Newcastle Station Incident 5th June 2013
The following is from the RAIB Website.
ANOTHER VERY LUCKY ESCAPE!
Passenger trapped in train doors and dragged a short distance at Newcastle Central station, 5 June 2013
The RAIB is investigating an incident at Newcastle Central station, in which a passenger was trapped in train doors, and dragged a short distance, as the train started to move out of the station. The train moved less than one coach length and did not pick up much speed, so the passenger was able to remain on her feet. However, she was shaken and suffered soft tissue damage to her wrist.
At about 17:00 hrs, a 3-car multiple unit train was standing at platform 10 waiting to form train 1P59, the 17:02 hrs Transpennine Express service from Newcastle to Manchester Airport. Shortly before the scheduled departure time, a passenger approached the train from the ticket office end (near field in the photograph), intending to board. The doors on the first (rear) coach were closed, but the rear set of doors on the middle coach was still open.
These doors were closing as the passenger reached them, so she put her right hand between the door leaves expecting this to cause them to re-open. They did not; closing around her right wrist and trapping it. The train then started to move, forcing the passenger to walk and jog alongside.
As the train started to move, the conductor, who was leaning out of the rear cab window, could not see the trapped passenger due to the curvature of the platform. Passengers on board the train observed what had occurred and pulled the emergency door release which had the effect of applying the brakes. Another person standing on the platform shouted to the conductor to stop the train and the conductor applied the emergency brake.
The incident was not reported to the RAIB until 3 July 2013.
The RAIB’s investigation will examine the sequence of events leading up to the incident, including the dispatch of the train and how the presence of obstructions that are trapped in doors are detected. It will consider how the risk associated with trains departing from the tightly curved platform was assessed and mitigated, and how the incident was reported and investigated by First Transpennine Express.
MY CONCLUSION:
A simple Risk Assessment would have highlighted the possibility of this type of event happening, quite how brake release occurred with the lady trapped is something that should never have happened. Imagine the possibility that if the train doors can close on an adults wrist and this is not detected allowing brake release, then for a young child there would be no hope whatsoever. Luck once again comes to the rescue! As I have always said on this website, what happens when luck runs out? This incident was totally FORESEEABLE and PREVENTABLE.
FORESEEABLE: Through a thorough Risk Assessment.
PREVENTABLE: From the findings of such a thorough Risk Assessment.
The easiest way to prevent this from happening again is not rocket science, there are actually a few solutions. If you struggle to find a solution then I will gladly give you the most cost effective and efficient way of how you deal with dispatching a train on a curve.
I wonder if this was reported via RIDDOR?
I really look forward to the final report from the RAIB on this major incident that clearly had potential for a LOSS OF LIFE.
As the train started to move, the conductor, who was leaning out of the rear cab window, could not see the trapped passenger due to the curvature of the platform. Passengers on board the train observed what had occurred and pulled the emergency door release which had the effect of applying the brakes. Another person standing on the platform shouted to the conductor to stop the train and the conductor applied the emergency brake.
The incident was not reported to the RAIB until 3 July 2013.
The RAIB’s investigation will examine the sequence of events leading up to the incident, including the dispatch of the train and how the presence of obstructions that are trapped in doors are detected. It will consider how the risk associated with trains departing from the tightly curved platform was assessed and mitigated, and how the incident was reported and investigated by First Transpennine Express.
MY CONCLUSION:
A simple Risk Assessment would have highlighted the possibility of this type of event happening, quite how brake release occurred with the lady trapped is something that should never have happened. Imagine the possibility that if the train doors can close on an adults wrist and this is not detected allowing brake release, then for a young child there would be no hope whatsoever. Luck once again comes to the rescue! As I have always said on this website, what happens when luck runs out? This incident was totally FORESEEABLE and PREVENTABLE.
FORESEEABLE: Through a thorough Risk Assessment.
PREVENTABLE: From the findings of such a thorough Risk Assessment.
The easiest way to prevent this from happening again is not rocket science, there are actually a few solutions. If you struggle to find a solution then I will gladly give you the most cost effective and efficient way of how you deal with dispatching a train on a curve.
I wonder if this was reported via RIDDOR?
I really look forward to the final report from the RAIB on this major incident that clearly had potential for a LOSS OF LIFE.
COPY OF A CIRUS REPORT FROM 2009
40664 Self dispatch at Liverpool Lime Street and Manchester Airport
A concern has been raised regarding a new self-dispatch procedure due to be implemented at Liverpool Lime Street and Manchester Airport stations at the beginning of April 2009.
Under conditions of the new self dispatch, the conductors are expected to dispatch their trains on their own without the help of platform dispatch staff. The reporter states that some of the platforms at Liverpool Lime Street station are on a curve and the signal sighting is poor. He or she feels this could present a safety risk if a conductor was to misread the signal and potentially send a train through a red signal.
According to the reporter, FTPE feel that the white light on the dispatch button is adequate to indicate that the signal is clear but the reporter disagrees.
At Manchester Airport in particular, the reporter states that with top train working there is an added risk that the conductors could become confused as to which train the OFF indicator is for.
Both stations have high volumes of people on the platforms. The reporter suggests that First Transpennine Express refrain from implementing self - dispatch at these stations and continue to provide a member of dispatch staff on the platform.
Response from First Transpennine Express
First TransPennine Express (FTPE) would like to thank the reporter for highlighting their concerns regarding self dispatch at Liverpool Lime Street and Manchester Airport Railway Stations. Whenever a new system of work is to be considered, we are required under the Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems Regulations to carry out a full Safety Validation. FTPE were accompanied by the HMRI on a visit to Liverpool Lime Street and a full risk assessment was carried out, the proposed self dispatch method was fully approved however a new agreement was reached with Northern and the company took the decision to continue with Northern‟s assistance. We emphasise that this was not for reasons of safety.
At Manchester Airport, again a Safety Validation has been completed for the proposed self dispatch method of working and a review meeting has been held. The risks at this location have been assessed jointly by FTPE and Northern Rail and any new method of work will take into account the layout of the station and the sighting of signals and equipment to ensure any risk is as low as is reasonably practicable. A further review meeting is planned for the beginning of August and until this time the current arrangements for dispatch will remain.
First TransPennine Express would like to assure the reporter that any concerns he/she may have concerning safety can be discussed with their line manager or a member of the safety team.
So was a FULL RISK ASSESSMENT carried out for Newcastle? Because if it was, it should have highlighted the possibility of what actually happened.
Previous risk assessments apparently carried out at similar locations, Lessons learned?
As for assuring the reporter that any concerns regarding safety can be discussed with their line manager or member of the safety team, this is just unbelievable propaganda, when did these "managers" ever take notice of safety concerns? My website is the utmost proof that for a six year period this never happened, all the way to a case management meeting with a Judge where TPE freely admit to IGNORANCE.
40664 Self dispatch at Liverpool Lime Street and Manchester Airport
A concern has been raised regarding a new self-dispatch procedure due to be implemented at Liverpool Lime Street and Manchester Airport stations at the beginning of April 2009.
Under conditions of the new self dispatch, the conductors are expected to dispatch their trains on their own without the help of platform dispatch staff. The reporter states that some of the platforms at Liverpool Lime Street station are on a curve and the signal sighting is poor. He or she feels this could present a safety risk if a conductor was to misread the signal and potentially send a train through a red signal.
According to the reporter, FTPE feel that the white light on the dispatch button is adequate to indicate that the signal is clear but the reporter disagrees.
At Manchester Airport in particular, the reporter states that with top train working there is an added risk that the conductors could become confused as to which train the OFF indicator is for.
Both stations have high volumes of people on the platforms. The reporter suggests that First Transpennine Express refrain from implementing self - dispatch at these stations and continue to provide a member of dispatch staff on the platform.
Response from First Transpennine Express
First TransPennine Express (FTPE) would like to thank the reporter for highlighting their concerns regarding self dispatch at Liverpool Lime Street and Manchester Airport Railway Stations. Whenever a new system of work is to be considered, we are required under the Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems Regulations to carry out a full Safety Validation. FTPE were accompanied by the HMRI on a visit to Liverpool Lime Street and a full risk assessment was carried out, the proposed self dispatch method was fully approved however a new agreement was reached with Northern and the company took the decision to continue with Northern‟s assistance. We emphasise that this was not for reasons of safety.
At Manchester Airport, again a Safety Validation has been completed for the proposed self dispatch method of working and a review meeting has been held. The risks at this location have been assessed jointly by FTPE and Northern Rail and any new method of work will take into account the layout of the station and the sighting of signals and equipment to ensure any risk is as low as is reasonably practicable. A further review meeting is planned for the beginning of August and until this time the current arrangements for dispatch will remain.
First TransPennine Express would like to assure the reporter that any concerns he/she may have concerning safety can be discussed with their line manager or a member of the safety team.
So was a FULL RISK ASSESSMENT carried out for Newcastle? Because if it was, it should have highlighted the possibility of what actually happened.
Previous risk assessments apparently carried out at similar locations, Lessons learned?
As for assuring the reporter that any concerns regarding safety can be discussed with their line manager or member of the safety team, this is just unbelievable propaganda, when did these "managers" ever take notice of safety concerns? My website is the utmost proof that for a six year period this never happened, all the way to a case management meeting with a Judge where TPE freely admit to IGNORANCE.
Information received: 3 pages of a complaint sent to the RAIB.
Very interesting information that once again highlights serious flaws in SAFETY and asks further questions.
I personally feel for the conductor in this incident, what I personally witnessed and what I am being told and as this letter states, training is non existent, but once again this is not rocket science, training is simple, but also a necessity. Why do I get the impression that this is the usual blind leading the blind? The answer is simple, the management are stale, they are clearly lacking the knowledge to rectify this because they cannot see it. They walk round with an air of arrogance believing that they are knowledgeable, in reality they never move on, they look at a person who reports the issues and challenges them as a threat, their only thought is how they eradicate the threat, completely IGNORING the possibly serious safety issues.
How can I state the above? Because I am living proof of this, evidence is all over this website. If however any of you from TPE think and feel otherwise, do something about it.
How can I state the above? Because I am living proof of this, evidence is all over this website. If however any of you from TPE think and feel otherwise, do something about it.
There are many questions and issues arising from this incident, as I have pointed out above, it all boils down to a thorough RISK ASSESSMENT.
Regarding the page above, there are so many unresolved issues, but the most frightening statement is, "yet nobody in the company or union seems to care", how disgusting, disgraceful and sad.