WITNESS STATEMENT PAGE 2
Charge 1, decision.
233. (MA 395) MA “It is my belief that this charge is proven that on the day in question you did fail to follow the correct procedure. The unit stayed in service was putting the safety of staff on the railway at risk”.
234. Guilty of gross misconduct for failing to follow the correct procedure, the procedure I allegedly did not follow, as cited by MA (MA 16 & 18) at the beginning of this hearing is as follows.
1. “You didn`t stop and report it at the controlling signaler”.
2. “You didn`t report it to the train operating company control”.
3. “At no point did you reduce the train speed”.
4. “You didn`t complete the repair book procedure correctly”.
235. The procedure that MA charged me with was not any known rule book procedure, but a cut and paste attempt to make charges fit. It vaguely resembles the procedure for reporting a complete failure of the warning horn (167). The reason why MA was so unsure of what procedure I never followed is because the charge is extremely vague and not specific to any breach of the rule book and also MA couldn`t find any information from the investigation notes to point out whether the horn failure was a complete or partial failure. He decided on the worst case scenario for me. I never once stated that the warning horn was a complete failure and said all along that I treated it as a partial failure of the warning horn. How could he make such a glaring error? How could he have had, even a reasonable belief in what I did was wrong? Whatever belief he had, was on the wrong set of facts.
236. As for the unit staying in service was putting the safety of staff on the railway at risk, if I had informed TPE control of this partial failure, warning horn fault, they would have adopted the procedure found in their (DOTE) Defective On Train Equipment contingency plans, this states (168) that the train can stay in service and run at line speed. Furthermore after arrival at York the cab I was in became out of use and the train was driven from the rear cab. Therefore this train would have run regardless. There is also the knowledge that no other driver on that day had a problem with the warning horn, MA knew this, he was also aware of the DOTE contingency plans. Therefore his statement shows that the DOTE contingency plans are wrong, allowing to run a train with a partial defect is putting people`s lives at risk. So the question is now, what has he done about this? Remembering what part 4 of his job description states (123), “That any unsafe activity is immediately stopped and prevented from continuing until adequate measures have been taken to reduce the risk associated with that activity to as low as reasonably practicable”.
237. When I think how many trains I have run because this DOTE contingency plans allows them to run and how many other driver`s have ran their trains then who really is putting the whole of the railway at risk? The answer is obvious, TPE, especially as they openly admit, that (169) “since introduction”, they have been aware of this problem. Should charge 1 in the first place have been a gross misconduct charge?
Charge 2 decision
238. (MA 395) MA “The failure to follow the correct reporting procedure for reporting a near miss. It is my belief that this is proven because the whole incident was a premeditated fabrication”. “You clearly failed to follow the correct process for following and reporting a near miss, when the fault came to light, the train was taken out of service for investigation and repair”. “I am also disturbed by your admittance of previous events and a lack of remorse shown in this hearing over this one which fails to convince me that the fabrication will stop. I`m also concerned that you freely admit to fabricating previous reports and it disturbs me to think of how much of your reporting is truthful and it’s not just a way of getting attention in these matters”. I will break this down and address each issue.
239. MA “It is my belief that this is proven because the whole incident was a premeditated fabrication”. I never once admitted or mentioned that my actions on that day were premeditated, even the investigating officer could only say, “possibly a premeditated act” (170). MA again, is wrong in his assumption, it was not a premeditated act, therefore his belief, that what I did, in other words, my guilt, was in his mind based upon premeditation, that is totally misguided.
240. MA, second part, “You clearly failed to follow the correct process for following and reporting a near miss”. Firstly, where can the procedure for reporting a near miss be found? How can I follow any type of procedure when I clearly stated in the very first interview, (70), “that he had NOT had a near miss”. There was no procedure to follow, because there was no near miss. If there had been a procedure to follow then I do not know where it is and this is despite many requests for it, TPE never produced it, remember when I requested it, Miss Pears said firstly it was in the rule book and then it was apparently in the Train Driving Competence Standards Booklet, (SC1). Again all of this information was available in the investigation report and mentioned to MA during my hearing, how can I clearly fail to follow this procedure? On this issue MA made a decision on something that again is not factual.
241. MA third part, “when the fault came to light, the train was taken out of service for investigation and repair”. This train was never taken out of service, it remained in service till its booked time. There was 3 faults that required attention. Repairs were carried out on the door (noise) and on the wipers, the warning horn got the usual, tested on depot, no fault found.
242. MA lastly stated, “I am also disturbed by your admittance of previous events and a lack of remorse shown in this hearing over this one which fails to convince me that the fabrication will stop. I`m also concerned that you freely admit to fabricating previous reports and it disturbs me to think of how much of your reporting is truthful and it’s not just a way of getting attention in these matters”.
243. There are 8 passages in the hearing that MA is obviously referring to. Before I deal with them I would like to point out my state of mind that day and what I considered to be a very aggressive attitude of MA. Therefore how I came across was interpreted by MA the wrong way. Also it was and never has been about getting attention to me, I only wanted the issues I raised to get attention, attention in the context of discussion however would have been nice.
244. (PW 36) “I`ve done it previously and you never pulled me on it. I`ve done it when it comes to a point that I`ve been ignored and ignored and ignored”.It did not sound well, but It was aimed at the way I behaved that day, it was how I always behaved faced with that type of fault. The only near miss report in my file is one dating back to 2005 (171 & 171a) I reported this via the signaler and my train remained in service, units are not taken out of service for a near miss. I am quite sure that if I had previously fabricated a near miss I would have been jumped upon.
Charge 1, decision.
233. (MA 395) MA “It is my belief that this charge is proven that on the day in question you did fail to follow the correct procedure. The unit stayed in service was putting the safety of staff on the railway at risk”.
234. Guilty of gross misconduct for failing to follow the correct procedure, the procedure I allegedly did not follow, as cited by MA (MA 16 & 18) at the beginning of this hearing is as follows.
1. “You didn`t stop and report it at the controlling signaler”.
2. “You didn`t report it to the train operating company control”.
3. “At no point did you reduce the train speed”.
4. “You didn`t complete the repair book procedure correctly”.
235. The procedure that MA charged me with was not any known rule book procedure, but a cut and paste attempt to make charges fit. It vaguely resembles the procedure for reporting a complete failure of the warning horn (167). The reason why MA was so unsure of what procedure I never followed is because the charge is extremely vague and not specific to any breach of the rule book and also MA couldn`t find any information from the investigation notes to point out whether the horn failure was a complete or partial failure. He decided on the worst case scenario for me. I never once stated that the warning horn was a complete failure and said all along that I treated it as a partial failure of the warning horn. How could he make such a glaring error? How could he have had, even a reasonable belief in what I did was wrong? Whatever belief he had, was on the wrong set of facts.
236. As for the unit staying in service was putting the safety of staff on the railway at risk, if I had informed TPE control of this partial failure, warning horn fault, they would have adopted the procedure found in their (DOTE) Defective On Train Equipment contingency plans, this states (168) that the train can stay in service and run at line speed. Furthermore after arrival at York the cab I was in became out of use and the train was driven from the rear cab. Therefore this train would have run regardless. There is also the knowledge that no other driver on that day had a problem with the warning horn, MA knew this, he was also aware of the DOTE contingency plans. Therefore his statement shows that the DOTE contingency plans are wrong, allowing to run a train with a partial defect is putting people`s lives at risk. So the question is now, what has he done about this? Remembering what part 4 of his job description states (123), “That any unsafe activity is immediately stopped and prevented from continuing until adequate measures have been taken to reduce the risk associated with that activity to as low as reasonably practicable”.
237. When I think how many trains I have run because this DOTE contingency plans allows them to run and how many other driver`s have ran their trains then who really is putting the whole of the railway at risk? The answer is obvious, TPE, especially as they openly admit, that (169) “since introduction”, they have been aware of this problem. Should charge 1 in the first place have been a gross misconduct charge?
Charge 2 decision
238. (MA 395) MA “The failure to follow the correct reporting procedure for reporting a near miss. It is my belief that this is proven because the whole incident was a premeditated fabrication”. “You clearly failed to follow the correct process for following and reporting a near miss, when the fault came to light, the train was taken out of service for investigation and repair”. “I am also disturbed by your admittance of previous events and a lack of remorse shown in this hearing over this one which fails to convince me that the fabrication will stop. I`m also concerned that you freely admit to fabricating previous reports and it disturbs me to think of how much of your reporting is truthful and it’s not just a way of getting attention in these matters”. I will break this down and address each issue.
239. MA “It is my belief that this is proven because the whole incident was a premeditated fabrication”. I never once admitted or mentioned that my actions on that day were premeditated, even the investigating officer could only say, “possibly a premeditated act” (170). MA again, is wrong in his assumption, it was not a premeditated act, therefore his belief, that what I did, in other words, my guilt, was in his mind based upon premeditation, that is totally misguided.
240. MA, second part, “You clearly failed to follow the correct process for following and reporting a near miss”. Firstly, where can the procedure for reporting a near miss be found? How can I follow any type of procedure when I clearly stated in the very first interview, (70), “that he had NOT had a near miss”. There was no procedure to follow, because there was no near miss. If there had been a procedure to follow then I do not know where it is and this is despite many requests for it, TPE never produced it, remember when I requested it, Miss Pears said firstly it was in the rule book and then it was apparently in the Train Driving Competence Standards Booklet, (SC1). Again all of this information was available in the investigation report and mentioned to MA during my hearing, how can I clearly fail to follow this procedure? On this issue MA made a decision on something that again is not factual.
241. MA third part, “when the fault came to light, the train was taken out of service for investigation and repair”. This train was never taken out of service, it remained in service till its booked time. There was 3 faults that required attention. Repairs were carried out on the door (noise) and on the wipers, the warning horn got the usual, tested on depot, no fault found.
242. MA lastly stated, “I am also disturbed by your admittance of previous events and a lack of remorse shown in this hearing over this one which fails to convince me that the fabrication will stop. I`m also concerned that you freely admit to fabricating previous reports and it disturbs me to think of how much of your reporting is truthful and it’s not just a way of getting attention in these matters”.
243. There are 8 passages in the hearing that MA is obviously referring to. Before I deal with them I would like to point out my state of mind that day and what I considered to be a very aggressive attitude of MA. Therefore how I came across was interpreted by MA the wrong way. Also it was and never has been about getting attention to me, I only wanted the issues I raised to get attention, attention in the context of discussion however would have been nice.
244. (PW 36) “I`ve done it previously and you never pulled me on it. I`ve done it when it comes to a point that I`ve been ignored and ignored and ignored”.It did not sound well, but It was aimed at the way I behaved that day, it was how I always behaved faced with that type of fault. The only near miss report in my file is one dating back to 2005 (171 & 171a) I reported this via the signaler and my train remained in service, units are not taken out of service for a near miss. I am quite sure that if I had previously fabricated a near miss I would have been jumped upon.
245. (PW 186) “Yes, I put my hands up immediately straight away and told them exactly what I did and why and I`ve done that previously”.Meaning always readily admitted each time I was interviewed that the near miss was a fabrication.
246. (PW 201) “Yes, I`ve done this type of thing before, but it never”.My answer was a referral to charge 1, the way I dealt with the defective warning horn that day was the same as any other day. But MA kept interrupting me and was really aggressive.
247. (PW 343) “As I say, I have done these type of things previously, I`ve not even had a warning. It’s not the first time”.Meaning, behaviour on the day in question, not informing control. But also by reporting using a scenario situation or referring to the hazards. (172) (173) (174) (175) (176) & (177)
248. (PW 345). “Mark, I`m the only driver at York that’s got two boxes over at Tanner Row, two boxes because I`m the one that puts most reports in. Previously health and safety rep, if you take time to go through them boxes you will find numerous occasions when I`ve done the same as this.I`ve never had much as a verbal or written warning about it. I`ve been spoken to but it’s never been classed as a verbal warning and I`ve never had a written warning about my reports”. Meaning, wrote so many reports on warning horn, noise and wiper failures that if investigated would have shown that maybe the procedures were not followed to the rule book.
249. (PW 358). “I`ve done this previously and I didn`t see any where wrong for what I was doing. If I had been jumped on previously maybe I would have reacted differently”. Meaning, the simple failure to report to control and fax the repair slip off. It was a common occurrence, every driver was guilty of this.
250. (PW 365). “It was my way of reporting faults”,Meaning, strong worded reports, not fabricated reports.
251. (PW 376). “You know that I am the type of person that has done this before, if I were jumped on before and warned and we come to an understanding then this would never have happened”. Meaning, at the time, I was trying to show MA some previous reports, showing my concerns for these very issues, they show that I never informed control, yet even though TPE had these, no manager came to me and let me know I was not supposedly doing the right thing. Although the comments state that I have done it before, I never once said that I have previously fabricated any reports.
252. Some other pointers surrounding these charges, what did MA want me to show “remorse” over? “And it’s not just a way of getting attention in these matters”, What chance would I have of getting any attention? History proves beyond any reasonable doubt that I didn`t stand a chance of getting attention, every previous report had been ignored. I did want attention, attention to serious health and safety issues, and if I had got attention we wouldn’t be here now.
Charge 3 decision:
253. MA Failure to follow the correct procedure for reporting unit defects. “It is my belief that this issue was covered in charge one as you represented Steve and I will withdraw it on this occasion”.
254. There were 3 faults, 2 of these differ from the warning horn, are these not important? Is it only a reporting procedure on a warning horn that warrants a “Gross Misconduct” charge? Because that is what this is saying. It also shows that this was never a gross misconduct charge. MA never went over this charge in this hearing, he completely forgot about it.
255. Furthermore MA States, “My view is the relationship between FTPE and yourself has irrevocably broken down to the effect that you have deemed it necessary to sit there and promote the fact that you falsify reports in relation to this incident, and have done previously. With regard to this, it is my decision today to summarily dismiss you from service with immediate effect”.
256. I have never falsified any reports in relation to that incident or any other incidents. I would like to say that this has been used by TPE as an add on to try and justify their decision to dismiss me, this was not what their original charges charged me with. I challenge them to show any reports that they think have been, or likely to have been, fabricated in relation to that incident. Yet MA dismissed evidence I tried to show him from before this incident, but he uses what he thinks is useful to him from previous events. Here are parts from the hearing which prove exactly this.
257. (MA 20) “I am not interested in previously”.
258. (PW 164) where I attempt to show MA a previous report, his response is (MA 173) “I understand what your saying, this in relation to this incident is separate, like you say is previous”.
259. (MA 310) “I know what you are saying for the range of reports for previous and all this, I am only reading into the context of this because this is the one I know about”.
(PW 311) “But its relevant Mark, its evidence”.
(MA 312) “I understand that”.
(PW 313) “Ignorance”.
260. (MA 339) “Well I can`t comment before the event can I? I can only go on what I have seen post this".
261. (PW 374) “Would you like to look through some of this evidence Mark, it just highlights some of my frustrations”.
262. (MA 375) “I can understand your frustration because clearly it’s there”.
263. Any evidence I attempted to show MA was dismissed, because he found it to be previous, yet he uses issues which he even states as previous in his decision to dismiss me. Issues that do not have evidence to back the statement up.
264. (MA 397) MA then goes on to say, “I have made my decision based on the facts that I have had and on your representations today”.
265. As I have shown throughout, he based his decision on the wrong facts.
266. At the end of this meeting, ST gave MA an email (178) the contents of which divulge information on what Driver Manager Ged Higgins tells Driver Geoff Lee. It alleges that TPE were going to stop my wages and dismiss me. The only reason we never brought this up earlier in the meeting was because if not needed we did not want to cause Driver Geoff Lee any problems. Sadly by showing this email, it did cause Driver Lee problems.
267. A letter dated 8th July 2009 (179 & 179a) was sent by MA with the hearing outcome notes.
Charge 1.
“On the day in question you did fail to follow the correct procedure by not reporting via telephone to the control, not completing the repair book in full and forwarding it to the control and then allowing the unit to depart York with another driver and remain in service, this put the safety of all staff on the railway at risk until the unit returned to the depot at 22.36. Therefore, I find this charge proven”.
According to this, I failed to follow this procedure.
1. Not reporting via telephone to control.
2. Not completing the repair book in full and forwarding it to control.
3. Allowing the unit to depart York with another driver and remain in service.
So what happened to?
1. Stop and report to the signaller?
2. Reduce the train speed?
Why was number 3 above added?
268. So the only conclusion that I come to on this charge, is that Gross Misconduct is for not informing TPE Control and not filling out and faxing the repair slip to Control. This is something that is a common occurrence among drivers. I have evidence of this.
246. (PW 201) “Yes, I`ve done this type of thing before, but it never”.My answer was a referral to charge 1, the way I dealt with the defective warning horn that day was the same as any other day. But MA kept interrupting me and was really aggressive.
247. (PW 343) “As I say, I have done these type of things previously, I`ve not even had a warning. It’s not the first time”.Meaning, behaviour on the day in question, not informing control. But also by reporting using a scenario situation or referring to the hazards. (172) (173) (174) (175) (176) & (177)
248. (PW 345). “Mark, I`m the only driver at York that’s got two boxes over at Tanner Row, two boxes because I`m the one that puts most reports in. Previously health and safety rep, if you take time to go through them boxes you will find numerous occasions when I`ve done the same as this.I`ve never had much as a verbal or written warning about it. I`ve been spoken to but it’s never been classed as a verbal warning and I`ve never had a written warning about my reports”. Meaning, wrote so many reports on warning horn, noise and wiper failures that if investigated would have shown that maybe the procedures were not followed to the rule book.
249. (PW 358). “I`ve done this previously and I didn`t see any where wrong for what I was doing. If I had been jumped on previously maybe I would have reacted differently”. Meaning, the simple failure to report to control and fax the repair slip off. It was a common occurrence, every driver was guilty of this.
250. (PW 365). “It was my way of reporting faults”,Meaning, strong worded reports, not fabricated reports.
251. (PW 376). “You know that I am the type of person that has done this before, if I were jumped on before and warned and we come to an understanding then this would never have happened”. Meaning, at the time, I was trying to show MA some previous reports, showing my concerns for these very issues, they show that I never informed control, yet even though TPE had these, no manager came to me and let me know I was not supposedly doing the right thing. Although the comments state that I have done it before, I never once said that I have previously fabricated any reports.
252. Some other pointers surrounding these charges, what did MA want me to show “remorse” over? “And it’s not just a way of getting attention in these matters”, What chance would I have of getting any attention? History proves beyond any reasonable doubt that I didn`t stand a chance of getting attention, every previous report had been ignored. I did want attention, attention to serious health and safety issues, and if I had got attention we wouldn’t be here now.
Charge 3 decision:
253. MA Failure to follow the correct procedure for reporting unit defects. “It is my belief that this issue was covered in charge one as you represented Steve and I will withdraw it on this occasion”.
254. There were 3 faults, 2 of these differ from the warning horn, are these not important? Is it only a reporting procedure on a warning horn that warrants a “Gross Misconduct” charge? Because that is what this is saying. It also shows that this was never a gross misconduct charge. MA never went over this charge in this hearing, he completely forgot about it.
255. Furthermore MA States, “My view is the relationship between FTPE and yourself has irrevocably broken down to the effect that you have deemed it necessary to sit there and promote the fact that you falsify reports in relation to this incident, and have done previously. With regard to this, it is my decision today to summarily dismiss you from service with immediate effect”.
256. I have never falsified any reports in relation to that incident or any other incidents. I would like to say that this has been used by TPE as an add on to try and justify their decision to dismiss me, this was not what their original charges charged me with. I challenge them to show any reports that they think have been, or likely to have been, fabricated in relation to that incident. Yet MA dismissed evidence I tried to show him from before this incident, but he uses what he thinks is useful to him from previous events. Here are parts from the hearing which prove exactly this.
257. (MA 20) “I am not interested in previously”.
258. (PW 164) where I attempt to show MA a previous report, his response is (MA 173) “I understand what your saying, this in relation to this incident is separate, like you say is previous”.
259. (MA 310) “I know what you are saying for the range of reports for previous and all this, I am only reading into the context of this because this is the one I know about”.
(PW 311) “But its relevant Mark, its evidence”.
(MA 312) “I understand that”.
(PW 313) “Ignorance”.
260. (MA 339) “Well I can`t comment before the event can I? I can only go on what I have seen post this".
261. (PW 374) “Would you like to look through some of this evidence Mark, it just highlights some of my frustrations”.
262. (MA 375) “I can understand your frustration because clearly it’s there”.
263. Any evidence I attempted to show MA was dismissed, because he found it to be previous, yet he uses issues which he even states as previous in his decision to dismiss me. Issues that do not have evidence to back the statement up.
264. (MA 397) MA then goes on to say, “I have made my decision based on the facts that I have had and on your representations today”.
265. As I have shown throughout, he based his decision on the wrong facts.
266. At the end of this meeting, ST gave MA an email (178) the contents of which divulge information on what Driver Manager Ged Higgins tells Driver Geoff Lee. It alleges that TPE were going to stop my wages and dismiss me. The only reason we never brought this up earlier in the meeting was because if not needed we did not want to cause Driver Geoff Lee any problems. Sadly by showing this email, it did cause Driver Lee problems.
267. A letter dated 8th July 2009 (179 & 179a) was sent by MA with the hearing outcome notes.
Charge 1.
“On the day in question you did fail to follow the correct procedure by not reporting via telephone to the control, not completing the repair book in full and forwarding it to the control and then allowing the unit to depart York with another driver and remain in service, this put the safety of all staff on the railway at risk until the unit returned to the depot at 22.36. Therefore, I find this charge proven”.
According to this, I failed to follow this procedure.
1. Not reporting via telephone to control.
2. Not completing the repair book in full and forwarding it to control.
3. Allowing the unit to depart York with another driver and remain in service.
So what happened to?
1. Stop and report to the signaller?
2. Reduce the train speed?
Why was number 3 above added?
268. So the only conclusion that I come to on this charge, is that Gross Misconduct is for not informing TPE Control and not filling out and faxing the repair slip to Control. This is something that is a common occurrence among drivers. I have evidence of this.
Charge 2
269. “Following an investigation into a non reported near miss it was discovered that the whole incident was a premeditated fabrication and that if there had been a near miss you failed to report it correctly, I was disturbed by your admission of previous false reporting and the lack of remorse shown, this did not convince me that fabrication of safety events would not happen again, I was also concern how freely you admitted fabricating reports previously to get noticed and get things done. I have little faith in what quantity of your reports were truthful or how many were your way of getting attention. Therefore I find this charge proven”.
270. Firstly, I dispute that the incident was premeditated, I never admitted this and the investigation never stated this. Then it cannot be said, that if there had been a near miss, I would have failed to report it. How would MA know whether I would have failed to report a near miss if it happened? I never once said that I had previously made a false report. Then MA seems to believe that what occurred was because I wanted to get noticed and get attention, where could he possibly form this belief from, what evidence supports his claim? Where did I ever say that it was because I wanted to get noticed?
Charge 3
271. Charge 3 is withdrawn due to being included and proven within charge 1.
272. Charge 3 was a separate charge, it had no relation to charge one which was specific in that it did mention the warning horn as the piece of equipment. Charge 3 was a non specific charge, I can only assume it referred to the noise and wiper issues. If I was supposedly guilty of charge one then I should have been guilty of charge 3.
Between end of hearing and the appeal. 30th June to 7th September
273. All I now wanted was to get my appeal as quickly as possible. Sadly that was not to happen.
274. We made requests for information, it took 23 days to receive a copy of the minutes. Further information requested was not forthcoming. We requested that Driver Geoff Lee and Engineer Steve Bridge are allowed as witnesses, we also requested the minutes from TPE investigation into the email handed to them at the end of my hearing. An appeal hearing had been arranged for the 30th July but so much information was still outstanding.
275. On the 24th July ST received an email (180) from Miss Pears, regarding the interview minutes from Driver Geoff Lee and Manager G Higgins, they were promised to be ready by this week but now delayed (181) (2nd para) due to Driver Lee being off work sick and the notes being resent to his house.
276. Our request for 2 witnesses to attend was bizarrely refused (182) (para 4) Miss Pears said, “In any event, I am unclear what the purpose of Driver Lee attending as a witness is as he has already been interviewed and provided a statement to this effect. The purpose of witnesses is to add clarification and not to be cross examined. If you have questions that you wish to put to Driver Lee, please let me know the questions and the relevance of these so that I can make arrangements for them to be put to him. This also applies to Steve Bridge”. From this, I think this clearly shows what I am up against, I would also like to question the role of Miss Pears involvement throughout this whole episode. Especially in light of this next comment she made, “Due to my involvement in this difficult case and my role as advisor and procedural expert, I am unable to reschedule this hearing to take place before Tuesday 25th August 2009”. The obvious question is what makes this case difficult? Its classed as admitted conduct, how hard can that be to prove? Surely if they have a reasonable belief in their charges then this should not be difficult. What was Miss Pears advisory role? Especially as Miss Pears was present at my hearing and appeal.
277. On the 12th August a man called Mark Tucker had a disciplinary hearing (183) for gross misconduct without Miss Pears being in attendance, so why was the need for Miss Pears to attend my appeal if she is only there as a minute taker?
278. Miss Pears had refused us the 2 witnesses we requested, yet in an email (184) on Wednesday 2nd September she states, “I refer back to what I have said previously, but as you are calling them as witnesses it’s your responsibility to ask them if they wish to attend. If they are willing to attend you need to notify us so that we can ensure they have been released. However their relevance to the charges you face will need to be understood on the day”.
279. This was all well and good saying we can now use them, but it only left 2 working days to sort out, I tried to contact both men to no avail, unbeknown to me, but clearly known to Miss Pears, Driver Geoff Lee was still on the sick, although it later transpired that he was actually on holiday.
280. I did however manage to obtain 2 statements from the interviews with Driver Lee (185 to 185b) and Manager Higgins (186 to 186b). This is regarding the email sent to me last June, before my hearing in relation to Driver Higgins stating that TPE were going to stop my wages and sack me.
281. Driver Lee does not agree with what Ged Higgins minutes say, even to this day, he has not received a copy of his minutes to sign off as agreed even though they were supposedly posted to his house (180). The only copy he has seen is what I emailed to him. Question is why hasn`t Driver Lee had a copy of these minutes?
282. The minutes of Manager Higgins do not make sense in places and stop abruptly, I Have been told by a York driver that is mentioned in these minutes that the investigation is still on-going and there is a further 5 pages of these minutes (187). Question is, especially bearing in mind the allegation, what did TPE have to hide in not supplying me with these pages and concluding this investigation, as it is still on-going. Why hasn`t this been concluded and when will it be concluded?
283. In Driver Lee`s initial interview (188, 12 GL), he says, “Yes, well he said more than that”. This is in reference to what Manager Higgins told him about me.
284. Driver Lee then talks about being downloaded for a third time (189, 3 GL) (checking the data recorder on a train to see if the driver is driving to the standards required), basically saying he is being victimised, to which Ian Humphreys who is chairing this meeting says (189, 4 IH), “we clearly take any allegation of bullying seriously”. Why didn`t TPE take my allegation of bullying seriously?
285. Driver Lee then says (189, 5 GL), “I believe Perry won`t win his appeal, you`ll go to court and may settle out of court, and I`m left with an unhappy manager. Look I understand that Perry was like an irritant that your sick of scratching”. This is from a colleague who I never have anything to do with at work, or out of work, but for him to state this also shows the general feeling of most train crew that I have spoken with, in that I was persistent in bringing numerous health and safety issues to the attention of TPE and this is the only reason for me to have such charges against me.
286. There is a contradiction in these minutes at (189, 12 GL) in reference to the wording of the email where it says, “their looking to sack you”. Because allegedly Driver Lee says , “That’s my opinion, that’s what I said to Ged”. But at the end of these minutes (190), On the 17th July 2009, Driver Lee spoke with Ian Humphreys and asked the following to be added to his statement, “Ged said to me, “we are going to sack him. I responded by saying you can`t fucking say that”, Ged then said, “we took the train out of service for 2 days for no reason and it cost us £40,000”, to which I responded, “Well you would say that about every driver who reports a fault”. Driver Geoff Lee confirmed to me that it was Manager Ged Higgins who said, “we are going to sack him”.
269. “Following an investigation into a non reported near miss it was discovered that the whole incident was a premeditated fabrication and that if there had been a near miss you failed to report it correctly, I was disturbed by your admission of previous false reporting and the lack of remorse shown, this did not convince me that fabrication of safety events would not happen again, I was also concern how freely you admitted fabricating reports previously to get noticed and get things done. I have little faith in what quantity of your reports were truthful or how many were your way of getting attention. Therefore I find this charge proven”.
270. Firstly, I dispute that the incident was premeditated, I never admitted this and the investigation never stated this. Then it cannot be said, that if there had been a near miss, I would have failed to report it. How would MA know whether I would have failed to report a near miss if it happened? I never once said that I had previously made a false report. Then MA seems to believe that what occurred was because I wanted to get noticed and get attention, where could he possibly form this belief from, what evidence supports his claim? Where did I ever say that it was because I wanted to get noticed?
Charge 3
271. Charge 3 is withdrawn due to being included and proven within charge 1.
272. Charge 3 was a separate charge, it had no relation to charge one which was specific in that it did mention the warning horn as the piece of equipment. Charge 3 was a non specific charge, I can only assume it referred to the noise and wiper issues. If I was supposedly guilty of charge one then I should have been guilty of charge 3.
Between end of hearing and the appeal. 30th June to 7th September
273. All I now wanted was to get my appeal as quickly as possible. Sadly that was not to happen.
274. We made requests for information, it took 23 days to receive a copy of the minutes. Further information requested was not forthcoming. We requested that Driver Geoff Lee and Engineer Steve Bridge are allowed as witnesses, we also requested the minutes from TPE investigation into the email handed to them at the end of my hearing. An appeal hearing had been arranged for the 30th July but so much information was still outstanding.
275. On the 24th July ST received an email (180) from Miss Pears, regarding the interview minutes from Driver Geoff Lee and Manager G Higgins, they were promised to be ready by this week but now delayed (181) (2nd para) due to Driver Lee being off work sick and the notes being resent to his house.
276. Our request for 2 witnesses to attend was bizarrely refused (182) (para 4) Miss Pears said, “In any event, I am unclear what the purpose of Driver Lee attending as a witness is as he has already been interviewed and provided a statement to this effect. The purpose of witnesses is to add clarification and not to be cross examined. If you have questions that you wish to put to Driver Lee, please let me know the questions and the relevance of these so that I can make arrangements for them to be put to him. This also applies to Steve Bridge”. From this, I think this clearly shows what I am up against, I would also like to question the role of Miss Pears involvement throughout this whole episode. Especially in light of this next comment she made, “Due to my involvement in this difficult case and my role as advisor and procedural expert, I am unable to reschedule this hearing to take place before Tuesday 25th August 2009”. The obvious question is what makes this case difficult? Its classed as admitted conduct, how hard can that be to prove? Surely if they have a reasonable belief in their charges then this should not be difficult. What was Miss Pears advisory role? Especially as Miss Pears was present at my hearing and appeal.
277. On the 12th August a man called Mark Tucker had a disciplinary hearing (183) for gross misconduct without Miss Pears being in attendance, so why was the need for Miss Pears to attend my appeal if she is only there as a minute taker?
278. Miss Pears had refused us the 2 witnesses we requested, yet in an email (184) on Wednesday 2nd September she states, “I refer back to what I have said previously, but as you are calling them as witnesses it’s your responsibility to ask them if they wish to attend. If they are willing to attend you need to notify us so that we can ensure they have been released. However their relevance to the charges you face will need to be understood on the day”.
279. This was all well and good saying we can now use them, but it only left 2 working days to sort out, I tried to contact both men to no avail, unbeknown to me, but clearly known to Miss Pears, Driver Geoff Lee was still on the sick, although it later transpired that he was actually on holiday.
280. I did however manage to obtain 2 statements from the interviews with Driver Lee (185 to 185b) and Manager Higgins (186 to 186b). This is regarding the email sent to me last June, before my hearing in relation to Driver Higgins stating that TPE were going to stop my wages and sack me.
281. Driver Lee does not agree with what Ged Higgins minutes say, even to this day, he has not received a copy of his minutes to sign off as agreed even though they were supposedly posted to his house (180). The only copy he has seen is what I emailed to him. Question is why hasn`t Driver Lee had a copy of these minutes?
282. The minutes of Manager Higgins do not make sense in places and stop abruptly, I Have been told by a York driver that is mentioned in these minutes that the investigation is still on-going and there is a further 5 pages of these minutes (187). Question is, especially bearing in mind the allegation, what did TPE have to hide in not supplying me with these pages and concluding this investigation, as it is still on-going. Why hasn`t this been concluded and when will it be concluded?
283. In Driver Lee`s initial interview (188, 12 GL), he says, “Yes, well he said more than that”. This is in reference to what Manager Higgins told him about me.
284. Driver Lee then talks about being downloaded for a third time (189, 3 GL) (checking the data recorder on a train to see if the driver is driving to the standards required), basically saying he is being victimised, to which Ian Humphreys who is chairing this meeting says (189, 4 IH), “we clearly take any allegation of bullying seriously”. Why didn`t TPE take my allegation of bullying seriously?
285. Driver Lee then says (189, 5 GL), “I believe Perry won`t win his appeal, you`ll go to court and may settle out of court, and I`m left with an unhappy manager. Look I understand that Perry was like an irritant that your sick of scratching”. This is from a colleague who I never have anything to do with at work, or out of work, but for him to state this also shows the general feeling of most train crew that I have spoken with, in that I was persistent in bringing numerous health and safety issues to the attention of TPE and this is the only reason for me to have such charges against me.
286. There is a contradiction in these minutes at (189, 12 GL) in reference to the wording of the email where it says, “their looking to sack you”. Because allegedly Driver Lee says , “That’s my opinion, that’s what I said to Ged”. But at the end of these minutes (190), On the 17th July 2009, Driver Lee spoke with Ian Humphreys and asked the following to be added to his statement, “Ged said to me, “we are going to sack him. I responded by saying you can`t fucking say that”, Ged then said, “we took the train out of service for 2 days for no reason and it cost us £40,000”, to which I responded, “Well you would say that about every driver who reports a fault”. Driver Geoff Lee confirmed to me that it was Manager Ged Higgins who said, “we are going to sack him”.
287. Please remember that TPE did stop my wages (191), this was mentioned by Manager Higgins to Driver Lee before my wages were stopped, TPE did dismiss me, therefore I have no doubt that the decision to dismiss was premeditated. The decision not to finish this investigation, which resulted in grievances submitted by drivers named by Manager Higgins is further evidence to suggest that TPE were aware of the implications that this investigation would show, namely the decision to dismiss me was pre planned, whatever my defence, I was to be found guilty and dismissed.
288. The interview notes of Manager Ged Higgins have so many irregularities.
289. The first time that Manager Higgins is questioned regards myself by the Investigatory officer Mark Atkinson is on the second page (192, 3 MA).The next time is asking this question (192, 7 MA),“In your day to day activities at York and within your team, what has been discussed about Perry Webb”?
290. Manager Higgins response (192, 8 GH) was, “Nothing, I`m not party to any discussions or emails”. Which suggests that there were discussions and email`s about myself.
291. Mark Atkinson says to Manager Higgins (192, 11 MA), “He alleges that you quoted that we`d stop his pay”.
292. This next paragraph by Manager Higgins is all over the place (192, 12 GH), firstly he denies he knew that TPE were stopping my pay, then he mentions a union meeting which his wife attended that I was present at, supposedly I was telling everyone what was happening to me. Then he says, “I don’t have any line manager activities”. Followed by, “Geoff Ackerman told me when I was doing a simulator session he was off work sick months ago, January I think and spent the entire 3 hour session pumping me for information”. This does not make any sense, parts are surely missed out. If he is referring to myself as being off work sick, then if asked in January I was not off work sick.
293. (192, 19 MA) Why would Mark Atkinson if the reason for this investigatory interview was to ascertain what was supposedly said by Manager Higgins to Driver Lee about me, now revert back to issues with Driver Lee`s driving? MA says, “You say there`s been 3 downloads have they all had issues”?
294. (193, 2 MA) Mark Atkinson continues to question about other drivers and Manager Higgins relationship with them. This was not the reason Manager Higgins was being interviewed.
295. (193, 7 GH) This is where manager Higgins says, “It did annoy me that Charlotte (Miss Pears) hadn`t told us that Perry had been dismissed and I understand why. But then we would have been aware when fielding off questions. We should have known, they seem to know everything”. Aware of what? Manager Higgins then goes on to mention an individual in his office who takes things back to drivers, and then says, “if you want to dismiss drivers that`s up to you”.
296. Manager Higgins continues talking about this individual even saying that Route Driver Barry Cook is aware who he is (193, 11 GH), but then bizarrely he then mentions, “at an ATCU (Associated Train Crew Union) meeting Perry Webb was stood up and asked for Leigh (Manager Higgins wife) to be removed”. Further stating, “Perry wasn`t happy to speak in front of Leigh as she`s married to a manager”. Let`s now go back to (192, 12 GH) where Ged said, “he was telling everyone what was happening to him”. One minute I am telling everyone and the next I am not happy to speak? One of these statements is obviously a lie. I can tell you that I did attend an ATCU meeting that Manager Higgins wife (Leigh) attended, I never stood up and asked for her to be removed and my situation was never mentioned once.
297. Finally regarding this investigatory interview, let`s look at the way this interview ends. (193, 13 GH), “so I joined the TSSA”, were the final words. As I mentioned previously, I had it on good authority there is 5 more pages of this interview from a driver who has seen them while his grievance was being investigated. I did request the findings of this investigation but TPE refused to give me them. Again, what have they to worry about if they had behaved reasonably?
Appeal Hearing
298. I attended this hearing on the 7th September 2009 and brought 121 separate items of evidence. My representative was Mr Shaun Brady (ATCU) Associated Train Crew Union. TPE were represented by Paul Watson, Operations Director and Charlotte Pears, Employee Relations Manager. I appealed on the basis that previous evidence was not taken into account and that the charges of gross misconduct were excessive.
299. (194) The following is what PW says at the beginning of this appeal hearing.“In preparation for today, I have been through the notes of the hearing and the other paperwork that appertained to the hearing” also saying,"but Perry's main point in terms of the hearing is that his actions were driven he believes by, I don’t want to put words into your mouth, I am sure that you will represent yourself as you wish to, but effectively I was driven to this action by the amount or frequency of faults with units”. Straight away, PW fails to mention the ignorance I pointed out to Mark Atkinson. Therefore if he had read the notes and other paperwork this should have been evident, not just the frequency of faults with units.
300. (194) (2nd para) SB states, “First what I would like to do is just raise some procedural deficiencies”.
301. (194) (3rd para) SB “we asked for two witnesses to come and they were refused” and “when Perry was asked to come to an investigation and we asked for representation that was refused”. (195) (2nd para) “There was no charges under which rule book or which procedure he had actually broken”.
302. (195) (3rd para) SB “I would also like to raise you with you Mr Watson is the fact that there was also a number of managers, not high management in your respect, that would have come today to defend Perry on the basis that Perry is a good driver and he was proactive in actually safety and he was actually in some ways looking after the business by identifying problems within the Company”. There was indeed some managers who backed me up but for fear of their own job wouldn`t come forward. They did however supply me with information which will be seen later on.
303. (195a) (1st para) SB says, “I am also going to present to you a catalogue of things with Perry over a history of time was reporting things, all I am going to ask you Paul is, do you accept that the safety reporting procedures within your Company was absolutely chaotic”? PW response is, “no”. SB says, “OK If I was able to prove that then, would you accept some of the things that I say to you about the way Perry was frustrated? If I could be able to prove to you that your reporting procedures were chaotic would you accept that some of the things that Perry was frustrated about was the fact that nothing that he reported was getting done or actually acknowledged”. PW replied, “I would certainly consider it, without knowing what it is; I obviously can’t say one way or the other”. Although as we now know, TPE responded to my reports as “No response or comments provided to the claimant by the respondent”.
304. SB and PW leave the room, SB shows PW (196 & 197) two emails which were given to us by a Manager from within TPE, this is proven by the fact that the only recipients of these emails were TPE management. Which proves the point that I said earlier about some managers within TPE backing me up.
288. The interview notes of Manager Ged Higgins have so many irregularities.
289. The first time that Manager Higgins is questioned regards myself by the Investigatory officer Mark Atkinson is on the second page (192, 3 MA).The next time is asking this question (192, 7 MA),“In your day to day activities at York and within your team, what has been discussed about Perry Webb”?
290. Manager Higgins response (192, 8 GH) was, “Nothing, I`m not party to any discussions or emails”. Which suggests that there were discussions and email`s about myself.
291. Mark Atkinson says to Manager Higgins (192, 11 MA), “He alleges that you quoted that we`d stop his pay”.
292. This next paragraph by Manager Higgins is all over the place (192, 12 GH), firstly he denies he knew that TPE were stopping my pay, then he mentions a union meeting which his wife attended that I was present at, supposedly I was telling everyone what was happening to me. Then he says, “I don’t have any line manager activities”. Followed by, “Geoff Ackerman told me when I was doing a simulator session he was off work sick months ago, January I think and spent the entire 3 hour session pumping me for information”. This does not make any sense, parts are surely missed out. If he is referring to myself as being off work sick, then if asked in January I was not off work sick.
293. (192, 19 MA) Why would Mark Atkinson if the reason for this investigatory interview was to ascertain what was supposedly said by Manager Higgins to Driver Lee about me, now revert back to issues with Driver Lee`s driving? MA says, “You say there`s been 3 downloads have they all had issues”?
294. (193, 2 MA) Mark Atkinson continues to question about other drivers and Manager Higgins relationship with them. This was not the reason Manager Higgins was being interviewed.
295. (193, 7 GH) This is where manager Higgins says, “It did annoy me that Charlotte (Miss Pears) hadn`t told us that Perry had been dismissed and I understand why. But then we would have been aware when fielding off questions. We should have known, they seem to know everything”. Aware of what? Manager Higgins then goes on to mention an individual in his office who takes things back to drivers, and then says, “if you want to dismiss drivers that`s up to you”.
296. Manager Higgins continues talking about this individual even saying that Route Driver Barry Cook is aware who he is (193, 11 GH), but then bizarrely he then mentions, “at an ATCU (Associated Train Crew Union) meeting Perry Webb was stood up and asked for Leigh (Manager Higgins wife) to be removed”. Further stating, “Perry wasn`t happy to speak in front of Leigh as she`s married to a manager”. Let`s now go back to (192, 12 GH) where Ged said, “he was telling everyone what was happening to him”. One minute I am telling everyone and the next I am not happy to speak? One of these statements is obviously a lie. I can tell you that I did attend an ATCU meeting that Manager Higgins wife (Leigh) attended, I never stood up and asked for her to be removed and my situation was never mentioned once.
297. Finally regarding this investigatory interview, let`s look at the way this interview ends. (193, 13 GH), “so I joined the TSSA”, were the final words. As I mentioned previously, I had it on good authority there is 5 more pages of this interview from a driver who has seen them while his grievance was being investigated. I did request the findings of this investigation but TPE refused to give me them. Again, what have they to worry about if they had behaved reasonably?
Appeal Hearing
298. I attended this hearing on the 7th September 2009 and brought 121 separate items of evidence. My representative was Mr Shaun Brady (ATCU) Associated Train Crew Union. TPE were represented by Paul Watson, Operations Director and Charlotte Pears, Employee Relations Manager. I appealed on the basis that previous evidence was not taken into account and that the charges of gross misconduct were excessive.
299. (194) The following is what PW says at the beginning of this appeal hearing.“In preparation for today, I have been through the notes of the hearing and the other paperwork that appertained to the hearing” also saying,"but Perry's main point in terms of the hearing is that his actions were driven he believes by, I don’t want to put words into your mouth, I am sure that you will represent yourself as you wish to, but effectively I was driven to this action by the amount or frequency of faults with units”. Straight away, PW fails to mention the ignorance I pointed out to Mark Atkinson. Therefore if he had read the notes and other paperwork this should have been evident, not just the frequency of faults with units.
300. (194) (2nd para) SB states, “First what I would like to do is just raise some procedural deficiencies”.
301. (194) (3rd para) SB “we asked for two witnesses to come and they were refused” and “when Perry was asked to come to an investigation and we asked for representation that was refused”. (195) (2nd para) “There was no charges under which rule book or which procedure he had actually broken”.
302. (195) (3rd para) SB “I would also like to raise you with you Mr Watson is the fact that there was also a number of managers, not high management in your respect, that would have come today to defend Perry on the basis that Perry is a good driver and he was proactive in actually safety and he was actually in some ways looking after the business by identifying problems within the Company”. There was indeed some managers who backed me up but for fear of their own job wouldn`t come forward. They did however supply me with information which will be seen later on.
303. (195a) (1st para) SB says, “I am also going to present to you a catalogue of things with Perry over a history of time was reporting things, all I am going to ask you Paul is, do you accept that the safety reporting procedures within your Company was absolutely chaotic”? PW response is, “no”. SB says, “OK If I was able to prove that then, would you accept some of the things that I say to you about the way Perry was frustrated? If I could be able to prove to you that your reporting procedures were chaotic would you accept that some of the things that Perry was frustrated about was the fact that nothing that he reported was getting done or actually acknowledged”. PW replied, “I would certainly consider it, without knowing what it is; I obviously can’t say one way or the other”. Although as we now know, TPE responded to my reports as “No response or comments provided to the claimant by the respondent”.
304. SB and PW leave the room, SB shows PW (196 & 197) two emails which were given to us by a Manager from within TPE, this is proven by the fact that the only recipients of these emails were TPE management. Which proves the point that I said earlier about some managers within TPE backing me up.
305. The first email (196) is from Jill James, Safety Systems Manager to (TPE all staff), management staff. It is regarding the IP (Injury Prevention) procedures, Jill states, “There are a number of Injury Prevention contacts in the database which remain open and require close out, some of which date back to previous years”. What happened to the IP reports that I submitted about the warning horns (198 & 199) ? These were not in this database, why not? What this shows is that individual managers who received these reports from me couldn`t be bothered to implement them into the IP database. As Peter Turpin was my allocated Driver manager then I hold him responsible. This email also shows that issues brought up in IP reports are still not addressed years later.
306. The second email (197) is from Paul Watson, Operations Director to the same management staff. In this email, Mr Watson asks managers to check for any outstanding actions that they have against them and put an update on the system if action being taken is ongoing. Mr Watson then goes on to say, “Be aware that in some cases but not indicating the correct field when the entry is first made, it is possible to assign yourself an action out of something that was rectified on the day. If this is the case they need to be closed down now, as explaining this some months later will not be acceptable”. If something “was rectified on the day” then I am quite sure the case would have been closed on that day and not left open for possibly a few years. This just highlights the slack behaviour of TPE management in using this IP process.
307. This is further highlighted by Mr Watson`s concerns when he states (197), “where the view is being formed that anyone who has actions open for a long time that could/should have been closed, are not taking safety as seriously as they should”. So what about the undeniable ignorance shown towards myself, the IP and other reports that never received any attention, these are issues that have been open for years and are still ongoing, these issues should have been dealt with. Are his management taking safety seriously by ignoring these issues? What this shows is the IP process which I have used is a system that the management of TPE for whatever reason are struggling to understand their role in using this system. The failure of this system is part of the reason I took the way I report issues to another level. I knew this system didn`t work, these emails are further proof supplied in TPE own senior management words.
308. SB explained to PW that I had been involved in 3 suicides, the latest incident apart from the death of track worker Lindsey Warrington at Old Trafford was hitting a woman at Deighton near Huddersfield and chopping off part of her arm and leg. These issues were not taken into consideration.
309. SB then explains in detail about reports not being answered. PW is then given 121 separate pieces of my evidence which I wanted him to consider, including ignored reports. PW Says (200), “All I would point out I think is that I understand that some of these refer to the point that you are making about fed up, reporting, nothing seems to ever get done”.
310. The only recommendation that came from the investigation (201) 10.1, “FTPE Operations Standards Department to incorporate the correct reporting procedure into the safety briefs”. We can see from the following driver responses by email (202) that this never happened. So what this shows is that TPE were worried that not only myself hadn`t reported correctly but other possibly hadn`t, they should have said also, “driver managers to stop ignoring reports and give feedback to any questions arising from issues reported”.
311. (200) SB says that the report received from the download of my journey that day (203 to 203d) clearly states on each page that I never used or attempted to use the NRN radio to ring control, it also states that there was no reduction in speed as required if warning horn was defective.I investigated this because I knew that I had made attempts to ring out on this radio. I got a driver friend, Graham Hill to ask a manager Mr Naz Chickhalia to find out if the use of the NRN radio shows up on a train download of data. (204) Shows that if a call is successful or not, it will not show up on a download. Therefore the only conclusion that I can make, is that whoever wrote on the downloaded graphs lied to make me look far worse. They also had no idea what type of warning horn failure I had that day, so they opted again for the worst case scenario for me.
312. (205) SB brings up the subject of my employment contract, “The other thing is when Perry asked for some of the evidence one of the issues he asked for was his contract of employment”. “Now the contract of employment that was issued to him was the pre contract fromRegional Railways”. SB points out that the disciplinary procedures used against me were not from my original contract with Regional Railways but from TPE dated February 2004. I never knew that these procedures existed until a copy of them arrived with my charges letter.
313. (206) SB mentions the fact that I was denied the 2 witnesses to attend my hearing, Driver Geoff Lee and Engineer Steve Bridge. Then the fact that Manager Mark Atkinson during my appeal said he didn’t abide by ACAS guidelines, he abided by TPE guidelines and furthermore that if PW listened to the recording of the hearing, he would hear the hostility and the atmosphere of pre-determination portrayed.
314. (207) SB says to PW at the end of the paragraph, “Basically you have identified that your people are not taking safety seriously”, to which PW agrees and says, “Yes I understand that”. This is something that is so obvious to me and has been for years, I do however think that it possibly isn`t a case of not taking it seriously but more a case of not fully understanding health and safety law, including their duties as management under this law. I believe that their management are too fragmented and individual managers have become isolated and therefore insecure, possibly out of fear they decide to ignore rather than ask for help. I don`t hate these people, my reasoning is in an attempt to try and understand why they ignored me to their utmost maximum, their system fails them as pointed out above and agreed by PW, they fear ridicule and the wrath of higher management if they speak out.
315. PW now sums up my first charge (208), “The first point of clarification for me is, in terms of reporting the partial failure your case today is definitely that you feel you have applied the rule book in terms of you attempted to report it twice via NRN at the most convenient opportunity”. I agreed with this statement.
316. Actual Rule Book wording. (209)
37.3 When in service
b) Partial failure
If the warning horn becomes partially defective (for example, one
tone not working) on a train which is in service, you must:
• tell the train operator’s control at the first convenient opportunity
• carry out the instructions given.
317. PW says, “So the question is, given that as you have said yourself this was in your view serious because of the implications of warnings on the line obviously, do you think the fact that you knew you that call failed for whatever reason cos you said static you couldn't be heard because of static, do you think that the actions of therefore trying it again, next place up, I think you said Northallerton, (210) Do you think that that meets the requirements of that section of the rule book”?
318. Notice how PW makes the point of how I deemed the issue as serious, not that he deemed it serious, this point is made by him on numerous occasions. I have always felt and acted this way, my reports show that. But it was never down to what I thought. I always thought that it was a very serious defect and that trains should not be allowed into service or run with any type of horn defect. But with a partial failure and TPE`s own Defective On Train Equipment contingency plans this train would have run regardless.
319. My response was, “yes”, I did feel it met the requirements of the rule book, mainly because this was how I had always interpreted this rule and it had never been brought to my attention that I was supposedly wrong. The word, “convenient”, being the key component. How I treat something as convenient will be totally different to how someone else treats something as convenient. It`s down to a matter of opinion, but a matter of opinion is not a procedure, it`s only a weapon in the hands of the person in control of the situation. Hence because in Paul Watson`s “opinion”, I am guilty, this cannot possibly be fair, I am guilty because of a difference in opinions.
_
320. (211) PW says “No I understand that the point, the question I am asking is in terms of sufficiency is that that I am taking what you told me earlier at face value”. So, would it have made any difference if I had stated that I made ten attempts instead of two? Where does sufficiency come into the rule book wording? In which procedure is sufficiency mentioned?
321. (211) PW says “Partial failure. Clearly in there it says stop where convenient and report to control. What I am saying is at the point of I have a defective working horn because for part of that journey even if I say take your point of, half his fault it was no long accepted because you made that today and at a certain stage it wasn’t defective, (PW understands it wasn`t defective, yet in the original decision by MA to dismiss me, he said allowing the train to leave York put the whole of the railway at risk, he found me guilty of something that clearly wasn`t a true fact) but during the journey and the two stops where you have attempted NRN contact it is defective, the question that I would ask why are those stops not using another method of communication available”.
322. (212) PW then says, “Yeah but the question I have you see, the thing I am trying to understand is I am taking what you said at face value which is I have got that much concern because of the reasons that you highlighted before, I have been involved in this and it was a danger to anybody on the track essentially, and all I am saying is at this stage we have got a partially defective warning horn, there are other methods of communication, there are phone conversations, the conductor on the train has a phone, there are signal post telephones, there are a number of ways of raising that issue for the duration of the time that the horn was partially defective. All of which you elected not to use so I just trying to”.
323. Again, all PW mentions is my concern of the situation, not his belief that the situation posed a danger.I elected not to use another method of communication because I am not instructed by any rules to do this and I am so, so used to this type of occurrence, it is second nature. This is how I have always behaved in this type of incident.Furthermore, it clearly states in the rules.
(213) 2.2, Driver reporting a defect
If possible you must avoid stopping the train.
On a junction
At any place where it might be difficult to deal with the situation.
324. At Darlington, I had green signals, my conductor was clearly busy, the nearest telephones for me were the adjacent platform, which after I had attempted to use the NRN and looked down my train, people were on and off very quickly and we were ready to move, or in the building opposite which requires a code to the lock and I did not know it, I deemed this inappropriate to attempt a call by other means. It was in my mind not convenient. At Northallerton, we had green signals, by the time I had finished trying to call out on the radio, I received the buzzer to set off, Northallerton is an extremely busy junction and I deemed it inappropriate therefore not convenient to attempt to call control using other means. The rule book wording is all about making a decision on what you think or class convenient as being, I was there on that day, Paul Watson wasn`t. But lets just remember, I was charged with gross misconduct for this, is this really gross misconduct based on this evidence?
325. What we must also remember here is, if I had have got my call through to TPE control they would have referred to their (DOTE) Defective On Train Contingency plans (214) which clearly states that this train would remain in service without any alterations to its speed. So if we re-evaluate the charge of gross misconduct, bearing in mind that this train would have definitely run, what damage had I caused? Where is there a serious problem that warrants gross misconduct? Why wasn`t the information from the rule book and the DOTE used during the investigation? Is there any wonder that my email (215 & 216) to MD Vernon Barker on the 12th February 2009 complained of a witch hunt?
326. We now go on to the issue of the ignored reports and exactly what I have done reporting wise in the past.
327. (212) PW “Right then following on from that in terms of the reports you have raised elsewhere about these issues, you have included the numbering in here”. ”You have raised them. In terms of your escalation of them because effectively what you are saying today is that I am that frustrated there is nothing occurring as a consequence of my report, that I felt driven to take this action. Because effectively this is something what you have said today. “What process have you gone through for raising those other than putting them on the report, have you engaged in any”,
328. Surely I should not have had to explain this, if Paul had taken time to read through my evidence there was ample information in there for him to know what I had done in attempting to raise these issues. I had made this clearly obvious in my hearing.
329. I explained, “I have put it through IP reports, I have put it through driver's reports, I have put it on defect slips, I have verbally spoke to Management about it and I have even raised it at our Branch ASLEF Branch”.
330. (212) SB interrupts and says, “One of the avenues that could have been used if they were in operation was the safety days, the briefs. But if you look at if you look at where them safety briefs have occurred they nearly never even actually happen do they? How often have you had a safety brief”?
331. I explained, 3 in 5 years, although TPE were only aware I had attended 2.
332. (217) PW continues, “So I mean like I say, what I am trying to what I am trying to understand is that you have gone to a point of escalation where you accept and this is my word its not meant to inferring anything its just my way of describing but apart from you had, you had decided that that invention of an event of driver action because I think you said something along those lines”. “Invention of an action, why would you not between I constantly report it, I understand what you are saying, I constantly report. My belief is that nothings been done, why would you not try and address that in some other fashion. I mean I am giving credit to the fact that as you say”.
333. (217) my response was, “Can you tell me how you would do it yourself then Paul please, because I have tried, through reporting, repairs books, verbally, where do I go? Other than like Shaun says, do I go to the HMRI, that’s what I am trying to say what do I do”? What you have to understand here, is that apart from becoming effectively a whistleblower, what options am I left with?
334. (217) SB makes a very valid point, “Can I just say Paul when I raised, if you look at there was two parts to your answer is, if you look at the avenues of communication that were within the Company, I believe that Perry demonstrated that he had tried all of them. Now the other avenues which something Perry didn’t want to do and wouldn't do was to expose you to outside forces like the HMRI, the Rail Regulator, ATOC the Transport Ministers, the Daily Mirror, the Sunday Mirror, York Evening Express. So that there, sothere could have been explored of other avenues but he didn’t want to do that he tried to build within the communication that was available”. To which PW actually says, “No I Understand I understand that but what”.
335. (217) PW then states, “But the point the point I am trying to make is, within the Company, there are there are ways of escalating”. SB asks what other avenues were there?
336. (217) PW replies, “What I am saying is, post event, you have emailed a number of people, and you could have emailed any of those people prior to the event. But you chose not to”. “Perry chose to email a number of people including myself the Managing Director, post event”. “I am saying if the concern is that great why wouldn’t he use that avenue pre event, which he must know its there because he’s used it post event”. Why indeed, should I have to go those lengths and where does the escalation stop? How far did Paul Watson expect me to go? But where? In which procedure does it tell me that this is what I should have done?
337. So why didn`t I take this to higher management? Because I twice before involved MD Vernon Barker (218 & 219) the email shows that I contacted him on the 13th August 2006, cc to the then Depot Manager Chris Swift, the Depot Manager Chris Swift never responded. Vernon`s PA promptly replied stating she would bring it to his attention when he returns from holiday in September, as you can see, I sent another email on the 15th November 2006 saying that I was still awaiting a response. The problem I had with this warning horn issue in 2009 required a very quick response, not waiting 3 months or more without a response.
What is of extreme relevance with my email to MD Vernon Barker on the 13th August 2006 is that it mentions the then Operations Director Danny Fox, this man stopped our Employee Relations Spokesperson Ian Beck from reading out my concerns at board level yet never had the decency to speak to me about issues I was raising. What example does that set and is there any wonder I had absolutely no faith in top level management taking any notice of the warning horn problem.
320. (211) PW says “No I understand that the point, the question I am asking is in terms of sufficiency is that that I am taking what you told me earlier at face value”. So, would it have made any difference if I had stated that I made ten attempts instead of two? Where does sufficiency come into the rule book wording? In which procedure is sufficiency mentioned?
321. (211) PW says “Partial failure. Clearly in there it says stop where convenient and report to control. What I am saying is at the point of I have a defective working horn because for part of that journey even if I say take your point of, half his fault it was no long accepted because you made that today and at a certain stage it wasn’t defective, (PW understands it wasn`t defective, yet in the original decision by MA to dismiss me, he said allowing the train to leave York put the whole of the railway at risk, he found me guilty of something that clearly wasn`t a true fact) but during the journey and the two stops where you have attempted NRN contact it is defective, the question that I would ask why are those stops not using another method of communication available”.
322. (212) PW then says, “Yeah but the question I have you see, the thing I am trying to understand is I am taking what you said at face value which is I have got that much concern because of the reasons that you highlighted before, I have been involved in this and it was a danger to anybody on the track essentially, and all I am saying is at this stage we have got a partially defective warning horn, there are other methods of communication, there are phone conversations, the conductor on the train has a phone, there are signal post telephones, there are a number of ways of raising that issue for the duration of the time that the horn was partially defective. All of which you elected not to use so I just trying to”.
323. Again, all PW mentions is my concern of the situation, not his belief that the situation posed a danger.I elected not to use another method of communication because I am not instructed by any rules to do this and I am so, so used to this type of occurrence, it is second nature. This is how I have always behaved in this type of incident.Furthermore, it clearly states in the rules.
(213) 2.2, Driver reporting a defect
If possible you must avoid stopping the train.
On a junction
At any place where it might be difficult to deal with the situation.
324. At Darlington, I had green signals, my conductor was clearly busy, the nearest telephones for me were the adjacent platform, which after I had attempted to use the NRN and looked down my train, people were on and off very quickly and we were ready to move, or in the building opposite which requires a code to the lock and I did not know it, I deemed this inappropriate to attempt a call by other means. It was in my mind not convenient. At Northallerton, we had green signals, by the time I had finished trying to call out on the radio, I received the buzzer to set off, Northallerton is an extremely busy junction and I deemed it inappropriate therefore not convenient to attempt to call control using other means. The rule book wording is all about making a decision on what you think or class convenient as being, I was there on that day, Paul Watson wasn`t. But lets just remember, I was charged with gross misconduct for this, is this really gross misconduct based on this evidence?
325. What we must also remember here is, if I had have got my call through to TPE control they would have referred to their (DOTE) Defective On Train Contingency plans (214) which clearly states that this train would remain in service without any alterations to its speed. So if we re-evaluate the charge of gross misconduct, bearing in mind that this train would have definitely run, what damage had I caused? Where is there a serious problem that warrants gross misconduct? Why wasn`t the information from the rule book and the DOTE used during the investigation? Is there any wonder that my email (215 & 216) to MD Vernon Barker on the 12th February 2009 complained of a witch hunt?
326. We now go on to the issue of the ignored reports and exactly what I have done reporting wise in the past.
327. (212) PW “Right then following on from that in terms of the reports you have raised elsewhere about these issues, you have included the numbering in here”. ”You have raised them. In terms of your escalation of them because effectively what you are saying today is that I am that frustrated there is nothing occurring as a consequence of my report, that I felt driven to take this action. Because effectively this is something what you have said today. “What process have you gone through for raising those other than putting them on the report, have you engaged in any”,
328. Surely I should not have had to explain this, if Paul had taken time to read through my evidence there was ample information in there for him to know what I had done in attempting to raise these issues. I had made this clearly obvious in my hearing.
329. I explained, “I have put it through IP reports, I have put it through driver's reports, I have put it on defect slips, I have verbally spoke to Management about it and I have even raised it at our Branch ASLEF Branch”.
330. (212) SB interrupts and says, “One of the avenues that could have been used if they were in operation was the safety days, the briefs. But if you look at if you look at where them safety briefs have occurred they nearly never even actually happen do they? How often have you had a safety brief”?
331. I explained, 3 in 5 years, although TPE were only aware I had attended 2.
332. (217) PW continues, “So I mean like I say, what I am trying to what I am trying to understand is that you have gone to a point of escalation where you accept and this is my word its not meant to inferring anything its just my way of describing but apart from you had, you had decided that that invention of an event of driver action because I think you said something along those lines”. “Invention of an action, why would you not between I constantly report it, I understand what you are saying, I constantly report. My belief is that nothings been done, why would you not try and address that in some other fashion. I mean I am giving credit to the fact that as you say”.
333. (217) my response was, “Can you tell me how you would do it yourself then Paul please, because I have tried, through reporting, repairs books, verbally, where do I go? Other than like Shaun says, do I go to the HMRI, that’s what I am trying to say what do I do”? What you have to understand here, is that apart from becoming effectively a whistleblower, what options am I left with?
334. (217) SB makes a very valid point, “Can I just say Paul when I raised, if you look at there was two parts to your answer is, if you look at the avenues of communication that were within the Company, I believe that Perry demonstrated that he had tried all of them. Now the other avenues which something Perry didn’t want to do and wouldn't do was to expose you to outside forces like the HMRI, the Rail Regulator, ATOC the Transport Ministers, the Daily Mirror, the Sunday Mirror, York Evening Express. So that there, sothere could have been explored of other avenues but he didn’t want to do that he tried to build within the communication that was available”. To which PW actually says, “No I Understand I understand that but what”.
335. (217) PW then states, “But the point the point I am trying to make is, within the Company, there are there are ways of escalating”. SB asks what other avenues were there?
336. (217) PW replies, “What I am saying is, post event, you have emailed a number of people, and you could have emailed any of those people prior to the event. But you chose not to”. “Perry chose to email a number of people including myself the Managing Director, post event”. “I am saying if the concern is that great why wouldn’t he use that avenue pre event, which he must know its there because he’s used it post event”. Why indeed, should I have to go those lengths and where does the escalation stop? How far did Paul Watson expect me to go? But where? In which procedure does it tell me that this is what I should have done?
337. So why didn`t I take this to higher management? Because I twice before involved MD Vernon Barker (218 & 219) the email shows that I contacted him on the 13th August 2006, cc to the then Depot Manager Chris Swift, the Depot Manager Chris Swift never responded. Vernon`s PA promptly replied stating she would bring it to his attention when he returns from holiday in September, as you can see, I sent another email on the 15th November 2006 saying that I was still awaiting a response. The problem I had with this warning horn issue in 2009 required a very quick response, not waiting 3 months or more without a response.
What is of extreme relevance with my email to MD Vernon Barker on the 13th August 2006 is that it mentions the then Operations Director Danny Fox, this man stopped our Employee Relations Spokesperson Ian Beck from reading out my concerns at board level yet never had the decency to speak to me about issues I was raising. What example does that set and is there any wonder I had absolutely no faith in top level management taking any notice of the warning horn problem.
338. A further serious issue I raised with MD Vernon Barker orally during a journey he had in the front cab with me, which he involved in the IP process was regarding limiting the distance a train is allowed to reverse. I had this conversation on the 2nd October 2008, you can see by the IP paperwork (220 & 221) that I am still to receive feedback and that it took 10 months to the 3rd July 2009 for the action, to bring it to the attention of the engineering team. This is taking an health and safety issue and escalating it to the top level, if the MD cannot respond then what hope do I have? Would you class this as acceptable?
339. (222) PW then says, “OK well I understand that yes. So moving on I mean is your base belief, because you have referred to a number of documents in here, is your base belief that nothing was being done to rectify this issue or is your base belief that what we were doing was not sufficient”.
340. Quite clearly, this far involved, all what we have gone through and PW cannot see the answer to his last question. If he had read through all my evidence then he would know the answer. If he had read through the investigation and the hearing notes he would have seen the answer. If he had listened to myself and SB so far, he would know the answer. No disrespect, but I think even someone with a low IQ would know that answer. This just typifies why I felt so demoralised at times, nobody listens.
341. (222) My response was, “No nothing was being done because you can go and check my box file, you can go ask the Management, I never got a response to anything on warning horns not one”.
342. (222) PW points out, “OK, but you have referred today to Tracking Bulletin (223) that, that clearly says what’s being done to address it as well”. This cannot be any defence on his behalf, this document came out while I was on investigatory suspension and should have been used in their investigation. Amazingly this document in some respects actually hangs them out to dry, it is an admission of guilt. It reads as follows.
TPE FLEET UPDATE, PERIOD 10, 7th Dec 2008 to 3rd January 2009
Class 185 Horns:
The issue of class 185 air horn defects is one problem about which FTPE drivers
wish to know what is happening. SINCE INTRODUCTION, horn faults have
become prevalent during the winter months especially during damp conditions.
A number of alterations to the system have already been carried out in the form of pressure
regulators,non return valves, settings and adjustments, we have discussed this matter further
with Siemens and the following protocol will now be as follows
It further states that:
“No fault found or working on arrival on depot shall no longer be acceptable
answers”.
“Assistance from FTPE to investigate in service and provide the necessary
detailed Information on the reported fault”. No disrespect, but TPE have had
since 2006 to investigate this and supply the information, its now 2010 and
still ongoing, why? Because they never deemed this problem as serious.
343. They freely admit, that since introduction back in 2006 they have been aware of these serious horn defects.
344. (224) PW says, “OK and then finally on that theme if you like about what you think we were or weren't doing with it, I would I would imagine you have probably had, simply because you were a Health & Safety Officer at one stage you said today”, “So I would assume you had more contact with us than most to be fair because Health & Safety Officers normally do on a Health & Safety basis”.
345. (224) I explain, “If you look through there, there was many times when I have requested meetings and there was many times when I was promised meetings which never materialised. Going down to as far as being given an office with furnishings and everything. It never happened”. We were given a room the size of a broom cupboard which we have to share with the RMT union, no privacy, the computer we use was donated to us by a driver, it is old and keeps crashing, there is no access to TPE intranet or the internet and it is on the first floor of a building with no fire escape. Diabolical conditions.
346. (224) PW says, “OK. But in terms of your dealing with complaints in the past then, because as I say, you must have dealt with them”. How did he think I dealt with them, all I did was get frustrated and write further reports till it reached a peak like it did in 2004, then I receive a severe reprimand for what TPE call derogatory comments.
347. (224) I responded with, “Well if you look through my reports Paul (225) not one of them in there, there is about 130 reports and every time I have to highlight it, I've highlighted it, I've said ignored – why you ignoring me, why you ignoring me. I was in general ignored completely. That proves it”. I did choose 20 of these reports using a cross section with different health and safety issues, the response of TPE as directed from the case management discussion was (226), “No response or comments provided to the claimant by the respondent”. I then went on to say, “I don’t understand why your Management didn’t come back to me on them issues all the time”.
348. (227) PW says, “OK so if I phrase that question slightly differently then... In that period of time across of range of issues would you say it was fair to say that you were consistently ignored or that it was patchy response”? I responded with, “No it was consistent ignorance”. The response then of PW was not what I would expect from a senior manager, he said, “Yeah OK”. There was an odd response now and again which I have shown, but nowhere near enough to even call patchy.
349. (227) PW now abruptly changes track and brings up the charge of misconduct in respect of supposedly failing to respond to a request to attend a medical. This is however the point that Miss Pears buts in on a regular basis. PW argument (228) is that I should have known that in TPE terms and conditions that to be out of the country while under a sick note I needed their permission. (229) I ask where does it imply that requirement.
350. (229) PW states that it is in the blue book of conditions. I explain that I have never seen this book before. I then enquired that when I first left the UK under a sick note, nobody said anything to me about needing permission. Later on (230) PW actually says, “Perry does leave the country and tells us and I accept he does”.
351. (231) PW makes a statement, “because of the seriousness of the allegations that Perry has made, we had an important and this is not about train faults, this is about harassment. Perry made a serious allegation and we appointed an independent investigator who not unreasonably based on what Perry had told us was attempting to contact him for three months to take forward this investigation”. Its such a shame that when I made the many reports about serious train defects that could cause loss of life they never took my serious allegations forward or indeed took any notice of them. Lets remember I was off work with depression, I would not have been in any fit state to aid this investigator at that time. This investigator could not have been attempting to contact me for 3 months, as surely TPE told him I was on holiday to the 5th or 7th May? TPE had sent letters to my house, when I never responded to them, why didn`t they once try to ring me? House number or mobile, what if I had been in an accident, in hospital? Where is the chain of care? They normally make home visits, why not to me? The reason is the continued ignorance that surrounded everything about me regarding their behaviour.
352. Adding further to this at (231) PW says, “but the question I`m asking of which I believe has two relevant parts which you haven`t answered is, why would you tell us you were coming back in April when you didn`t”? As far as TPE were concerned, their records suggested I was coming back the 5th or 7th May, I left the country on a sick note and emailed further sick notes.
353. (232) PW says “and secondly what is the important point is, having made those allegations, and having being told there was an independent investigator why would you choose to make the investigations impossible for three and a half months”? I never knew about the independent investigator being brought in and certainly never knew three and a half months previous, which means PW is suggesting I was aware of this sometime in early March. How could I possibly know if letters had been sent to my house and I wasn`t there?
354. At the end of this debate, (233) PW says, “I understand but if your answer that you gave at the front is you that for those 3 months you didn't take proper licence the investigation is because his state of mind is affected by all this, I accept that as the answer (Correct, depression, I would not be fit to aid the investigation). So the question now is, why did Miss Pears withdraw the investigation without fully examining why I never spoke with the investigator. The reason being, like I have shown in this tribunal so far, that ignorance and hostility is prevalent, everyone has worked together to basically stitch me up. There was now an adjournment.
355. After the adjournment PW responds to the earlier procedural challenges. On my contract, (234) PW says “Perry's question that he felt that it was different that the one that he was contractually entitled to because of the move from British Railways North East into TPE. Having checked that, the question was raised so since when has this been in place or words to that effect and having checked the records I can confirm that there is an agreed procedure in place since November 2006. Agreed through the relevant parties and published to that effect. Although I have to say the two procedures are not a million miles apart anyway to be fair but that is the date just to close that question”. Why had I never been given a copy or seen a copy of this agreed procedure from November 2006, why did TPE use a set of disciplinary procedures dated February 2004 not November 2006 against me, which I had also never seen before?
356. (234) PW then goes onto say that charge 4, was found proven on the day, SB points out that no sanction was applied to this charge, therefore we did not appeal on this issue.
357. (234) PW says, “So then moving on again with the procedural stuff you have mentioned the ACAS Code of Practice we are actually aware of that but we do have an agreed procedure and this agreed procedure doesn't include representation at investigatory interviews and that is a Code of Practice it’s not an applicable code it’s a Code of Practice. Lets remember Hearing Officer Mark Atkinson`s aggressive stance, “I comply with our policy, not ACAS guidelines”.
358. PW statement, “and this agreed procedure doesn't include representation at investigatory interviews”. (234 A) The drivers rostering and manning agreement states, (1) “All incidents will be thoroughly investigated and drivers treated fairly and consistently”. (3) “Following every incident an investigation will be carried out by the Driver Standards Manager. The investigation will include interviewing the driver and any witnesses”. (234b) “Whilst the right to accompaniment is not triggered at this stage, a fellow employee, staff representative or TU official may attend to support the driver provided that this is possible without unnecessarily prolonging or causing undue delay to the process”. So straight away PW does not know his own companies procedures.
359. Then it was apparent from the outset that the 2nd investigatory interview had a prejudged outcome, this is because my turn of duty was covered by another driver before I had even booked on duty. The decision that disciplinary action was going ahead had already been made.
360. (235) PW makes the point, “Again just for clarification because I haven't seen it challenged during your case you stated that Perry was actually denied a rep. I have to accept clearly there was not one present and I have to say that I can see no evidence that there was one requested and I have to say that is captured in two sets of notes which have never been challenged up to this point. Haven't been challenged today actually”.
361. This was challenged by SB (236) at the beginning of this appeal. As for the two sets of notes PW is referring to, these are the investigatory interview notes, you will notice that these were not signed off by myself or Mr Percival. Also what this proves is that PW had clearly not read through the investigation report, because I make it quite clear (54) Appendix K, I said, “How can that entry in that repair book be of such a serious nature that I am taken for a second interview, not given the chance to have representation, just like the first interview and then suspended from driving”.
362. (235) Miss Pears now buts in, again only because she thinks the issue she is raising is doing harm to my defence. She says, “yes I think you made the reference, but Paul is referring back to when Perry was interviewed”. I never asked when being interviewed, therefore it is not documented. I asked before the interview.
363. PW now refers to the challenge on allowing witnesses, he says, “So in terms of witnesses I will just come round to. Again I have read because you supplied them the correspondence between the two parties and its quite clear as I read them that our initial response is that all the evidence that they give is a matter of written record”, How can PW or Miss Pears decide that the evidence supplied so far is sufficient for my cause, I wanted them there because they could have provided evidence to back my case up. PW says, “however last week we clearly did say clearly did say if you wish to request witnesses go ahead and request them if we need to release them then we will do”.
I was previously denied as this next statement from Miss Pears shows (237) “I am unclear what the purpose of Driver Lee attending as a witness is as he has already been interviewed and provided a statement to that effect. The purpose of witnesses is to add clarification and not be cross examined. If you have any questions that you wish to put to Driver Lee, please let me know the questions and the relevance of these so I can make arrangements for them to be put to him, this also applies to Steve Bridge”. How can this be fair? Why does Miss Pears need to know the relevance of my evidence? Also the statement Driver Lee supplied was not signed off by him and he has told me that he disagreed with what it said as his witness statement will point out.
It was only 2 working days before my appeal when Miss Pears said (238) “I refer back to what I have said previously, but as you are calling them as witnesses its your responsibility to ask them if they wish to attend. If they are willing to attend you need to notify us so that we can ensure they have been released. However their relevance to the charges you face will need to be understood on the day”. I had absolutely no chance of getting these two men to attend, I emailed Steve Bridge and Driver Lee, I got no response. I emailed Siemens to try and contact Steve Bridge because I mistakenly thought he was an engineer for them and not TPE. Driver Lee never responded because he was on holiday of which TPE were aware, admitted by PW (238 A) “because he is currently on sick leave”.
364. SB now questions PW on Driver Lee`s statement that he was told TPE were going to stop my wages and sack me, PW(239)admits, “Geoff Lee has said that yes. OK, because it is a fact and we have supplied it to you”. PW (240) goes on to say about Driver Lee and Manager Higgins statements, “I said two people made two different statements I don’t particularly believe either of them and that’s a fact”. Therefore he is saying that both Driver Lee and his own Manager, Ged Higgins are liars. The big question here again is, why wasn`t this investigation concluded? Why is it still ongoing to this day? A serious point was made by Driver Lee, obviously not a lie, because TPE would have jumped down hard on Driver Lee, the way the interviews were carried out to me, says it all.
365. (240) PW says, “Well we would defend it with the written records which is what we said to you as we have two written records one from each individual and its currently still under investigation as was made clear at the time in writing because the individual was unable to return his signed copy of the notes. And we did say that we would share them but the difficulty in sharing these things the individual driver has yet to sanctify the notes. So we shouldn't be sharing them but we are doing. The key point he admits is, “its currently still under investigation”, what I find hard to believe is that we made TPE aware at the end of my hearing on the 30th June 2009, Driver Lee was interviewed on the 14th July and Manager Higgins on the 24th July, the date of my appeal was the 7th September, surely this is ample time to conclude this investigation? Unless TPE are scared of the truth. But then lets face reality, TPE are hardly going to implicate themselves, so the easiest solution is ignore it, I believe this investigation should have been concluded before my appeal, due to the allegations and how relevant they were to my case.
366. (240) SB makes the very valid point. “So why did you hear the initial, why the fact the initial investigation had not been completed why did you hear the form one, why did you hear the discipline if the initial investigation hadn't been dealt with yet?
367. Another interruption by Miss Pears, “Can I just interrupt there because obviously Paul wasn’t in the hearing. That wasn’t brought to our attention till after the hearing”. And again, “No, that wasn’t brought to our attention until the decision had been relayed”.
368. Whenever this was brought to the attention of TPE, it was new evidence, I still had an appeal outstanding and as such this should have been investigated. Once again Miss Pears is quick to jump in and I would like her involvement that goes beyond that of a mere minute taker brought into question. Miss Pears was involved all the way throughout this process, the fact that she has interrupted at this appeal on issues she thought would go against me and also the fact that she was involved with Mark Atkinson at my hearing, then by what I have been told, dealing with solicitor Simon Robinson about this case before my appeal, including her own admission that my case was a difficult one and she had to be present because she is the procedural expert and advisor, says to me that there will be clear bias from her regarding anything that is talked about with PW in my appeal hearing, to me, Miss Pears was judge, jury and executioner.
369. The last few words said on this topic were from SB who said, “Right then we go onto the next stage then, the fact that evidence had been brought forward and we have appealed it. We are sitting here now where the investigation has not even been completed yet”.
370. The response of PW was simply, “No well”. In other words, what can you do about it. Other than mention it today, what could we do?
371. The following is an extremely vital area to examine, it is part of PW summing up and an extra reason to why he upholds the original decision to dismiss me.
372. (240) PW says “the case there is frustration, Perry's frustration with what he sees as a lack of action on our part, the Company's part to deal with sufficient or reasonable whichever term you want to use about the actions around unit defects and that’s broadly the case that’s been made today” . “I have asked some questions regarding “escalation policy”, it is a matter of fact that you have (241) said today that you also entered into the notes of the hearing that the desired effect was to sit up and take notice that was the term used. Do I believe that there is other steps afoot to sit up and take notice other than inventing a safety of the line issue? Yes I do, yes I do and I will demonstrate why I believe that there are, because Perry has shared with us again in his evidence I have read that he has escalated issues in the past and we have demonstrated that we have dealt with them and that’s actually contained in the documentation you have shared with us. So I believe, does he know there’s a route of escalation? Yes he does”. Escalation policy ! Is this a TPE procedure?
373. Continuing (241) (241a) “I understand that and it’s correct that I give it sufficient time and consider the points you raised. The issue then if I use the term that you have used then in the investigation, the term that was used in the investigation that Perry falsified, he invented it were the two terms used to “sit up and make someone sit up and take notice at Siemens”. That's what it says. I actually said in my second interview, “to give Siemens a short sharp shock to get someone listening and not bury their head in the sand”.
Do I think that’s a reasonable action is the point in question here and my answer is no I don’t I think there is a number of things that can be done. Do I think it’s rare that people invent nearly running over someone because that’s what he wrote down, I haven't come across one in my thirty two years I have to say. So that’s why I base my judgement on do I think that’s a reasonable reaction.
As I said do I believe and again I put it to you why not escalate it further beforehand then and the answer was, because of where people sit in this Company, (we never made this answer), that effectively I don’t know what term you would use unapproachable, unreachable, whichever term you want to use but again I refer back to some of the stuff that’s in here which has been escalated and might not have had the outcome that Perry wanted but actually showed an investigation trait.
374. The following is evidence to show what happens when I have escalated issues in the past to the ORR, (Office of the Rail Regulator).
Disgraceful conditions of York Messroom and Toilets.
375. There are a series of reports dating from 26th April 2005 to the 18th July 2008.
376. These are the reports. (242 to 242y) There are 22 separate reports of which 17 were notified to TPE before the following email response from the Office of Rail Regulator, not forgetting the amount of times I verbally and on health and safety inspections raised this issue.
377. (243) This is an email from Mark lenderyou, HM Inspector of Railways, Office of Rail Regulator, dated 30th September 2008. He states, “When discussing your complaint with TPE I was surprised to find that you had not raised the issue with them prior to complaining to the enforcing authority”. I had made a complaint about the abysmal state of the messroom facilities in York to the local council environmental health department, this was forwarded to the ORR. What transpired was, the ORR contacted TPE regarding this complaint, what does my evidence show? It clearly and undeniably shows that I had put reports in to TPE regarding this issue. Therefore the response from TPE to the ORR as I have just demonstrated is a blatant lie, why would they go to these lengths?
Noise levels in 185 cabs
378. These are a selection of reports regarding extremely loud noise levels in 185 cabs.
379. These are the reports. (244 to 244 n) There are 11 reports notified to TPE before the following email response from the Office of Rail Regulator, not forgetting the amount of times I verbally and on health and safety inspections raised this issue.
380. (245) This is another email from Mark Lenderyou, ORR, dated 22nd February 2008, he states, “when I discussed your complaint with TPE, they were unaware of your concerns”. My reports clearly show that once again I brought it to the attention of TPE.
381. Both these instances show what happens when I go above TPE to complain, all TPE do is say I never informed them. What chance do I have of getting anyone to take notice if TPE tell blatant lies to the ORR? Is there any wonder I tried a different avenue to try and get my serious life threatening concern across? I challenge any person who has a passion for health and safety, how would you behave faced with a warning horn who`s behaviour is so unpredictable that you never know when it is going to fail on you, my evidence is overwhelming on this, TPE cannot say this unpredictability is not there.
382. If you complain to your immediate management, they ignore you, this is not questionable, it is already admitted by TPE. If you complain in a repair book, the only response is the usual tested on depot, or unable to test on depot, therefore allowed back into service without being tested, a clear danger to everyone track side, again proof of this in my files. If I attempt to escalate to the ORR, I get accused of not bringing the subject to the attention of TPE even though my evidence proves I made them aware. What is left? I have witnessed death on the railway, both suicide and accidental, I don’t want to witness or hear of a death through ignorance and that is what I was faced with in this instance, especially when it can be preventable, I don`t want another Potters Bar incident where there was numerous warnings that were sadly ignored. I still feel extremely passionate about this problem, it is a danger to anyone trackside, sadly eventually there will be a death.
383. I chose what I thought was a reasonable option, aimed with shock treatment in mind towards, Siemens staff and TPE management, trying to get them to realise the implications of running trains knowing full well since introduction, already admitted conduct on behalf of TPE, that these train have a serious malfunction of a warning horn under a range of conditions with an unpredictability trait, so much so, that the next time you depress the warning horn lever it may not work in either tone, this was actually admitted (246 & 247) by MD Vernon Barker in his letter dated 15th March 2010 to the Lib Dem Transport Secretary, Norman Baker. Vernon Barkers statement says exactly what I have been saying, he says, “The press reports spring from two design issues which only revealed themselves in very poor weather conditions, most notably in heavy snowfall. The first fault to emerge was that the warning horns on the trains can be affected by either, freezing fog or snowy conditions, with one or both of the two horn tones affected depending on the severity of the weather”.
384. To put the record straight, you do not need very poor weather to affect these horns, it only needs to be below zero to affect any tone or both tones. They can also be affected in damp conditions and also when travelling at higher speeds, as many of the reports in my case file show. One major point that Vernon makes, is the fact that both tones are capable of failing to work. In other words there is no logic to the failure of these horns. Low tone, high tone or both tones can fail and do at any time. MD Vernon Barker goes on to say that there are processes in place that in the event of both tones failing the train`s onward journey is done safely.
But what happens when the failure is at 100mph, both tones have failed and some young children have wandered through an open farm crossing gate onto the track? Or a group of track workers are just round the blind bend walking with their backs to you, having just finished or just walking to their worksite. Then how about the train that`s broken down and the train crew are examining the outside, or in bad visibility and suddenly you see someone in a position of imminent danger. The scenarios are endless, but all possibilities.
The sad and frightening outcome is the possibility of death. TPE and Siemens are playing Russian roulette and have been doing since 2006. We all know that when playing this game, someone always ends up shot. Do I really deserve gross misconduct for highlighting such a serious high risk situation capable of killing someone? Especially bearing in mind that TPE management and Siemens have been aware since introduction in 2006, been made aware by my numerous reports and other drivers reports yet failed miserably in whatever attempt they have made to rectify this problem. Even stating as recent as January this year (247a) by Engineering Director Nick Donovan, “for reasons that we don`t fully understand a build up of snow and ice in and around the compressor air inlets caused a complete blockage”.
Over a year previously, TPE in their Fleet Update (247b) under the heading, Compressor failures in falling snow and freezing weather state exactly the same as what Engineering Manager Nick Donovan said in (247a) above. Further adding, “investigations are underway as to why this has happened and course of action to prevent re-occurence”. In other words, its now 2010 and TPE are no further forward finding a solution. I do not come from an engineering background, but in a logical sense, if I was given all the data they have on this, I am quite certain that I could find a solution. But all the time, the clock is ticking, their luck, because lets face it, that`s clearly what it is (luck), will run out. I don`t have to state the obvious, we should all know by now what will eventually happen. I hope and pray it never does, because I have seen first hand the devastation it causes. The only consolation for me personally, would be, that I could hold my head up and say, I tried, I tried.
Due to the unpredictability trait and my experience that one minute the horn can function adequately but the next minute completely fail, I once again challenge anyone to explain, especially bearing in mind the 2 scenario`s (PW 128) I spoke aboutearlier and the one above that I have just pointed out. How is this controllable safety wise. Basic common sense and logic is all that is required to understand that this is unsafe and puts people’s lives at risk.
385. Carrying on, a further point made by PW (248),“But you can report it to control via the signal box, if you are saying, so effectively what I am saying to you is and this is only my opinion, but you have said to me how important you view this be in terms of a safety equipment failure and you believe that fulfils so if you ask the questions do you believe that fulfils what we call the rule book. Two failed NRN calls, do you think that’s sufficient and Perry to be fair said yes he does. I'm saying I don’t believe it is by a long way”. PW makes the point that was also made by MA, that it is how important that I view this equipment failure, not how he views it, both PW and MA clearly formed beliefs on my thoughts of how I perceived the situation, not beliefs on their thoughts of the situation, and surely it is their beliefs of this situation that form the reason to dismiss me not mine, after all my opinion has always been worthless to TPE.
386. PW also made a point here of saying, “and this is only my opinion”. This is in respect of how I interpreted the rule book on reporting a partial failure of the warning horn. We have two different opinions on how we understand that ruling, my understanding has always been as it was that day. When did PW last or ever become in a position like I did that morning? Does he drive trains on a daily basis?
387. The ruling is open to interpretation, I am not saying PW is wrong, because as he pointed out, that was his opinion. So let me ask this very valid point, is this really worthy of a gross misconduct charge? There is so much proof in my case file that other drivers have behaved the same as me and after all, that is their interpretation of this particular rule.
388. PW argues on this point again (248) “OK let me come let me come back, the reason why I am making that point is that because it clearly says you must stop and tell your control when its convenient, when the convenient opportunity arises, you have become aware of the defect then it gives a list of defects, then it says what the convenient opportunity may be, which includes the next scheduled station stop or a stopping point on the journey or when the train is at signal with a stop aspect. In reporting the defect will cause delay you must tell the signaller the reason for this delay. So even accepting delay to the service safety comes first. That what is there. To be fair in your defence earlier you said, would have caused delay didn’t want to do that”. Again, this issue is how we both interpret the meaning of the word convenient.
Another point to make about contacting TPE control is, there has been many occasions when I have tried to contact them and there has been no answer, this was made apparent in a recent fleet update dated 15th November 2009 to December 12th 2009 (248a) Q3 says, “Train crew can at times have problems contacting maintenance control due to the dedicated line being busy”. It creates a no win situation for the driver, in my instance, it was a partial failure, I know regardless of what I tell control that train will run forwards with no restrictions. Yet if on ringing control I cannot get through and I choose to wait until I eventually talk with them I would also be in trouble for causing undue delay, not only to my train but all those trains waiting behind me and the knock on effect this will have on passenger connections.
389. PW (249) now goes back to a topic discussed earlier and says, “I've said already and again I do make this, I have made this point three times I will make it again because it’s important because I have referred to documents in there because there are some considerable time old some of them, you have asked me to consider that. Inside that document you posed a number of questions that you asked me to answer. In the documentation. I have said do I believe that there is a. the ability to report and the knowledge of how to report and I think it is demonstrated in there, do I believe that Perry knows how to escalate something short of the point of I invent an event that hasn't happened, and I believe that there is documentation in there that proves that including the letter that you relied on the evidence from the HMRI, because that clearly says follow the correct reporting procedures through your Company and that’s clearly what it says”.
(250)Correct, that`s what it says, but we have come all this way, hearing, appeal, my argument has always been that I have followed the correct reporting procedures that many times all to no avail, which has been admitted by TPE (250a), “no response or comments provided to the claimant by the respondent”. It`s evident that from the words of PW, that he has totally ignored the fact that I have reported issue`s so many times through the correct reporting procedures and it has got me nowhere, all PW is doing, is ignoring the fact that ignorance by his management has always been my problem. Again, what chance does anyone stand faced with such a refusal by a senior manager to accept the truth with so much evidence available to him?
390. PW now makes a point (249) of saying TPE engaged specialist contractors to investigate complaints I made about (251) cab fumes and cab noise.
391. I had complained about these issues, regarding the cab fumes, I explained to PW (251) that I never received any feedback to say that specialist contractors had been used or the outcome. I did get a response from the HMRI on cab noise, saying an inspector rode from Manchester to Huddersfield and found the noise acceptable, to me that wasn`t a thorough investigation, but it wasn`t a response from TPE.
392. When I pointed out that I never received any feedback, PW said, “Ok ok I will take your point but I believe differently”. “I believe differently”.
393. SB challenges PW on this and says show us the proof that Perry has signed for this information and that if he was so sure of his statement he would have brought the evidence in.
394. The next statement by PW (251) makes a complete contradiction of what he said about, “I believe differently”. He says, “Well to be honest I haven't gone away and looked because I am too intense in this Morning”. PW is again making a judgement without having hard evidence to back up his claim.
395. This appeal ends with PW stating he didn`t think two attempts of trying to ring control was sufficient to discharge the rule book. The problem with this, is that is his interpretation, the rule book mentions nothing about sufficiency. Another valid point is he doesn`t know the route from York to Newcastle, I have been working over this route since 1979, when I explained my reasoning why I never used another means of ringing control, I asked PW is he knew the layout of Darlington and Northallerton, his response was (252), “I think that`s a nonsense”. Yet another assumption without evidence to back his belief up.
396. The very end of these appeal minutes, the following is written (253), “Following is not verbatim due to tape running out”. Miss Pears a supposed minute taker or was she? That is why I question her involvement because she couldn`t write the small section at the end. Furthermore, bearing in mind that my appeal hearing was held on the 7th September, why did it take Miss Pears to the 1st December (253a) to send me a copy of the minutes?
397. (254) PW says, “Do I believe Perry would know to go and speak to his demons of the past is what I come to. Do I think not getting on the phone is by chance or something else. You ask me why you’ve never been told not to do it before. I’m not using previous disciplines”. “Demons of the past”? I suppose this means whistleblowing, taking a complaint to the HMRI. As for “by chance or something else”, let me make it quite clear, I only behaved how I always had done in my interpretation of the rule book. There was no malicious intent in not trying other means to contact the control. As for not using previous disciplines, this was part of my reason for appealing, that evidence was not taken into account by MA, both MA and PW used information against me that was previous, but neither of them allowed me to use the same type of information as evidence.
398. The relevance to a previous disciplinary hearing is the charges are of a very similar nature. That on the 30th August 2005, I was charged with the following (255).
1. You refused to work a train after fault rectification had been carried out and the fault addressed.
2. You failed to carry out the correct reporting procedures as provided for in rule book instructions TWS 7.2 and instructions contained in competence standards SC1.
3. You failed to carry out fault finding procedures to address the fault.
Manager Chris Swift also pointed out that I failed to follow the correct procedures for reporting a train fault. Exactly the same charge as charges 1 and 3 that I was found guilty of gross misconduct for. The procedures as he thought them to be are as follows. (255a)
1. Inform the signaller of the circumstances, including the time required, to identify and rectify the fault.
2. Assess train faults and take appropriate action.
3. Notify the conductor of the situation so customers can be kept updated.
4. Seek advice from operations control where faults cannot be accurately identified or quickly rectified.
5. Decide with signaller and TPE control the next step to avoid undue delay to train and future services.
6. Report to TPE operations control, all minor train faults when safe and convenient.
Since 2005, the rule book, competence standards and TPE so called reporting procedures have not changed at all. There is however a distinct difference in opinion between Chris Swift and Mark Atkinson over what the supposed procedures are. I say supposed because nobody has shown me a written procedure.
Mark Atkinson`s idea of what the reporting procedures are is (256).
1. Stop and report it to the controlling signaller.
2. Report it to TPE control.
3. Complete the repair book procedure correctly.
4. Allowing a unit to depart and remain in service, (added when charging me).
As we can see 1 and 2 are mentioned by Chris Swift. The initial charges by Chris Swift were specific in that they clearly stated which breach of rules (255), the charges I have do not have any specific reference to which breach of rules. They were made up as TPE went through the investigation and hearings, with bits added and taken out to suit themselves. As in number 4 of Chris Swifts and TPE reporting procedures, He states, “Seek advice from operations control where faults cannot be accurately identified”. But in my case I accurately identified all 3 faults, so according to Chris I have no need to seek advice. As for rectification, TPE have had, “since introduction” 2006, to sort these problems.
But now is the major difference, for a same charge, how can two Senior Managers interpret TPE`s Discipline Arrangements so differently?
Depot Manager Chris Swift doesn`t make any specific relation to what he constitutes the charges to be, I am invited to a discipline hearing. The outcome of which I receive a REPRIMAND.
Route Driver Manager Barry Cook levels charges of GROSS MISCONDUCT and at my hearing Route Driver Manager Mark Atkinson upholds those charges and I am SUMMARY DISMISSED.
How can 3 Senior Managers looking at the very same type of charges come up with 2 very different outcomes, which are not even close, they range from one end of the spectrum to the other. Where is the consistency you would expect from such a large company? Why would their opinions be so different, what was the reasoning behind the decision to first make it a charge of gross misconduct and secondly apply the sanction of dismissal?
399. Why would TPE use 2 previous disciplines dated from 1999 and 2004 (TPE 55 to 77 not included in this file) in their agreed bundle of evidence, yet PW wouldn`t allow or listen to what representations we wished to make regarding these disciplines. His actual words were (254),“I`m not using previous disciplines”. It is typical of their behaviour throughout, they have not once looked at this from my point of view. Incidentally, the 2 disciplines should not have been used by TPE as they were all expunged. The only possible use is to try and strengthen their case against me, because they know the charges against me did not warrant gross misconduct. Amazingly the 3rd discipline was dated 30th August 2005, yet not included by them, only because of the relevance I have shown earlier (255) in that for the same type of charge, I previously only received a reprimand.
400. PW last words were, “I have decided to uphold the original decision”. As I demonstrated earlier, the original decision by MA was based on flawed information and facts including being totally oblivious to my evidence and having a clear indication of pre-judgement.
401. To be subjected to years of what can only be described as mental torture with absolutely no way out of it. I state mental torture because inside that is how it felt, it almost and probably did become a game, I complain, they ignore, I complain, they ignore. Only this is not over trivial issues, the issues are not fabrications, they are genuine concerns on health and safety issues, from no hot water in a ladies toilets at the lower end although this is still a potential issue that could cause death, to points such as distraction issues and defective equipment issues that could cause injury or death.If I am not happy about the way they are treating me, where do I go? Who do I complain to?
402. Looking back on all of this, the way I have shown the magnitude of ignorance in many different ways levelled against me, there would have been an avenue open to me, I could have used the grievance procedures. But then again, this is what happened when I used the procedure. When TPE took over in 2004 I had a grievance in for loss of 1 days pay (257 to 257q). The file shows numerous written requests to sort this grievance, as I speak today, that grievance is still unresolved. This highlights further the degree of ignorance this company displayed towards me, how can anyone be expected to achieve anything from the level of ignorance and deceit this company is capable of? These people ruined my career and life.
403. Finally, “As professionals all of us have to remember we`re human beings, all of us have to take the necessary precautions including the use of ANY TECHNIQUES available that enable us to master those human characteristics that CAN EXPOSE RISK in the field of train driving”. This is quite simply what I did. To me it was a necessary precaution to one day save someone from being killed. You would think that these words are mine but these are not my words, they come from a TPE summer brief document, (258).
404. I did request a Managing Directors appeal, this was turned down by the MD Vernon Barker (259). Other drivers however have had these appeals, one such driver from Blackpool who (260) admitted a number of serious conduct issues, including falsifying documentation, defrauding the company and lying in the investigation was reinstated.
405. This driver was reinstated even though MD Vernon Barker and Operations Director Paul Watson stated (261) “however our belief is that individuals who commit acts of gross misconduct do so in the knowledge that this is unacceptable and they therefore risk a disciplinary action”. I never once thought that what I did could possibly bring charges of gross misconduct in trying to prevent injury or death.
406. While TPE may have believed that I behaved inappropriately. I believe that they should have taken into account that the situation I found myself in was not of my own making, but as this statement has demonstrated. Quite simply, TPE are to blame for creating the monster that bit them, that being, the unquestionable ignorance taken to extreme lengths in many different guises by many different managers which was in simplistic terms, bullying in the form of mental torture, in modern day terms, psychological warfare.
407. We should have exchanged witness statements on the 4th June, TPE delayed this until the 24rd June before we exchanged statements.
The contents of this witness statement are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Signed: Perry Webb Date: 3rd June 2010