLETE FAILURE of a warning horn. Its easy for a Manager to sit in his office all day and surmise on what should and shouldn`t happen in the real world just like Operations Director Paul Watson did in my appeal hearing.
So in other words its completely ignored, what would happen if this unit came into service later that day and killed a track worker because they did not hear the warning horn? This is the serious consequence of what could happen. That unit obviously entered service even though the rule book doesn't allow this with a defective warning horn because they were unable to test at 01.30am.
This repair slip contains shocking evidence of TPE
ignoring rules and procedures!
_ One of my reports, Repair slip number 038882. Once again I encountered a complete failure of both warning horn tones. I stated that this is a,“serious safety issue” and that it happens every time the weather freezes, I also said that the horn may well work when next tested on depot, amazing that this horn was supposedly tested at 04.30am? But it was 04.30am 2 days later!
So it remained in service after I reported it with a complete warning horn failure. Notice also, that all TPE control told me to do, was trip the warning horn circuit breaker! What happened to their so called Defective on Train Equipment Contingency Plans in this instance? Reduce speed to 20mph?
I acted on their instructions which were clearly wrong. How on earth can a COMPLETE FAILURE be left for 2 days? TransPennine Express make up their own set of rules to make sure their trains run at all costs.
I CHALLENGE ANY MANAGER FROM TPE AFTER READING THIS SECTION TO ANSWER THE ALLEGATIONS I HAVE PUT ON HERE AND EXPLAIN HOW THIS IS NOT THE CASE.
PAUL WATSON, MARK ATKINSON & BARRY COOK, I CHALLENGE YOU TO PUBLICLY ANSWER MY ALLEGATIONS.
BELOW ARE TPE CONTINGENCY PLANS
So it remained in service after I reported it with a complete warning horn failure. Notice also, that all TPE control told me to do, was trip the warning horn circuit breaker! What happened to their so called Defective on Train Equipment Contingency Plans in this instance? Reduce speed to 20mph?
I acted on their instructions which were clearly wrong. How on earth can a COMPLETE FAILURE be left for 2 days? TransPennine Express make up their own set of rules to make sure their trains run at all costs.
I CHALLENGE ANY MANAGER FROM TPE AFTER READING THIS SECTION TO ANSWER THE ALLEGATIONS I HAVE PUT ON HERE AND EXPLAIN HOW THIS IS NOT THE CASE.
PAUL WATSON, MARK ATKINSON & BARRY COOK, I CHALLENGE YOU TO PUBLICLY ANSWER MY ALLEGATIONS.
BELOW ARE TPE CONTINGENCY PLANS
Please refer back to these Contingency Plans when reading each individual report or repair slip
Repair Slip
Repair Slip
_ Repair slip number 038883, dated 15th December 2008, by D Gyte of Scarborough, the page after the one above, where I reported a complete warning horn failure on the 2nd December 2008. The Driver even states, "See previous reports"!
Once again highlighting that both tones fail to work and once again the response, "Tested on depot, all working fine". Surely, surely it has to sink in that it`s not on the depot where the fault lies but when in service during freezing and damp conditions. This unit also clearly stayed in service from 11.50hrs that day till it was seen on the depot at 04.30am the following morning. This was another complete failure of the warning horn. This train remained in service with a COMPLETE warning horn failure.
Repair Slip following on from 038882 and 038883
Once again highlighting that both tones fail to work and once again the response, "Tested on depot, all working fine". Surely, surely it has to sink in that it`s not on the depot where the fault lies but when in service during freezing and damp conditions. This unit also clearly stayed in service from 11.50hrs that day till it was seen on the depot at 04.30am the following morning. This was another complete failure of the warning horn. This train remained in service with a COMPLETE warning horn failure.
Repair Slip following on from 038882 and 038883
Repair slip number 038886, by A Panier of Barrow, this report carries on from the previous two.
Driver wrote, " Failure of both warning horns ". 038882 above was dated 2nd December 2008 with this report 038886 dated 31st December 2008, therefore this train was running in service for a month being susceptible to a complete failure of the warning horn.
Was this reported to the signaller? Why was this unit allowed to remain in traffic with a COMPLETE FAILURE OF THE WARNING HORN?
This failure was being put on each and every Driver which took over the controls of that train, because of the fact that warning horn failures happened all the time, most of these Drivers will have ignored the failure and passed it on to the next Driver along, that unfortunately is the sad reality of this situation, which TPE Management were fully aware of.
Why the complete lack of care, do SIEMENS and TPE see a warning horn as something that doesn’t need to function correctly?
Because all they have ever shown is a complete disregard to the numerous complaints, why the ignorance? Why the ignorance from TPE towards myself when I attempted to bring this to their attention?
Frightening thing again, is this defect after a failure of both warning horn tones took 36 hours to be looked at.
This train remained in service with a complete failure of the warning horn!
Repair Slip
Driver wrote, " Failure of both warning horns ". 038882 above was dated 2nd December 2008 with this report 038886 dated 31st December 2008, therefore this train was running in service for a month being susceptible to a complete failure of the warning horn.
Was this reported to the signaller? Why was this unit allowed to remain in traffic with a COMPLETE FAILURE OF THE WARNING HORN?
This failure was being put on each and every Driver which took over the controls of that train, because of the fact that warning horn failures happened all the time, most of these Drivers will have ignored the failure and passed it on to the next Driver along, that unfortunately is the sad reality of this situation, which TPE Management were fully aware of.
Why the complete lack of care, do SIEMENS and TPE see a warning horn as something that doesn’t need to function correctly?
Because all they have ever shown is a complete disregard to the numerous complaints, why the ignorance? Why the ignorance from TPE towards myself when I attempted to bring this to their attention?
Frightening thing again, is this defect after a failure of both warning horn tones took 36 hours to be looked at.
This train remained in service with a complete failure of the warning horn!
Repair Slip
_Repair slip number 031659,
by R Coulson of Newcastle. He states, "
Another warning horn partially defective ", the word, " Another
", says it all. Usual Siemens response, warning horn adjusted and
tested.
This time please note, that it is the high tone that is defective.
This train remained in service with a partial failure of the warning horn as per TPE Contingency Plans.
Repair Slip
This time please note, that it is the high tone that is defective.
This train remained in service with a partial failure of the warning horn as per TPE Contingency Plans.
Repair Slip
An issue highlighting that speed can also be a factor in deciding whether the horn works or not! Partial failure of the warning horn?
This train remained in service.
Repair Slip
This train remained in service.
Repair Slip
Please note: Previously booked 3 days earlier, a partial failure of the warning horn, unit allowed back into service without being rectified and the same sorry state of affairs continues on, its put straight back onto each and every Driver, is there any wonder that most Drivers ignored this type of persistently recurring fault.
Train remained in service with a partial failure of the warning horn as per the Contingency Plans.
Repair Slip
Train remained in service with a partial failure of the warning horn as per the Contingency Plans.
Repair Slip
Another speed issue, although the relevant speed is not mentioned, I found it was mainly above 75mph.
Train remained in service.
Repair Slip
Train remained in service.
Repair Slip
Carrying on from the above report, the Driver changes ends and finds exactly the same problem in the other driving cab, this problem was the same on all units, the only difference being, that this Driver could be bothered to report it.
The train remained in service.
From reading all of the above reports and issues, if I was given gross misconduct for supposedly not reporting a partially defective warning horn and was dismissed, then Watson, Atkinson, Cook, Turpin, Percival, Steele & Barker should all have been dismissed for allowing such dangerous practices to go unchallenged and furthermore continue to the present date.
FURTHER EVIDENCE CAN BE VIEWED IN SECTIONS 2 - 4.
The train remained in service.
From reading all of the above reports and issues, if I was given gross misconduct for supposedly not reporting a partially defective warning horn and was dismissed, then Watson, Atkinson, Cook, Turpin, Percival, Steele & Barker should all have been dismissed for allowing such dangerous practices to go unchallenged and furthermore continue to the present date.
FURTHER EVIDENCE CAN BE VIEWED IN SECTIONS 2 - 4.