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Click the > below to start the audio of this hearing (part 1)
Click the > below to start the audio of this hearing (part 1)
The above file is the 1st part of my Disciplinary Hearing with Route Driver Manager Mark Atkinson on the 30th June 2009, Charlotte Pears was there as minute taker and I was represented by Steve Trumm of the Associated Train Crew Union, (ATCU).
For anyone who has ever been involved in this type of process, listening to this hearing in the way Mark Atkinson behaved, you will not be able to believe this man`s behaviour. I have never before witnessed such rude and aggressive behaviour as this man verbally attacked from beginning to end, I likened this hearing to what I believe a Nazi interrogation would be like. There was no set agenda to the questioning, Mark Atkinson says, “That`s why in reading the charge out, and reading out exactly what he should of done, I`ll understand why he didn`t do that”. Judge for yourself.
Route Driver Manager, Mark Atkinson was clearly pre-programmed to dismiss me, he made so many mistakes which I will highlight, I ask anyone who listens to this hearing, is this how a disciplinary hearing should be conducted?
My Report on Disciplinary Hearing at Bridgewater House on Tuesday 30th June 2009
Present:
Perry Webb – Driver, York.
Steve Trumm – ATCU Representative.
Mark Atkinson – Route Driver Manager.
Charlotte Pears – Employee Relations Manager.
At the start I explained that I did not feel in the frame of mind to be able to do myself justice. As Dr David G Thomas pointed out, I needed medication and counseling, with clear evidence of anxiety and depression and although he stated that there is no medical reason not to attend this hearing, I was at a handicap with not being able to focus or think straight. Doctor Thomas`s report is below.
For anyone who has ever been involved in this type of process, listening to this hearing in the way Mark Atkinson behaved, you will not be able to believe this man`s behaviour. I have never before witnessed such rude and aggressive behaviour as this man verbally attacked from beginning to end, I likened this hearing to what I believe a Nazi interrogation would be like. There was no set agenda to the questioning, Mark Atkinson says, “That`s why in reading the charge out, and reading out exactly what he should of done, I`ll understand why he didn`t do that”. Judge for yourself.
Route Driver Manager, Mark Atkinson was clearly pre-programmed to dismiss me, he made so many mistakes which I will highlight, I ask anyone who listens to this hearing, is this how a disciplinary hearing should be conducted?
My Report on Disciplinary Hearing at Bridgewater House on Tuesday 30th June 2009
Present:
Perry Webb – Driver, York.
Steve Trumm – ATCU Representative.
Mark Atkinson – Route Driver Manager.
Charlotte Pears – Employee Relations Manager.
At the start I explained that I did not feel in the frame of mind to be able to do myself justice. As Dr David G Thomas pointed out, I needed medication and counseling, with clear evidence of anxiety and depression and although he stated that there is no medical reason not to attend this hearing, I was at a handicap with not being able to focus or think straight. Doctor Thomas`s report is below.
How could anyone with these symptoms do themselves justice in such an important situation where your job has already been lost before you start the hearing.
I made it plainly obvious how I felt.
Applied for parental leave but my request was ignored.
I leave it up to you how you read into his, "obviously", you took yourself off to Thailand".
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16. MA Said in relation to the charges, “You
failed to follow the correct procedure for reporting a defective warning horn.
That in mind”,
1. "You didn`t stop and report it at the controlling signaller".The reason being is that rule book TW5, section 37, doesn`t say this.
Section 37.3 When in service
b) Partial failure
If the warning horn becomes partially defective while the train is in service, the driver must now tell the train operator’s control, not the signaller.
MA is not aware of the facts surrounding this case, the question here is why not? MA is charging me with something that never happened. This is where the investigation failed, or as is plainly obvious, in that what I explained was ignored, because TPE had only one thing on their mind and that was to dismiss me. Charge unfounded.
A further and very relevant point to make on this charge is that when I received the disciplinary hearing outcome letter from MA, he makes no mention that I never contacted the signaller, only that I didn`t report it to control. I find this further proof of trying to make anything possible stick against me.
1. "You didn`t stop and report it at the controlling signaller".The reason being is that rule book TW5, section 37, doesn`t say this.
Section 37.3 When in service
b) Partial failure
If the warning horn becomes partially defective while the train is in service, the driver must now tell the train operator’s control, not the signaller.
MA is not aware of the facts surrounding this case, the question here is why not? MA is charging me with something that never happened. This is where the investigation failed, or as is plainly obvious, in that what I explained was ignored, because TPE had only one thing on their mind and that was to dismiss me. Charge unfounded.
A further and very relevant point to make on this charge is that when I received the disciplinary hearing outcome letter from MA, he makes no mention that I never contacted the signaller, only that I didn`t report it to control. I find this further proof of trying to make anything possible stick against me.
“You failed to follow the correct procedure for reporting a defective warning horn. That in mind”,
A "defective warning horn" is very non specific, you would think for such severe charges that they would know what type of warning horn failure my train had that morning. It is either a complete or partial failure, yet Mark Atkinson chooses the worst case scenario, there was no evidence in the investigation report as to what type of failure the horn encountered. If he didn`t know, then he could have asked, even though he was eventually informed that it was a partial failure. What made Mark Atkinson choose the worst case scenario? I think we all know the reason for that.
A "defective warning horn" is very non specific, you would think for such severe charges that they would know what type of warning horn failure my train had that morning. It is either a complete or partial failure, yet Mark Atkinson chooses the worst case scenario, there was no evidence in the investigation report as to what type of failure the horn encountered. If he didn`t know, then he could have asked, even though he was eventually informed that it was a partial failure. What made Mark Atkinson choose the worst case scenario? I think we all know the reason for that.
2. "You didn’t report it to the train operating control". Hardly the crime of the century, but as I have shown, I am not the only
one who forgets. But at least I did attempt to inform control and as I have
shown, it was only due to confusion and time restraints that I forgot. The DOM
on duty would have verified all the confusion and time it took to sort out, so
would the timings of both trains, but neither obtained.
3."No point did you reduce the train speed". TW5, section 37, does not tell me to reduce speed, again this charge is unfounded. It would have helped if Barry Cook when levelling those charges against me had actually taken time to quote which rule had been broken. Because it`s extremely evident that this is being made up as we go along. Charge unfounded.
4. "You did not complete the repair book procedure correctly". Very unlike me, as I fill more in than anyone, again due to the set swap at York, confusion and time constraint I simply forgot to put my name and depot on the sheet, but did readily admit when interviewed that it was mine.
5. "The unit remained in service until it arrived at a depot at 22.36". It remained in service because every other driver found it safe to run. I knew it was safe to run, I have come across these problems so many times I was familiar with what control would say and this is proven in the DOTE Contingency Plans, these plans state, "In Service Actions, Train may complete its journey", that train was safe to finish its journey. Charge unfounded.
3."No point did you reduce the train speed". TW5, section 37, does not tell me to reduce speed, again this charge is unfounded. It would have helped if Barry Cook when levelling those charges against me had actually taken time to quote which rule had been broken. Because it`s extremely evident that this is being made up as we go along. Charge unfounded.
4. "You did not complete the repair book procedure correctly". Very unlike me, as I fill more in than anyone, again due to the set swap at York, confusion and time constraint I simply forgot to put my name and depot on the sheet, but did readily admit when interviewed that it was mine.
5. "The unit remained in service until it arrived at a depot at 22.36". It remained in service because every other driver found it safe to run. I knew it was safe to run, I have come across these problems so many times I was familiar with what control would say and this is proven in the DOTE Contingency Plans, these plans state, "In Service Actions, Train may complete its journey", that train was safe to finish its journey. Charge unfounded.
_ 18."You also failed to follow (the) correct procedure for reporting a near miss incident. So you failed to report a near miss incident".
"So you failed to report a near miss incident".
"You didn`t stop at the reporting signal box or controlling signaller to report it".
"You didn’t report it to (the) TOC control".
How can I possibly report a non reportable near miss? All through the investigation I made it plainly clear that there was NO NEAR MISS. Charge unfounded.
"Resulting in a train being taken out of service". As shown above, that unit completed its diagrammed work, it was never taken out of service. Charge unfounded.
"To get yourself noticed and the faults on the train noticed".
I never once implied that this was about me, I CHALLENGE MARK ATKINSON to show where I ever implied this.
Charge 3, "I did not stop and report unit defects correctly". For those type of defects, where does it tell me that I must STOP and report them? Again, MA is getting carried away with what actually happened by adding his thoughts on this charge without any substance. Charge unfounded.
22. "Did any other Driver report any kind of fault with that train subsequently"? The simple answer is not on the faults that I had highlighted, therefore as I had stated, the warning horn was now functioning correctly. Mark Atkinson however did not answer this question.
23. MA, is by now starting what I considered to be a very rude, aggressive and ignorant approach, firstly as ST quite rightly points out, he can ask questions. MA did not give him chance or take notice of him, he blatantly ignored him and also failed to answer my very relevant question. Which was, “Why have the warning horn faults never been rectified, why should it be put on me and every other driver"? MA kept stating, “Do you think it`s safe“. Do you think what Siemens and you have done in allowing these units with known wiper, noise and warning horn faults to enter service is a safe method of working?
"So you failed to report a near miss incident".
"You didn`t stop at the reporting signal box or controlling signaller to report it".
"You didn’t report it to (the) TOC control".
How can I possibly report a non reportable near miss? All through the investigation I made it plainly clear that there was NO NEAR MISS. Charge unfounded.
"Resulting in a train being taken out of service". As shown above, that unit completed its diagrammed work, it was never taken out of service. Charge unfounded.
"To get yourself noticed and the faults on the train noticed".
I never once implied that this was about me, I CHALLENGE MARK ATKINSON to show where I ever implied this.
Charge 3, "I did not stop and report unit defects correctly". For those type of defects, where does it tell me that I must STOP and report them? Again, MA is getting carried away with what actually happened by adding his thoughts on this charge without any substance. Charge unfounded.
22. "Did any other Driver report any kind of fault with that train subsequently"? The simple answer is not on the faults that I had highlighted, therefore as I had stated, the warning horn was now functioning correctly. Mark Atkinson however did not answer this question.
23. MA, is by now starting what I considered to be a very rude, aggressive and ignorant approach, firstly as ST quite rightly points out, he can ask questions. MA did not give him chance or take notice of him, he blatantly ignored him and also failed to answer my very relevant question. Which was, “Why have the warning horn faults never been rectified, why should it be put on me and every other driver"? MA kept stating, “Do you think it`s safe“. Do you think what Siemens and you have done in allowing these units with known wiper, noise and warning horn faults to enter service is a safe method of working?
33. MA, states, “Reporting a near miss to ensure that faults get rectified, a clear false allegation that was premeditated“. Stupid question but did I report a near miss?
35. “Do you think that`s the actions of a responsible professional“? Your own ignorance as a company put me in this position, as I will prove. If you constantly report a serious life threatening issue through the correct procedures and over the YEARS are ignored then being responsible and extremely worried I had to resort to a different approach. It wasn`t pre – meditated, it was a spur of the moment thought. I thought of it when the problems became apparent that morning, as my stress levels climbed due to yet another year as soon as it gets cold, warning horn problems surface. The other two issues of wipers and noise are a daily occurrence which you get used to and are as usual ignored by all concerned.
36. When I said, “that I had done it previously and you`ve never pulled me on it”. It did not mean that I have reported a fabricated near miss incident before. I have
behaved in the same way I did
that morning numerous times.
37. ST, points out the aggressive attitude of MA, he then makes an extremely valid point, that he believes there is prejudice, which I have pointed out all along, he believes the same as me that it was all down to being a trade union activist. So did ASLEF, the following is taken from a 3 page letter sent from the York Branch to the ASLEF General Secretary, Keith Norman.
"Notwithstanding the serious nature of the offences that Bro Perry Webb is alleged to have done, this York (243) Aslef Branch believes that, once again TransPennine Express (TPE) is being heavy handed and excessive in its use of the disciplinary procedures. This time to silence a union activist and persistent critic of TPE`s unit fault finding procedures.
Accordingly, this branch calls on the executive committee not to grant TPE any extension of the current rest day working agreement until such time as the charges against Bro Webb are either dropped or reduced. In the event of TPE refusing to do so then this branch asks the EC to call a ballot of TPE Drivers for Industrial Action on Bro Webb`s behalf".
This was carried unanimously at the York (243) Branch Meeting held on Wednesday February 11th 2009.
35. “Do you think that`s the actions of a responsible professional“? Your own ignorance as a company put me in this position, as I will prove. If you constantly report a serious life threatening issue through the correct procedures and over the YEARS are ignored then being responsible and extremely worried I had to resort to a different approach. It wasn`t pre – meditated, it was a spur of the moment thought. I thought of it when the problems became apparent that morning, as my stress levels climbed due to yet another year as soon as it gets cold, warning horn problems surface. The other two issues of wipers and noise are a daily occurrence which you get used to and are as usual ignored by all concerned.
36. When I said, “that I had done it previously and you`ve never pulled me on it”. It did not mean that I have reported a fabricated near miss incident before. I have
behaved in the same way I did
that morning numerous times.
37. ST, points out the aggressive attitude of MA, he then makes an extremely valid point, that he believes there is prejudice, which I have pointed out all along, he believes the same as me that it was all down to being a trade union activist. So did ASLEF, the following is taken from a 3 page letter sent from the York Branch to the ASLEF General Secretary, Keith Norman.
"Notwithstanding the serious nature of the offences that Bro Perry Webb is alleged to have done, this York (243) Aslef Branch believes that, once again TransPennine Express (TPE) is being heavy handed and excessive in its use of the disciplinary procedures. This time to silence a union activist and persistent critic of TPE`s unit fault finding procedures.
Accordingly, this branch calls on the executive committee not to grant TPE any extension of the current rest day working agreement until such time as the charges against Bro Webb are either dropped or reduced. In the event of TPE refusing to do so then this branch asks the EC to call a ballot of TPE Drivers for Industrial Action on Bro Webb`s behalf".
This was carried unanimously at the York (243) Branch Meeting held on Wednesday February 11th 2009.
42. MA now changes the charge to a "malicious false allegation".
Definition of malicious is, “Proceeding from hatred or ill will; dictated by malice; as, a malicious report; malicious mischief”.
Where did I show any hatred or ill will? Unless of course being a nuisance in reporting health and safety issues is in your mind hatred towards TPE. But yet again this is just another in the line of add-ons to show me in a bad light. MA then asks, “do you think that`s the actions of a responsible professional then Perry"?
43.In my response I explain about witnessing the death of a track worker, I then explain that I think Siemens and TPE are appalling in their attitude and had a large sample of reports to show him, especially IPP reports, (reports will be posted later). I explained that all reports were as usual ignored. His response was the same, just plain ignorance.
48. As ST rightly points out MA is not as he keeps saying reading out the charges, this is where MA gets quite irate.
Definition of malicious is, “Proceeding from hatred or ill will; dictated by malice; as, a malicious report; malicious mischief”.
Where did I show any hatred or ill will? Unless of course being a nuisance in reporting health and safety issues is in your mind hatred towards TPE. But yet again this is just another in the line of add-ons to show me in a bad light. MA then asks, “do you think that`s the actions of a responsible professional then Perry"?
43.In my response I explain about witnessing the death of a track worker, I then explain that I think Siemens and TPE are appalling in their attitude and had a large sample of reports to show him, especially IPP reports, (reports will be posted later). I explained that all reports were as usual ignored. His response was the same, just plain ignorance.
48. As ST rightly points out MA is not as he keeps saying reading out the charges, this is where MA gets quite irate.
Mark Atkinson`s irate manner continues 50 down to 57.
63. MA, "You were on holiday until 27 of the fourth", yet at the start of this hearing Mark Atkinson says I had parental leave till the 5th or 7th May!
PW 76. As far as I was concerned I thought that my sick notes covered me while I was away and because I had never seen or heard of anything that suggested I had to return for a medical, I stayed in Thailand. Notice, even MA 77, Says, "It might cover you", even he was unsure.
ST 88. This is where Mark Atkinson is totally and utterly out of his depth, Steve Trumm ties him in knots, it clearly shows the decision to dismiss me was taken before this hearing, I will invite anyone reading this to make their own judgment.
_ 88. ST asks MA to, “Define your company`s definition of gross misconduct”?
MA then responds with, “yes”. (No other reply is given, 5 seconds elapse.)
ST prompts MA asking, “What is it”?
91. MA states that, “THESE CLEARLY COMPLY WITH GROSS MISCONDUCT”, that says it all, in his mind he already knows the outcome. Before he even listens to my defence, he admits the charges are CLEARLY GROSS MISCONDUCT. At present the charge is only an allegation. All ST asked was define TPE`s stance on gross misconduct, but MA could not help himself, he jumped in because he already knew that whatever was said on that day, a decision was already made as to the outcome of my hearing. Some people would describe this type of thing as nothing more than a kangaroo court.
ST asks again, “What is your definition of gross misconduct that you are applying to these charges”? (6 seconds without any response. 3 charges levelled against me of gross misconduct and MA cannot think or indeed does not know to what specific definition these charges come under.)
I interrupted and stated that everyone could get gross misconduct charges, because we were all guilty of not reporting warning horn failures, which I can prove, and if what I said was a serious allegation then why didn`t Mark Atkinson look at the evidence I placed in front of him? MA eventually finds the relevant charges, and states, “Examples of gross misconduct that these charges are for”, (3 seconds of silence), “deliberate falsification of records”,(6 seconds silence), “Serious negligence which cause, might cause loss (?) of might cause damage or injury”,( a further 7 seconds silence), “Breaches of health and safety rules and procedures, they all fall in the context of gross misconduct charges”.
It is blatantly obvious that he did not have the slightest clue why I was being charged with gross misconduct, it just yet again highlights that this is as we always knew, nothing more than a witch hunt to get rid of me. MA had to read through TPE`s disciplinary procedures, to find the section under number 9 of these procedures. The time lapses show that he had to read through the examples and pick out what he thought was appropriate, hardly professional for such severe charges.
“Deliberate falsification of records”. What did I supposedly falsify? I wrote in a train vehicle repair book, what I stated about the defects were real case events, these problems had existed, the near miss was not a falsification of a vehicle defect. I do have defect sheets that mention things that are not related to a train defect, yet I was the only person pulled on this, why? If I had wrote about the near miss on a drivers report form and handed it in, then that would have been a falsification of an actual record.
“Serious negligence which cause, might cause loss (?) of might cause damage or injury”. How could what I wrote cause loss, damage or injury? I was trying to prevent injury or death. If it`s because I supposedly allowed this train to depart with another driver then TPE are also guilty of this charge, because their Defective on train contingency plans would allow this train to run regardless and as I have already proven, they also knowingly allow trains to run with defective warning horns.
“Breaches of health and safety rules and procedures, they all fall in the context of gross misconduct charges". I CHALLENGE ANYONE FROM TPE to show me which health and safety rules and procedures I supposedly breached, this is made all the more dubious by the fact that TPE couldn`t even level specific charges from the rule book against me. So we have 3 area`s of gross misconduct which MA believes I am in breach of, for the charges against me, yet not one of them area`s carries any substance in relation to the charges.
MA then responds with, “yes”. (No other reply is given, 5 seconds elapse.)
ST prompts MA asking, “What is it”?
91. MA states that, “THESE CLEARLY COMPLY WITH GROSS MISCONDUCT”, that says it all, in his mind he already knows the outcome. Before he even listens to my defence, he admits the charges are CLEARLY GROSS MISCONDUCT. At present the charge is only an allegation. All ST asked was define TPE`s stance on gross misconduct, but MA could not help himself, he jumped in because he already knew that whatever was said on that day, a decision was already made as to the outcome of my hearing. Some people would describe this type of thing as nothing more than a kangaroo court.
ST asks again, “What is your definition of gross misconduct that you are applying to these charges”? (6 seconds without any response. 3 charges levelled against me of gross misconduct and MA cannot think or indeed does not know to what specific definition these charges come under.)
I interrupted and stated that everyone could get gross misconduct charges, because we were all guilty of not reporting warning horn failures, which I can prove, and if what I said was a serious allegation then why didn`t Mark Atkinson look at the evidence I placed in front of him? MA eventually finds the relevant charges, and states, “Examples of gross misconduct that these charges are for”, (3 seconds of silence), “deliberate falsification of records”,(6 seconds silence), “Serious negligence which cause, might cause loss (?) of might cause damage or injury”,( a further 7 seconds silence), “Breaches of health and safety rules and procedures, they all fall in the context of gross misconduct charges”.
It is blatantly obvious that he did not have the slightest clue why I was being charged with gross misconduct, it just yet again highlights that this is as we always knew, nothing more than a witch hunt to get rid of me. MA had to read through TPE`s disciplinary procedures, to find the section under number 9 of these procedures. The time lapses show that he had to read through the examples and pick out what he thought was appropriate, hardly professional for such severe charges.
“Deliberate falsification of records”. What did I supposedly falsify? I wrote in a train vehicle repair book, what I stated about the defects were real case events, these problems had existed, the near miss was not a falsification of a vehicle defect. I do have defect sheets that mention things that are not related to a train defect, yet I was the only person pulled on this, why? If I had wrote about the near miss on a drivers report form and handed it in, then that would have been a falsification of an actual record.
“Serious negligence which cause, might cause loss (?) of might cause damage or injury”. How could what I wrote cause loss, damage or injury? I was trying to prevent injury or death. If it`s because I supposedly allowed this train to depart with another driver then TPE are also guilty of this charge, because their Defective on train contingency plans would allow this train to run regardless and as I have already proven, they also knowingly allow trains to run with defective warning horns.
“Breaches of health and safety rules and procedures, they all fall in the context of gross misconduct charges". I CHALLENGE ANYONE FROM TPE to show me which health and safety rules and procedures I supposedly breached, this is made all the more dubious by the fact that TPE couldn`t even level specific charges from the rule book against me. So we have 3 area`s of gross misconduct which MA believes I am in breach of, for the charges against me, yet not one of them area`s carries any substance in relation to the charges.
_MA reckons (MA 104) that TPE`s discipline process is one that
invokes punishment.
ST refers (ST 105) MA to the ACAS guidelines asking him where it states an employer is to punish members of staff.
MA states (MA 108), "I comply with our policy, not ACAS guidelines". This was the general bully boy attitude we encountered throughout. As I have also shown with Stephen Percival`s Investigation Report, there is a general ignorance towards ACAS guidelines.
(ST 109) In this long passage ST examines the actual charges. Charge 1, I Failed to follow the correct reporting procedure for reporting a defective warning horn. ST argues that this cannot be classed as gross misconduct, and is more of a training issue.
Charge 2, I failed to follow the correct procedure for reporting a near miss, resulting in a train being taken out of service, you subsequently admitted that this was a false allegation. There was no near miss incident, so there was nothing to report. The train was not taken out of service as it continued its whole diagram. The false allegation charge was a footnote and makes no specific reference to any charge. There is absolutely no substance to this wording regards a specific charge.
Charge 3, I failed to follow the correct reporting procedure for reporting unit defects. ST argues that TPE failed in their obligation to do anything regarding the numerous reports on these defects and informing what remedial action was taken. Continuing from this to explain that there was no “Duty of care”, on behalf of TPE, I received scant support and that these charges are down to my Trade Union activities.
ST refers (ST 105) MA to the ACAS guidelines asking him where it states an employer is to punish members of staff.
MA states (MA 108), "I comply with our policy, not ACAS guidelines". This was the general bully boy attitude we encountered throughout. As I have also shown with Stephen Percival`s Investigation Report, there is a general ignorance towards ACAS guidelines.
(ST 109) In this long passage ST examines the actual charges. Charge 1, I Failed to follow the correct reporting procedure for reporting a defective warning horn. ST argues that this cannot be classed as gross misconduct, and is more of a training issue.
Charge 2, I failed to follow the correct procedure for reporting a near miss, resulting in a train being taken out of service, you subsequently admitted that this was a false allegation. There was no near miss incident, so there was nothing to report. The train was not taken out of service as it continued its whole diagram. The false allegation charge was a footnote and makes no specific reference to any charge. There is absolutely no substance to this wording regards a specific charge.
Charge 3, I failed to follow the correct reporting procedure for reporting unit defects. ST argues that TPE failed in their obligation to do anything regarding the numerous reports on these defects and informing what remedial action was taken. Continuing from this to explain that there was no “Duty of care”, on behalf of TPE, I received scant support and that these charges are down to my Trade Union activities.
(ST 113 & 117). ST points out that the case is massively misconceived and that he does not think I am getting a fair hearing and that the attitude of MA is abrupt and aggressive. Due to the manner of questioning and the obvious pre-judgement factor.
MA then says (MA 118), "I can`t prejudge unless", unless what? Further saying, “I certainly can`t prejudge these charges unless I hear his point of view from him”. Not Perry`s point of view but, his and him, rather rude. I don`t refer to people within any meeting as “his, him or her” in that type of context. Prejudge! Sorry but he already stated earlier that my charges, “CLEARLY COMPLY WITH GROSS MISCONDUCT”.
A definite pre-judgment.
MA then states (MA118), “That`s why in reading the charge out, and reading out exactly what he should of done, I`ll understand why he didn`t do that”. If he had taken time to listen to me so far, he would know, that I never had a Complete failure of the warning horn and I never had a near miss incident.(ST 119). ST points out that the manner in which MA is presenting the charges, demonstrates that pre-judgement has been made. As he was reading the charges his emphasis was very apparent in the context of saying, “you did not”, it was aggressive. It also says you are guilty. His attitude was clearly biased from the start.
_
(MA 120). MA by now is even more confused, he states, “I`m reading out exactly what the process
should`ve been to follow”. What process was he talking about?
(ST & CP124 to 132) in dialogue. ST enquired why his correspondence had not been answered, it seems quite disturbing that contact is made and then ignored. CP gets confused herself when she says (CP 126), “I didn`t pick the message up and I responded to Perry”. How could CP respond when she didn`t get the message? CP then goes on to say (CP 132), “We don`t communicate with representatives, we communicate with the employee”. You would think that it would have been polite to inform ST of this.
The next passage clearly highlights that the management within TPE are unfamiliar with their own procedures.
(ST 133) ST refers to reports not being responded to, in particular the IP (Injury Prevention) reports.
(ST 135) ST asks if there is any window in which these reports are responded to.
(MA 136) MA states, “There isn`t a designated window that says you`ve gotta have an answer back by whatever days”. So we have a procedure with no designated time scale to respond.
(ST 137) ST asks, “is there some sort of indication that you get a response back at any point”, this is the same question as number 135, but gets a different response.
(MA 138). MA now states, “It all depends what the context of the report is”. We now have a procedure that discriminates on reports.
(ST 139) ST now asks if any issues I have raised would fall within the context of receiving a reply.
(ST & CP124 to 132) in dialogue. ST enquired why his correspondence had not been answered, it seems quite disturbing that contact is made and then ignored. CP gets confused herself when she says (CP 126), “I didn`t pick the message up and I responded to Perry”. How could CP respond when she didn`t get the message? CP then goes on to say (CP 132), “We don`t communicate with representatives, we communicate with the employee”. You would think that it would have been polite to inform ST of this.
The next passage clearly highlights that the management within TPE are unfamiliar with their own procedures.
(ST 133) ST refers to reports not being responded to, in particular the IP (Injury Prevention) reports.
(ST 135) ST asks if there is any window in which these reports are responded to.
(MA 136) MA states, “There isn`t a designated window that says you`ve gotta have an answer back by whatever days”. So we have a procedure with no designated time scale to respond.
(ST 137) ST asks, “is there some sort of indication that you get a response back at any point”, this is the same question as number 135, but gets a different response.
(MA 138). MA now states, “It all depends what the context of the report is”. We now have a procedure that discriminates on reports.
(ST 139) ST now asks if any issues I have raised would fall within the context of receiving a reply.
_
(MA 140). MA responds, “Normal repair book reports wouldn`t fall within”. ST specifically mentioned the IP procedure (ST 133), he never mentioned repair book sheets.
The IP process discussion ceases as the dialogue loses track of the initial question, but does re-appear, but before I continue, (MA 154) is talking about a repair book slip when he says, “The blue slip is faxed through to control, they make a judgment on whether the train stays in service, comes out of service, that clearly didn`t happen.” This is not true, this is not any procedure that I know. Imagine if you are nowhere near a fax machine during your shift and you fill a repair slip in within ten minutes of driving your train. The only opportunity you have of faxing is at the end of your shift. That train would therefore have stayed in service without their judgment.
(MA 140). MA responds, “Normal repair book reports wouldn`t fall within”. ST specifically mentioned the IP procedure (ST 133), he never mentioned repair book sheets.
The IP process discussion ceases as the dialogue loses track of the initial question, but does re-appear, but before I continue, (MA 154) is talking about a repair book slip when he says, “The blue slip is faxed through to control, they make a judgment on whether the train stays in service, comes out of service, that clearly didn`t happen.” This is not true, this is not any procedure that I know. Imagine if you are nowhere near a fax machine during your shift and you fill a repair slip in within ten minutes of driving your train. The only opportunity you have of faxing is at the end of your shift. That train would therefore have stayed in service without their judgment.
_This is where I will continue the IP process from.
(PW 164) I show MA an IP report (107), dated 29th October 2008, type of incident was, “Failure of warning horn”.
The passages reads, “As previous years, first really cold spell and the warning horns freeze up, to start with the low tone wouldn`t make any noise, with minimal noise from the high tone. But at Guide Bridge on the 15mph PSR, when trying to warn p way staff (track workers), both tones failed to respond, possibility that a snow shower didn`t help the situation. This is an age old problem that never gets rectified, maybe it requires a death before a solution is found”.
(MA 165) MA looks at the IP report without reading it, but seems unconcerned with its content. MA then gives ST his version of what the IP procedure is.
“So the IP, for Steve`s clarity, the IP sometimes is a general staff contact interface. How are you? What would you like to discuss kind of stuff. Clearly that doesn’t generate any type of feedback. Where people are specific in hazards, other things that they want feedback for, it can work a trail where people will get feedback even if they, face to face or written, this is what we`ve found” . Would you describe the IP process like this? So the question has to be, why didn`t I get any feedback?
TPE documentation states, “We are committed to feeding back to you the corrective actions taken as a result of the IP process so that you can see the benefit”. This was from 2007. Where was their commitment to my feedback? The following are Further TPE, IP and Safety Statements.
First Safety Principles. Number 1, do not endanger yourself or others. Report any hazardous condition or practice that may cause injury to people, property or the environment. This is my example of just this, which I have fully complied with all to no avail. (Hazardous condition: A defective warning horn that is extremely unpredictable as to whether it will work or not).
A statement from the Managing Director, Vernon Barker, from August 2006, “I have pledged my full backing to Injury Prevention Programme and believe that it will assist in generating a positive safety culture throughout First Transpennine Express”. Positive safety culture: What`s positive about ignorance?
First Performance Information. “Our commitment to the safety of our employees and customers through Injury Prevention means if you can`t do it safely, don`t do it”. Can`t do it safely, don`t do it: Take a look at this scenario, a driver sets off on a journey, it’s a cold damp day, like many days we have in this country. His speed builds up to 100mph, he enters an area of twists and turns, with many bridges spanning the railway, as he approaches a left bend, he goes under a bridge, suddenly not 1000ft away are a gang of track workers, he pushes his warning horn lever upwards, he gets no response, (remember the train is still moving at 100mph, at that speed, you travel 150 feet per second), when he gets over the initial shock of no response if he doesn`t freeze, he presses the lever down, again there is no response, (your still travelling at 100mph, 150 feet per second), what next? Myself personally, I can only hope and pray that this never happens, not only would the relatives of the deceased be distraught but think of the driver and what impact it would have on him. Then spare a thought for the police, ambulance and anyone else who has to take the body away and clean the mess up.
Is it safe therefore to run a train where that scenario could happen? It may well be hypothetical, but in realistic terms, it could happen. Is it safe, no it isn`t. Do TPE or Siemens take any notice? No they don`t. Especially as I will prove, TPE and SIEMENS allowed trains to run with COMPLETE FAILURES OF THE WARNING HORN. Maybe this is common practise in Germany, would a British Company allow this to happen?
This is an extract from a paper brief sent out to all staff.
Firstly, Safety, “We are committed to making FTPE a safe place for you and our customers at all times. We can improve our already good safety record through, using the Injury Prevention principles and recording safety conversations”, what should be said now is, if you’re an health and safety rep and also called Perry Webb we will ignore you.
“Improving accident investigation and safety briefs to our staff”. Accident prevention would have been more appropriate, and as for safety briefs, they are an absolute joke, I have had 2 recorded safety briefs in 5 years that TPE were aware of. I had to make them aware that I remembered a previous safety brief back in 2004, so that’s 3 in 5 years. The accepted standard from the Cullen recommendations brought about by the Ladbroke Grove tragedy is 2 per year.
“If you follow the Injury Prevention principles and report unsafe conditions and challenge unsafe behaviours it will help us improve safety”. I have reported so many unsafe behaviours and conditions, that is why I was ruthlessly dismissed.
“The only way to avoid accidents is to do things the safe way. Always”. TPE ignorance regarding warning horns and safety totally contradicts this statement. Continuing, “even if it takes a bit longer or needs more thought or preparation”. TPE already admit they were aware of the warning horn problem since introduction, back in 2006. It`s now 2010 and we still encounter exactly the same problem. Maybe a bit longer is required? How long? Till a death?
“If you can see the same old problem which regularly happens and you think we can be smarter and slicker, lets us know”. This statement leaves me absolutely speechless, it makes absolutely no difference how many times I see the same old problems happening time and time again, ignorance is bliss.
Mark Atkinson totally ignored the reports that I put in front of him as shown below, but why break the habit of a lifetime? Apparently he dismissed these reports because he saw them as (MA 173) "previous", yet how many times was this man using and willing to use information that was not from the day of January 14th 2009?
Back to the hearing report, (168 to 176). MA insists that the IP report I showed him was previous, my point is that it is also extremely relevant to my case and it never received any response for such a serious point which could as it said cause the death of a track worker one day. I then show MA another ignored IP report, it was dated 1st November 2008, “PS, Warning horn frozen on this unit, not working, hence causing the driver an awkward dilemma, chances are if reported to Network Rail as it should be, they may not allow the train to run. But 30 minutes later the horn will probably thaw out. All drivers are aware these horns are defective, but opt to run the service. But if they have an incident, will any blame be theirs for not informing the signaller and following instructions”? MA wasn`t interested and sadly neither was any manager at the time I wrote this, a simple response was all that I required, bearing in mind TPE IP principles, why did they fail me?
(PW 164) I show MA an IP report (107), dated 29th October 2008, type of incident was, “Failure of warning horn”.
The passages reads, “As previous years, first really cold spell and the warning horns freeze up, to start with the low tone wouldn`t make any noise, with minimal noise from the high tone. But at Guide Bridge on the 15mph PSR, when trying to warn p way staff (track workers), both tones failed to respond, possibility that a snow shower didn`t help the situation. This is an age old problem that never gets rectified, maybe it requires a death before a solution is found”.
(MA 165) MA looks at the IP report without reading it, but seems unconcerned with its content. MA then gives ST his version of what the IP procedure is.
“So the IP, for Steve`s clarity, the IP sometimes is a general staff contact interface. How are you? What would you like to discuss kind of stuff. Clearly that doesn’t generate any type of feedback. Where people are specific in hazards, other things that they want feedback for, it can work a trail where people will get feedback even if they, face to face or written, this is what we`ve found” . Would you describe the IP process like this? So the question has to be, why didn`t I get any feedback?
TPE documentation states, “We are committed to feeding back to you the corrective actions taken as a result of the IP process so that you can see the benefit”. This was from 2007. Where was their commitment to my feedback? The following are Further TPE, IP and Safety Statements.
First Safety Principles. Number 1, do not endanger yourself or others. Report any hazardous condition or practice that may cause injury to people, property or the environment. This is my example of just this, which I have fully complied with all to no avail. (Hazardous condition: A defective warning horn that is extremely unpredictable as to whether it will work or not).
A statement from the Managing Director, Vernon Barker, from August 2006, “I have pledged my full backing to Injury Prevention Programme and believe that it will assist in generating a positive safety culture throughout First Transpennine Express”. Positive safety culture: What`s positive about ignorance?
First Performance Information. “Our commitment to the safety of our employees and customers through Injury Prevention means if you can`t do it safely, don`t do it”. Can`t do it safely, don`t do it: Take a look at this scenario, a driver sets off on a journey, it’s a cold damp day, like many days we have in this country. His speed builds up to 100mph, he enters an area of twists and turns, with many bridges spanning the railway, as he approaches a left bend, he goes under a bridge, suddenly not 1000ft away are a gang of track workers, he pushes his warning horn lever upwards, he gets no response, (remember the train is still moving at 100mph, at that speed, you travel 150 feet per second), when he gets over the initial shock of no response if he doesn`t freeze, he presses the lever down, again there is no response, (your still travelling at 100mph, 150 feet per second), what next? Myself personally, I can only hope and pray that this never happens, not only would the relatives of the deceased be distraught but think of the driver and what impact it would have on him. Then spare a thought for the police, ambulance and anyone else who has to take the body away and clean the mess up.
Is it safe therefore to run a train where that scenario could happen? It may well be hypothetical, but in realistic terms, it could happen. Is it safe, no it isn`t. Do TPE or Siemens take any notice? No they don`t. Especially as I will prove, TPE and SIEMENS allowed trains to run with COMPLETE FAILURES OF THE WARNING HORN. Maybe this is common practise in Germany, would a British Company allow this to happen?
This is an extract from a paper brief sent out to all staff.
Firstly, Safety, “We are committed to making FTPE a safe place for you and our customers at all times. We can improve our already good safety record through, using the Injury Prevention principles and recording safety conversations”, what should be said now is, if you’re an health and safety rep and also called Perry Webb we will ignore you.
“Improving accident investigation and safety briefs to our staff”. Accident prevention would have been more appropriate, and as for safety briefs, they are an absolute joke, I have had 2 recorded safety briefs in 5 years that TPE were aware of. I had to make them aware that I remembered a previous safety brief back in 2004, so that’s 3 in 5 years. The accepted standard from the Cullen recommendations brought about by the Ladbroke Grove tragedy is 2 per year.
“If you follow the Injury Prevention principles and report unsafe conditions and challenge unsafe behaviours it will help us improve safety”. I have reported so many unsafe behaviours and conditions, that is why I was ruthlessly dismissed.
“The only way to avoid accidents is to do things the safe way. Always”. TPE ignorance regarding warning horns and safety totally contradicts this statement. Continuing, “even if it takes a bit longer or needs more thought or preparation”. TPE already admit they were aware of the warning horn problem since introduction, back in 2006. It`s now 2010 and we still encounter exactly the same problem. Maybe a bit longer is required? How long? Till a death?
“If you can see the same old problem which regularly happens and you think we can be smarter and slicker, lets us know”. This statement leaves me absolutely speechless, it makes absolutely no difference how many times I see the same old problems happening time and time again, ignorance is bliss.
Mark Atkinson totally ignored the reports that I put in front of him as shown below, but why break the habit of a lifetime? Apparently he dismissed these reports because he saw them as (MA 173) "previous", yet how many times was this man using and willing to use information that was not from the day of January 14th 2009?
Back to the hearing report, (168 to 176). MA insists that the IP report I showed him was previous, my point is that it is also extremely relevant to my case and it never received any response for such a serious point which could as it said cause the death of a track worker one day. I then show MA another ignored IP report, it was dated 1st November 2008, “PS, Warning horn frozen on this unit, not working, hence causing the driver an awkward dilemma, chances are if reported to Network Rail as it should be, they may not allow the train to run. But 30 minutes later the horn will probably thaw out. All drivers are aware these horns are defective, but opt to run the service. But if they have an incident, will any blame be theirs for not informing the signaller and following instructions”? MA wasn`t interested and sadly neither was any manager at the time I wrote this, a simple response was all that I required, bearing in mind TPE IP principles, why did they fail me?
From above. Again, no feedback given
whatsoever, extremely relevant to my incident. If feedback had been given to
those 2 reports out of numerous that were ignored then there is every chance
that I would not be in the position I was in. This report should have set alarm
bells ringing straight away, did it mean that I actually drove this train at
line speed with a complete warning horn failure? Why did the management team at
York ignore these reports? It also shows that I was aware of what drivers
actually did and that is, run the service regardless of a warning horn fault.
(ST 192) This passage explains my thought mechanism on the day in question. The main points from this are. The stress and anxiety this problem caused me. My concerns over the safety aspects of these defects in relation to running a service. The thought that no matter how many times I report this through the correct reporting procedures I am always ignored. ST points out that at worst this is a training issue and that the reporting procedure is a key part of this.
(ST 192) This passage explains my thought mechanism on the day in question. The main points from this are. The stress and anxiety this problem caused me. My concerns over the safety aspects of these defects in relation to running a service. The thought that no matter how many times I report this through the correct reporting procedures I am always ignored. ST points out that at worst this is a training issue and that the reporting procedure is a key part of this.
_
(MA 193) States, “I understand that”. But then his next words were. (MA 195), “and at what point does it make it right to start making stuff up”? ST had just taken 3 minutes and 13 seconds explaining the reasoning why I fabricated the near miss incident.
(MA 193) States, “I understand that”. But then his next words were. (MA 195), “and at what point does it make it right to start making stuff up”? ST had just taken 3 minutes and 13 seconds explaining the reasoning why I fabricated the near miss incident.
(Minutes 199 to 211). I start off by trying to go through charge number 1, but MA keeps rudely interrupting. He does not give me the chance to speak. This is not the first time that he prevented me from putting my point of view across. However yet again MA makes the comment (MA 206) about my concerns on the train faults, not his concerns, and that I could have made sure this train wouldn`t have gone any further once I arrived in York. He should/would have known that this train would have run because the cab I was in on arrival at York was not the one the train was now being driven from and TPE DOTE contingency plans would allow that train to run. Yet he chose to ignore these relevant facts because it helped my argument.
I ask any TPE Driver, "would that train have been taken out of service"?
(PW 211).This is where I explain again that the fault was a partial failure and that I attempted to call control via the NRN radio. I then ask the question, “Does the NRN show up on a down load”?
I ask any TPE Driver, "would that train have been taken out of service"?
(PW 211).This is where I explain again that the fault was a partial failure and that I attempted to call control via the NRN radio. I then ask the question, “Does the NRN show up on a down load”?
_(MA 212). MA responds, “NOT SURE”. A Route Driver Manager unsure about
basic train workings.
(PW 213) I explain the events leading up to and arriving in York, there was quite a bit of confusion which was also time consuming.
(MA 214 & 216) MA Then says that my duty is the concerns on the train, but with no immediate relieving driver there, I turned my attention to help the passengers who were boarding the wrong train. Again MA makes the point that I am, “concerned about the state of the train" , not that he was concerned.
(MA 218) MA says, “not to worry about people getting on and off with cases, deal with what you think is right”. That is exactly what I did at the time, my decision. I didn`t want elderly and women with small children dragging their cases onto a train that was not going forward to Manchester Airport.
(PW 219) This is where I explain the defects and my knowledge that the train was not leaving with any defect that could result in harm or damage. It was definitely, definitely safe to run that train.
basic train workings.
(PW 213) I explain the events leading up to and arriving in York, there was quite a bit of confusion which was also time consuming.
(MA 214 & 216) MA Then says that my duty is the concerns on the train, but with no immediate relieving driver there, I turned my attention to help the passengers who were boarding the wrong train. Again MA makes the point that I am, “concerned about the state of the train" , not that he was concerned.
(MA 218) MA says, “not to worry about people getting on and off with cases, deal with what you think is right”. That is exactly what I did at the time, my decision. I didn`t want elderly and women with small children dragging their cases onto a train that was not going forward to Manchester Airport.
(PW 219) This is where I explain the defects and my knowledge that the train was not leaving with any defect that could result in harm or damage. It was definitely, definitely safe to run that train.
(MA 225) "No", agrees that 2 safety briefs in 5 years is not normal. We all know that the Cullen Report suggested one every 6 months, this came about after a serious accident at Ladbroke Grove. Safety Briefs are paramount to promoting safety on the railway, yet here we have Route Driver Manager Mark Atkinson admitting his Companies obligation to these extremely important briefs has been compromised. Yet this company (TPE) states, "Safety is our number one priority".
(237 to 244) This is about safety encounters, I explain that they last all of five minutes and are done either in your break or at the end of your shift, that drivers are not listening and just want to get off home.
_
(MA 245) MA responds by saying,“When Joe Bloggs wants to go home”, MA still does not understand the relevance of a serious safety related issue, an extremely petulant and what I would call disgraceful statement to make for a Senior Manager. I am trying to explain that these encounters do not work.
(ST 248) Makes a mockery of TPE and Siemens so called protocol. they state, "No fault found or working on arrival on depot shall no longer be acceptable answers". Yet this was the very answer to my repair book entry.
(MA 245) MA responds by saying,“When Joe Bloggs wants to go home”, MA still does not understand the relevance of a serious safety related issue, an extremely petulant and what I would call disgraceful statement to make for a Senior Manager. I am trying to explain that these encounters do not work.
(ST 248) Makes a mockery of TPE and Siemens so called protocol. they state, "No fault found or working on arrival on depot shall no longer be acceptable answers". Yet this was the very answer to my repair book entry.
It was, TPE Fleet Update from January 2009 , “No fault found or working on arrival at depot shall no longer be acceptable answers ”.
Mark Atkinson also knows that Siemens response is always the same when he says, (MA 254), "the same old, the same old".
You will also notice how confused Mark Atkinson is over this information, to me what he is saying is garbled and does not make sense, does it make sense to any of you who read this?
The point being made next is about the weather on the day in question, which played a major part in the events.
The temperature on arrival in York was above freezing, this warning horn was now functioning correctly, that was based on my judgment, I ask any of you, what would control have said?
(MA 265). MA says, “If you are so serious to start making a song and dance about trying to get it out of traffic for a near miss”. An unbelievable statement given all the facts he has had so far. Where throughout this entire investigation and this hearing have I made this so called SONG AND DANCE? It is extremely evident once again that MA is losing the plot, he quite clearly is working to the agenda preset before this hearing began, that I will be found guilty at all cost.
The facts:
There was no near miss.
I never once attempted to get the unit taken out of traffic.
Where does my, “SONG AND DANCE”, come from?
(MA 265). MA says, “If you are so serious to start making a song and dance about trying to get it out of traffic for a near miss”. An unbelievable statement given all the facts he has had so far. Where throughout this entire investigation and this hearing have I made this so called SONG AND DANCE? It is extremely evident once again that MA is losing the plot, he quite clearly is working to the agenda preset before this hearing began, that I will be found guilty at all cost.
The facts:
There was no near miss.
I never once attempted to get the unit taken out of traffic.
Where does my, “SONG AND DANCE”, come from?
_(MA 283). MA concern (MA 260 & 262) is
that I allowed the train to remain in traffic. As I previously explained on the
same subject. My decision was based on the evidence I had before me and that
was everything worked satisfactorily to allow that train to run. Every time a
driver leaves any train they make the same conscious decision. Does MA want us
to ring for advice on each occasion we leave a train?
(MA 288). MA asks, “Is this the only train you have driven that`s had cold issue`s with the weather”? This highlights that once again that he is fully aware that problems exist in cold weather, yet as a Senior Manager with the responsibilities as laid out in his job description, what has he ever done about this except turn the proverbial blind eye? Number 4 is a specific responsibility for MA, Route Driver Manager, “That any unsafe activity is immediately stopped and prevented from continuing until adequate measures have been taken to reduce the risk associated with that activity to as low as reasonably practicable”.The warning horns and their unpredictability make it totally unsafe in certain weather conditions, no adequate measures were in place for me.
(MA 290). MA states, “I don`t think you will find a fleet in the country that doesn`t struggle with it because of the positioning of the horn`s because they are exposed to the elements”. So because he thinks every train operating company run this way, it is acceptable for TPE to do this. He freely admits guilt by this statement, which again highlights that TPE FAILED ME, again a Senior Manager aware of such a dangerous and life threatening situation, yet what has he done about it? How about practicing these 3 SAFETY PRINCIPLES, or don`t these count for Senior Managers or any Managers.
1. Number 1. Accepting responsibility for your own safety and for the safety of those working around you.
2. Number 3. Reporting anything you think is unsafe, no matter how small you think it may be.
3. Number 8. Zero tolerance of unsafe behaviours at all levels of the organisation.
(ST 291). ST Points out that the precedent set by TPE in that Managers and Engineers being fully aware of this problem yet allowing these trains to run sends the message out that its acceptable to run with a warning horn fault. That it`s Management who should take the lead and stop this unsafe working practice. For over 3 years, TPE and Siemens have allowed this unsafe working practice to continue and it still continues to this day.
(MA 288). MA asks, “Is this the only train you have driven that`s had cold issue`s with the weather”? This highlights that once again that he is fully aware that problems exist in cold weather, yet as a Senior Manager with the responsibilities as laid out in his job description, what has he ever done about this except turn the proverbial blind eye? Number 4 is a specific responsibility for MA, Route Driver Manager, “That any unsafe activity is immediately stopped and prevented from continuing until adequate measures have been taken to reduce the risk associated with that activity to as low as reasonably practicable”.The warning horns and their unpredictability make it totally unsafe in certain weather conditions, no adequate measures were in place for me.
(MA 290). MA states, “I don`t think you will find a fleet in the country that doesn`t struggle with it because of the positioning of the horn`s because they are exposed to the elements”. So because he thinks every train operating company run this way, it is acceptable for TPE to do this. He freely admits guilt by this statement, which again highlights that TPE FAILED ME, again a Senior Manager aware of such a dangerous and life threatening situation, yet what has he done about it? How about practicing these 3 SAFETY PRINCIPLES, or don`t these count for Senior Managers or any Managers.
1. Number 1. Accepting responsibility for your own safety and for the safety of those working around you.
2. Number 3. Reporting anything you think is unsafe, no matter how small you think it may be.
3. Number 8. Zero tolerance of unsafe behaviours at all levels of the organisation.
(ST 291). ST Points out that the precedent set by TPE in that Managers and Engineers being fully aware of this problem yet allowing these trains to run sends the message out that its acceptable to run with a warning horn fault. That it`s Management who should take the lead and stop this unsafe working practice. For over 3 years, TPE and Siemens have allowed this unsafe working practice to continue and it still continues to this day.
After getting this far in the hearing, you surely would think that the penny would drop by now, but not so for Mark Atkinson.
(MA 296). MA continues, “Could you control the situation? If you were the driver and your horn is partially defective, fully defective, is it controllable? Safely? Is that situation controllable in a safe manner”?
(ST 297). ST responds “Of course it`s controllable. You obviously restrict your speed appropriately”.
(MA 298). MA says to me, “WHY DIDN`T YOU”? Yet again this categorically proves MA and Manager Stephen Percival failed from the outset to discover all the facts. To me the horn defect was a PARTIAL FAILURE, TW5 37.3 rule book and TPE`s own DOTE contingency plans allow the train to run at line speed and complete its journey. But why wasn`t this sorted in the investigation? Furthermore I had made it quite clear earlier (PW 21) (PW 26) (PW 211) (PW 219) (ST 248) that the defect was a partial failure, yet MA can only focus on the worst case scenario for me, that of a complete failure, yet again his judgment is based on the wrong set of facts, despite being constantly informed exactly what type of horn defect this unit had.
(MA 300). MA asks if I thought it was really unsafe. Not the belief that he found it unsafe.
(PW 302). I responded by saying, “I didn`t say it was completely unsafe because...”.
(MA 303). MA interrupts and says, “It was still working”. This was just one of 20 interruptions in total.
(PW 304). PW My response was “on and off , it`s all right you know, (meaning this is a very common occurrence which we all as drivers have to put up with), there like that, they all are”.
(MA 296). MA continues, “Could you control the situation? If you were the driver and your horn is partially defective, fully defective, is it controllable? Safely? Is that situation controllable in a safe manner”?
(ST 297). ST responds “Of course it`s controllable. You obviously restrict your speed appropriately”.
(MA 298). MA says to me, “WHY DIDN`T YOU”? Yet again this categorically proves MA and Manager Stephen Percival failed from the outset to discover all the facts. To me the horn defect was a PARTIAL FAILURE, TW5 37.3 rule book and TPE`s own DOTE contingency plans allow the train to run at line speed and complete its journey. But why wasn`t this sorted in the investigation? Furthermore I had made it quite clear earlier (PW 21) (PW 26) (PW 211) (PW 219) (ST 248) that the defect was a partial failure, yet MA can only focus on the worst case scenario for me, that of a complete failure, yet again his judgment is based on the wrong set of facts, despite being constantly informed exactly what type of horn defect this unit had.
(MA 300). MA asks if I thought it was really unsafe. Not the belief that he found it unsafe.
(PW 302). I responded by saying, “I didn`t say it was completely unsafe because...”.
(MA 303). MA interrupts and says, “It was still working”. This was just one of 20 interruptions in total.
(PW 304). PW My response was “on and off , it`s all right you know, (meaning this is a very common occurrence which we all as drivers have to put up with), there like that, they all are”.
(ST 305). ST asks a very relevant question, “Perry has run a train in public service which should not have run. Is that the position you occupy”? The response as you will see has no relevance to the question, he cannot answer the question for fear of incriminating himself. He knows that train would have remained in service regardless.
(MA 306). MA response to the question is as I just pointed out, this is what he replied, “I am trying to understand the whole picture of why he has had these chances to make a song and dance as he put it”. I cannot understand how the question had this response but it shows as many times previously that MA is trying to show me in the worst possible light, yet amazingly once again I have never said the term or shown any indication of, “MAKING A SONG AND DANCE”, let`s look back at number 265 which said the following, MA says, “If you are so serious to start making a song and dance about trying to get it out of traffic for a near miss”. So it was not me that mentioned a song and dance, MA was obviously trying to justify the pre-meditated decision and realised we have a very strong case. He had
already made too many mistakes.
(MA 306). MA response to the question is as I just pointed out, this is what he replied, “I am trying to understand the whole picture of why he has had these chances to make a song and dance as he put it”. I cannot understand how the question had this response but it shows as many times previously that MA is trying to show me in the worst possible light, yet amazingly once again I have never said the term or shown any indication of, “MAKING A SONG AND DANCE”, let`s look back at number 265 which said the following, MA says, “If you are so serious to start making a song and dance about trying to get it out of traffic for a near miss”. So it was not me that mentioned a song and dance, MA was obviously trying to justify the pre-meditated decision and realised we have a very strong case. He had
already made too many mistakes.
(ST 308). ST mentions the range of reports that I
have previously submitted. (all available to see on that day and on the table
in front of MA).
(MA 310). MA admits there is a range of reports but says he is only interested in this one, because this is the one he knows about.
(PW 311). PW I explain that they are relevant and its evidence.
(MA 312). MA says, “I understand that”. He clearly did not understand. In the next sentence (PW 313) I actually say,“ignorance”.
(MA 314). MA says, “I am trying to understand events on this day why he acted like he did”, you would think that it has been clearly explained by now? What more can I add? It was explained clearly back in my investigatory interviews.
(315 & 317). I explain because I was at the end of my tether, sick of reporting these defects to which MA says again (MA 316),“I understand that, I understand what you’re saying”. If he fully understood then why the same old questioning? It was just repetitive, his line of questioning was the same, time and time and time again.
(MA 310). MA admits there is a range of reports but says he is only interested in this one, because this is the one he knows about.
(PW 311). PW I explain that they are relevant and its evidence.
(MA 312). MA says, “I understand that”. He clearly did not understand. In the next sentence (PW 313) I actually say,“ignorance”.
(MA 314). MA says, “I am trying to understand events on this day why he acted like he did”, you would think that it has been clearly explained by now? What more can I add? It was explained clearly back in my investigatory interviews.
(315 & 317). I explain because I was at the end of my tether, sick of reporting these defects to which MA says again (MA 316),“I understand that, I understand what you’re saying”. If he fully understood then why the same old questioning? It was just repetitive, his line of questioning was the same, time and time and time again.
(ST 318). ST puts it to MA, how do we find a solution for this problem on warning horns, do drivers work to standards and is a train taken out of service every time there is a horn defect. I thought this was a sympathetic approach to this serious subject and certainly never expected such a poor and thoughtless answer from someone who is supposed to be a professional person in a senior managerial role.
UNBELIEVABLE RESPONSE
(MA 319). MA replies, “I don`t know and I don`t think that is for debate in this forum”. I wish we were in a forum, ask yourself why can`t MA answer these extremely relevant questions? But then again, not one manager could answer me since the end of 2006 on this issue, so I don`t expect an answer now. Lets remember back to MA saying (MA 118), “and that’s why in reading the charges out, and reading out exactly what he should have done, I`ll understand why he didn`t do that”. All we were asking is what should I have done.
UNBELIEVABLE RESPONSE
(MA 319). MA replies, “I don`t know and I don`t think that is for debate in this forum”. I wish we were in a forum, ask yourself why can`t MA answer these extremely relevant questions? But then again, not one manager could answer me since the end of 2006 on this issue, so I don`t expect an answer now. Lets remember back to MA saying (MA 118), “and that’s why in reading the charges out, and reading out exactly what he should have done, I`ll understand why he didn`t do that”. All we were asking is what should I have done.
_
(MA 325). MA says, “He needs to comply with instructions”. MA all through this hearing has been confused over what instructions I should have followed.
(ST 326). ST asks, “WHICH ARE”. (MA takes time to answer).
(MA 327).MA responds eventually, “THAT THEY REPORT CORRECTLY”, he hasn`t got a clue which set of rules or instructions or so called procedures I should have followed. It points to nothing more than a sham of an investigation and a sham of a hearing. All ST wanted was an answer to the appropriate way (ST 320) I should have conducted myself that day. Yet I should have complied with instructions and reported correctly.
(MA 325). MA says, “He needs to comply with instructions”. MA all through this hearing has been confused over what instructions I should have followed.
(ST 326). ST asks, “WHICH ARE”. (MA takes time to answer).
(MA 327).MA responds eventually, “THAT THEY REPORT CORRECTLY”, he hasn`t got a clue which set of rules or instructions or so called procedures I should have followed. It points to nothing more than a sham of an investigation and a sham of a hearing. All ST wanted was an answer to the appropriate way (ST 320) I should have conducted myself that day. Yet I should have complied with instructions and reported correctly.
(MA 337). MA responds to ST mentioning a certified illness (ST 336), whereby MA says that I “committed”an event and that “allegedly” , my illness came on after the event. I would like to say, that constant ignorance made me feel extremely low, it hammers your self esteem.The levels of ignorance made me feel totally worthless and that is why I gave up the role as health and safety representative, (MA 339) states, “Well I can`t comment before the event can I”?“I can only go on what I have seen post this”. MA could have taken time to read through the pile of evidence I had brought, in this evidence was information to suggest that I had previous run ins with TPE management, was sent for a medical examination and that ignorance was the only ingredient responsible for my actions. Ignorance is mental torture, I defy anyone to say otherwise, especially looking at the levels of ignorance I had to endure, I have plenty more examples of this.
(MA 341). MA states, “I do not mind him having a focus on safety as long as it`s conducted properly”. How many more reports do TPE require? How many times did I conduct myself properly but got no response? The only issue I was faced with was BLATANT IGNORANCE. Perhaps TPE should conduct themselves correctly. MA ignores the fact that time and time again I reported correctly.
(ST 342). ST points out that if not done correctly, that Management would step in and show me how to do it. Main point here is, In the last 4 years I must have been doing it correctly otherwise surely TPE Management would have made me aware I was wrong?
(PW 343). PW I stated, “I have done these type of things previously, I`ve not even had a warning, it`s not the first time”. Meaning not informing control on a partial defect, sometimes not faxing the repair book slip, also the amount of reports I submit and the amount of defect reports I submit, with hard hitting topics, including using scenario`s to try and show what I consider a danger.
(PW 345). PW I point out that I am the only driver with 2 personal boxes, due to my constant reporting of faults and defects, (which does highlight that I am quite aware of how to report a defect), yet one minor blip and TPE call it “Gross Misconduct”. Also pointing out that most of it was from being the health and safety rep and that I have never had even a verbal or written warning about my reports. Yet in the investigation SP makes a big issue of the way I supposedly wrote my reports, so why wasn`t I disciplined in any way for this especially in light of the history surrounding the way I allegedly write my reports.
(MA 341). MA states, “I do not mind him having a focus on safety as long as it`s conducted properly”. How many more reports do TPE require? How many times did I conduct myself properly but got no response? The only issue I was faced with was BLATANT IGNORANCE. Perhaps TPE should conduct themselves correctly. MA ignores the fact that time and time again I reported correctly.
(ST 342). ST points out that if not done correctly, that Management would step in and show me how to do it. Main point here is, In the last 4 years I must have been doing it correctly otherwise surely TPE Management would have made me aware I was wrong?
(PW 343). PW I stated, “I have done these type of things previously, I`ve not even had a warning, it`s not the first time”. Meaning not informing control on a partial defect, sometimes not faxing the repair book slip, also the amount of reports I submit and the amount of defect reports I submit, with hard hitting topics, including using scenario`s to try and show what I consider a danger.
(PW 345). PW I point out that I am the only driver with 2 personal boxes, due to my constant reporting of faults and defects, (which does highlight that I am quite aware of how to report a defect), yet one minor blip and TPE call it “Gross Misconduct”. Also pointing out that most of it was from being the health and safety rep and that I have never had even a verbal or written warning about my reports. Yet in the investigation SP makes a big issue of the way I supposedly wrote my reports, so why wasn`t I disciplined in any way for this especially in light of the history surrounding the way I allegedly write my reports.
_ (MA 346). The next statement will be so familiar, MA says, “Why the need to do it?“Why go down the road”. This is the only line of questioning he keeps saying, it`s become like a war time interrogation. How many more times did he want an explanation? Why hasn`t this man taken notice of what I was telling him?
(347 to 356). MA Keeps going over the same ground, he has no other line of questioning, what more can I say on this matter. YES I made the near miss up. I do point out that it is a build up of frustration, (MA 354) MA even states, “I understand that drivers get frustrated with things”. With what I had presented so far, he could never have an understanding of the frustrations that I endured.
(ST 357).ST Has a very common sense approach in this passage, he talks about how the system has broken down with feedback, but there is in place a process to deal with this situation, it`s called IP (Injury Prevention), but sadly it has failed miserably. The problem we have is management clearly don`t want reports put in, so by acting towards myself in this manner they silence their biggest critic hence putting anyone else off from complaining or reporting anything.
(347 to 356). MA Keeps going over the same ground, he has no other line of questioning, what more can I say on this matter. YES I made the near miss up. I do point out that it is a build up of frustration, (MA 354) MA even states, “I understand that drivers get frustrated with things”. With what I had presented so far, he could never have an understanding of the frustrations that I endured.
(ST 357).ST Has a very common sense approach in this passage, he talks about how the system has broken down with feedback, but there is in place a process to deal with this situation, it`s called IP (Injury Prevention), but sadly it has failed miserably. The problem we have is management clearly don`t want reports put in, so by acting towards myself in this manner they silence their biggest critic hence putting anyone else off from complaining or reporting anything.
(PW 358). I explain that in 2004 I was suspended over health and safety issues and sent to see Dr Pearlman in Leeds. The following is what happened in 2004.
In February 2004, First Group, Transpennine Express took over the franchise, from the very beginning there was hostility towards me and no response to reports that I submitted.
The following that occurred throughout 2004 set the trend for each year after, except, each year the ignorance got gradually worse. On March 9th 2004, Manager John Moans has an informal chat with me (not the first time a Manager has turned an informal chat into a written record), regarding my wording of driver reports, the informal chat however was recorded on my personal file. (Displayed below). The report highlights 3 issues,
a. Reports with disparaging or insulting comments on them (para 2), which I totally deny.
b. The offer to give me an insight (para 3) into how TPE (TransPennine Express) departments work together. Guess What? This never happened. Did anyone actually think this would happen?
c. The clear understanding of the manager that frustration was at the root of my reports (para 4).
_
The following is a letter to Dr Pearlman from Manager John Moans
_ Manager John Moans states that my file is extensive
and catalogues a massive number of issues, he claims that these reports contain
associated derogatory remarks, which I totally deny. He then states that when
TPE took over I was briefed on First Groups commitment to improving information
flow to staff and to develop a culture of staff involvement. If this was the
case, then we would not have been in a tribunal.
What is said next makes a complete mockery of what John Moans pointed out above, "develop a culture of staff involvement"!
“Driver Webb was to attend a 5 day job mirroring exercise with Transpennine Control and fleet engineers next week, this has now been cancelled”!
It then continues to point out that the reports I submit are abusive, again, which I totally deny. He then states that, “Webb`s actions are the actions of a member of staff that has taken everything out of perspective”. Because I have a passion for health and safety, challenging conditions I feel are dangerous, I supposedly have
taken everything out of
perspective.
What is said next makes a complete mockery of what John Moans pointed out above, "develop a culture of staff involvement"!
“Driver Webb was to attend a 5 day job mirroring exercise with Transpennine Control and fleet engineers next week, this has now been cancelled”!
It then continues to point out that the reports I submit are abusive, again, which I totally deny. He then states that, “Webb`s actions are the actions of a member of staff that has taken everything out of perspective”. Because I have a passion for health and safety, challenging conditions I feel are dangerous, I supposedly have
taken everything out of
perspective.
_Manager Moans
then makes six points he asks the Doctor for guidance upon, in the third point,
he states, “Is this driver becoming
paranoid. I have assured him that the company is doing everything possible to
meet his demands”.
I have never made any demands, all I ever asked for was involvement and answers to my reports.
In point 4, he makes it look like every report I submit is a deliberate transgression, my reports were hard hitting and very much to the point.
In the sixth point, I was never offered counseling or refused any help. None of Manager Moans concerns were talked about with me, also like all previous correspondence have never seen this letter until I received it from BUPA on request of my file.
I have never made any demands, all I ever asked for was involvement and answers to my reports.
In point 4, he makes it look like every report I submit is a deliberate transgression, my reports were hard hitting and very much to the point.
In the sixth point, I was never offered counseling or refused any help. None of Manager Moans concerns were talked about with me, also like all previous correspondence have never seen this letter until I received it from BUPA on request of my file.
Dr Pearlman`s reply to Manager John Moans
_
On the 17th June 2004, I had an
appointment with Doctor J Pearlman, the following are what she ascertained from
our conversation.
a. Health & Safety Rep for 5 years, feels confident.
b. Reports put in about issues, but comments nothing ever done.
c. Still persistently ignored.
d. States no change.
e. Angry & frustrated in work issues.
f. Specifically perceives his line management do not talk to him and explain why his queries are dealt with.
g. Presented to me 13 vehicle repair sheets, Arriva, states all these Transpennine. (Arriva mentioned because the repair book was written by Arriva.)
h. His problem is, H&S Rep is voice of people.
i. His perception, problem is being ignored.
a. Health & Safety Rep for 5 years, feels confident.
b. Reports put in about issues, but comments nothing ever done.
c. Still persistently ignored.
d. States no change.
e. Angry & frustrated in work issues.
f. Specifically perceives his line management do not talk to him and explain why his queries are dealt with.
g. Presented to me 13 vehicle repair sheets, Arriva, states all these Transpennine. (Arriva mentioned because the repair book was written by Arriva.)
h. His problem is, H&S Rep is voice of people.
i. His perception, problem is being ignored.
"Perry presented calm and rational and feels frustrated as
Health & Safety Rep. Unable to support his colleagues on numerous issues,
re health and safety issues he brings to your attention. There are no medical
reasons to prevent him driving. I would suggest that a case conference be had
to review the management issues he is focusing on".
"I would suggest that a case conference be had to review the management issues he is focusing on".
NO PRIZES for guessing the outcome of the above request.
_
"I would suggest that a case conference be had to review the management issues he is focusing on".
NO PRIZES for guessing the outcome of the above request.
_
Dr Pearlmans reply to manager John Moans. Are four paragraphs that sum up the problem adequately. (para 1) States my case, “Perry states very clearly that he is frustrated as he is unable to support his colleagues with the numerous issues regarding health and safety that are brought to his attention. He perceives that he is ignored by management”.
The following are the key points Doctor Pearlman makes.
(para 2) “I would suggest that a way forward with this situation would be a case conference with him to review the management issues that he is focusing on”.
(para 3) “I do feel that counseling would help but, much more specifically, with regard to dealing with the frustrations that he clearly perceives within his job”.
(para 4) “All that I can advise is that an individual risk assessment be undertaken by the driver team manager and liaison be had with him regarding his other concerns of management issues”.
I was sent to this doctor because TPE perceived my actions that of someone who was not mentally stable, they wanted to know why I was supposedly deliberately transgressing and continuing to submit these reports. Doctor Pearlman gave her opinion, basically my prescription. So why was not one of her recommendations adhered to? I am quite sure if the doctor had said this man has worrying signs and I feel he is no longer suitable to drive a train, I would have been taken out of the driving grade. TPE ignored Doctor Pearlman`s diagnosis and remedy. Taking this into account, I think that nearly 5 years further on with unbelievable ignorance displayed, I did extremely well to try and keep myself calm and sane.
TPE ignorance was nothing more than bullying and harassment, it is clearly defined in their bullying and harassment procedures, TPE define it as, “Bullying may be characterised as offensive, intimidating, malicious or insulting behaviour, an abuse or misuse of power through means intended to undermine, humiliate, denigrate or injure the recipient. Bullying or harassment may be by an individual against an individual (perhaps by someone in a position of authority such as a manager or supervisor) or involve groups of people. It may be obvious or it may be insidious. Whatever form it takes, it is unwarranted and unwelcome to the individual”.
On reading that passage, I found their ignorance to be offensive, I deserved some respect. It was clearly intimidating, the fact that they were aware the longer they ignored me the more I would retaliate. To subject any individual to this level of ignorance had to be borne out of ill will, this was malicious. Their ignorance was also a powerful weapon which undermined my efforts which in turn was a control measure to the rest of staff to say, look, if he cannot get anywhere then you have no hope. This is where the humiliation comes in, the humiliation at continuing to try and improve everyone`s working environment and make safety the number one priority (supposedly a First Group value) yet openly be ignored and get absolutely nowhere. Finally as for denigrate, you only need to look at the investigation report to see the attempts to make me look as bad as possible by including references that I mentioned earlier. When looking at the quiet word incident, Stephen Percival in his investigation says it was an “informal discussion”, the letter says interview.
_
(MA 362) MA Again, all he can come up with is that I am, “completely off the mark”. How many more times?
The point to be made here is the meaning of, “you’ve done it before”, firstly, I have never fabricated any reports before, If there was any report of a similar nature, don`t you think it would have been brought to my attention? I have however added scenario`s stating possibilities, in the context of this, what I have done before is how I behaved on that morning in question, that in not informing control and faxing the repair slip straight away because of my understanding of such a common fault and how the behavior of every other driver towards this responded. Previous reports and repair slips show this to be the case, therefore why wasn`t I or any other driver pulled up on this? But then with my reports and repair slips that TPE had in their possession, it is fairly obvious to conclude and evidence shows they were ignored.
(MA 366) MA asks an extremely relevant question, “what prevents this frustration from building up again and you doing it again”? No disrespect, but the answer to this question is the key to the reason we were in that hearing. It should have been so blatantly obvious to MA what the answer is. This is where I firmly believe that any manager taking this hearing with an open mind and based on the evidence they would have heard so far could have ended this hearing now and come up with a solution. Main question has to be, why did management let my frustration escalate this far? It could have been stopped by dialogue, consultation. Why did management always treat me as the enemy?
I even said, (PW 368 & 370) “That is why I want to put a stop to it now”, and “this is where a stop could be put to it”.
(MA 362) MA Again, all he can come up with is that I am, “completely off the mark”. How many more times?
The point to be made here is the meaning of, “you’ve done it before”, firstly, I have never fabricated any reports before, If there was any report of a similar nature, don`t you think it would have been brought to my attention? I have however added scenario`s stating possibilities, in the context of this, what I have done before is how I behaved on that morning in question, that in not informing control and faxing the repair slip straight away because of my understanding of such a common fault and how the behavior of every other driver towards this responded. Previous reports and repair slips show this to be the case, therefore why wasn`t I or any other driver pulled up on this? But then with my reports and repair slips that TPE had in their possession, it is fairly obvious to conclude and evidence shows they were ignored.
(MA 366) MA asks an extremely relevant question, “what prevents this frustration from building up again and you doing it again”? No disrespect, but the answer to this question is the key to the reason we were in that hearing. It should have been so blatantly obvious to MA what the answer is. This is where I firmly believe that any manager taking this hearing with an open mind and based on the evidence they would have heard so far could have ended this hearing now and come up with a solution. Main question has to be, why did management let my frustration escalate this far? It could have been stopped by dialogue, consultation. Why did management always treat me as the enemy?
I even said, (PW 368 & 370) “That is why I want to put a stop to it now”, and “this is where a stop could be put to it”.
_
(ST 371). ST explains the very nature of the ATCU and how we want to take forward issues with any management, a very long passage but very relevant and a way forward.
(ST 371). ST explains the very nature of the ATCU and how we want to take forward issues with any management, a very long passage but very relevant and a way forward.
(ST 373). ST, Once again speaks with common sense on identifying issues and improving areas of concern. At the end of this paragraph he states, “Maybe over exuberance, maybe misguided but done with the very best intentions and done out of frustration by someone who`s not well and is taken in that light. I therefore look forward to your proposals as to a way forward”.
I ask MA (PW 374) if he would like to look through some of my evidence, which highlights some of my frustrations. MA never even glanced at it, he just ignored it.
Yet amazingly MA states (MA 375) “I can understand your frustration because clearly it`s there”. This is the same man that said what I did was with malicious intent.
(PW 376) PW In this passage I explain to MA that I have done this before and if management had warned me it wouldn`t have happened again. I tried to show him the exact reports which showed a scenario situation being used and also that I never informed control in the same situation. I then explain that I feel the warning horns do not match the expectation of the group standards, at low speed, high speed and with cold weather and that if this had been addressed I would never be in this position.
I ask MA (PW 374) if he would like to look through some of my evidence, which highlights some of my frustrations. MA never even glanced at it, he just ignored it.
Yet amazingly MA states (MA 375) “I can understand your frustration because clearly it`s there”. This is the same man that said what I did was with malicious intent.
(PW 376) PW In this passage I explain to MA that I have done this before and if management had warned me it wouldn`t have happened again. I tried to show him the exact reports which showed a scenario situation being used and also that I never informed control in the same situation. I then explain that I feel the warning horns do not match the expectation of the group standards, at low speed, high speed and with cold weather and that if this had been addressed I would never be in this position.
(MA 377). MA a senior manager now makes an astounding comment, he
actually asks me, if it has been proven that the warning horns are not audible
at that distance!
Let`s remember that I am in this hearing because despite years and numerous complaints about defective warning horns, always completely ignored, I try a different approach to highlight this problem. TPE freely admit they have been aware of this problem “Since Introduction”. MA is freely admitting he doesn`t know if these horns have been tested. (ST 379) asks that very question, “has it been investigated”. (PW 380) I explain with the amount of reports you would think it would have been investigated. I believe that TPE have only just started to investigate this problem now, 4 years after becoming aware and I believe that is only because of my involvement in highlighting this very serious life threatening problem.
(PW 387). PW I point out that in recent control logs there are issues raised of train crew not reporting defects, why wasn`t the same charges of
“Gross Misconduct” levelled at
them?
(PW 389). PW I point out that in the repair slips I had with me, there would be many that have not been rang in to control. Therefore not following the same so called procedure I apparently didn`t follow.
(MA 390).MA says, “But your actions have decided to go down the same line as the others”. If my actions went down the same line as others, why weren`t the others given the same charges? Why? Because it was me.
Let`s remember that I am in this hearing because despite years and numerous complaints about defective warning horns, always completely ignored, I try a different approach to highlight this problem. TPE freely admit they have been aware of this problem “Since Introduction”. MA is freely admitting he doesn`t know if these horns have been tested. (ST 379) asks that very question, “has it been investigated”. (PW 380) I explain with the amount of reports you would think it would have been investigated. I believe that TPE have only just started to investigate this problem now, 4 years after becoming aware and I believe that is only because of my involvement in highlighting this very serious life threatening problem.
(PW 387). PW I point out that in recent control logs there are issues raised of train crew not reporting defects, why wasn`t the same charges of
“Gross Misconduct” levelled at
them?
(PW 389). PW I point out that in the repair slips I had with me, there would be many that have not been rang in to control. Therefore not following the same so called procedure I apparently didn`t follow.
(MA 390).MA says, “But your actions have decided to go down the same line as the others”. If my actions went down the same line as others, why weren`t the others given the same charges? Why? Because it was me.
(PW 391). PW I explain that I try to do something about it to make it
safer. I then mention my petition that was started and signed by a few drivers. It points out that they are as
guilty as me, because not one of them that signed the petition apart from
Driver Keith Walden and maybe one or two others would have reported anything.
(ST 392). ST sums up the events, but warns that if other failed to follow what TPE call the correct procedures for reporting defects then they must face the same charges, but we all know that will not happen, because the only issue on the mind of TPE was to get rid of Webb.
(ST 392). ST sums up the events, but warns that if other failed to follow what TPE call the correct procedures for reporting defects then they must face the same charges, but we all know that will not happen, because the only issue on the mind of TPE was to get rid of Webb.